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Whose Rules of Professional Conduct
Should Govern Lawyers in Federal
Court and How Should the Rules
Be Created?
Bruce A. Green*
At present, the rules of professional conduct applied in federal
judicial proceedings vary from district to district. In reaction to this
problem, the Judicial Conference of the United States is studying the
question of whether a uniform set of rules of professional conduct
should apply in federal judicial proceedings and, if so, what the na-
ture of the rules should be and how they should be developed. The
principal proposals under consideration are the adoption of a uni-
form set of federal rules based on the American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the adoption of a require-
ment that each federal district court apply the rules of the state in
which it sits.
This Article demonstrates the shortcomings of these two alterna-
tives and proposes a third: that the federal judiciary undertake
rulemaking to develop a single set of highly detailed rules of profes-
sional conduct. It argues that the two alternative proposals will re-
quire the application of rules that are, in many respects, vague or
ambiguous. The meaning of many of these rules would never be clar-
ified, because federal courts rarely have occasion to interpret rules of
professional conduct. As to the rules that federal courts would ad-
dress, inconsistencies would abound, because the courts could be ex-
pected to adopt varying interpretations. Further, the standards of
conduct adopted by interpreting open-textured disciplinary rules in
the course of adjudication would likely be less appropriate than stan-
dards adopted by judicial rulemaking, because individuals and orga-
nizations with relevant perspectives would be denied an opportunity
to present their views to the adjudicating court.
This Article sets its discussion of the relative merits of the various
alternatives in the context of the hotly debated question of whether
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law; Director, Stein Center for Ethics and
Public Interest Law; A.B. Princeton University, 1978; J.D. Columbia University, 1981.
My perspective on the question addressed in this Article has been enriched by my experi-
ence on various bar association committees concerned with issues of legal ethics, including cur-
rently as Chair of the Ethics and Professionalism Committee of the American Bar Association
Section of Litigation, as Vice Chair of the New York State Bar Association Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics, and as a member of the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. As will become evident to the reader, however,
the views expressed in this Article are my own, and almost certainly would not be shared by the
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lawyers may contact represented persons in criminal cases. First, ex-
amining a recent Department of Justice regulation addressing this
question, it argues that the administrative rulemaking process is infer-
ior to judicial lawmaking because of the institutional bias of the exec-
utive branch, but that rulemaking is otherwise a preferable means of
developing standards of professional conduct. Second, examining a
recent United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision
on criminal defense lawyers' communications with represented per-
sons, it demonstrates the shortcomings of adopting ambiguous Amer-
ican Bar Association model rules that must be interpreted in the
course of adjudication. Finally, it proposes and defends detailed
rulemaking by the federal judiciary as the preferable alternative.
Introduction
Lawyers refer to their profession as "self-regulating,"' but this term is
misleading2 as well as wishful.3 Although it is true that the American Bar
Association ("ABA") has taken the initiative to draft model rules of profes-
sional conduct,4 and state bar associations have built on or revised the ABA
1 See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, ...... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIc SER-
VIcE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONAUSM IV(D)(7) (1986);
Bryant G. Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement:
Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 639, 641; Irwin D. Miller, Prevent-
ing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 259,261 (1994); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799,
846 n.206 (1992) (citing COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DIscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, ABA
REPORT TO THa HOUSE OF DELEGATES iii (1991) [hereinafter McKAY REPORT]); see also Rob-
ert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1988) (asserting that
professional independence entails freedom from outside regulation).
2 See, e.g., Ippolito v. Florida, 824 F. Supp. 1562,1571 & n.23 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (preferring
the term "'judicial regulation' which means regulation by the court with the assistance of law-
yers," to "self-regulation [which connotes] regulation by lawyers with the assistance of the court"
(citing John F. Harkness, Judicial Independence Is at the Heart of Today's Lawyer Regulation,
FLA. BJ., May 1993, at 12)).
Some would argue that it is equally misleading to use the term "profession," rather than
"business," to describe law practice. I leave that debate to others. See, e.g., MARY A. GLENDON,
A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994); ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDE-
ALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SOL M. LINowrrz wrrH MARTIN MAYER, THE BE-
TRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTmT CENTURY (1994); John
Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1021 (1982); Nancy J.
Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 773; Russell G. Pearce, The
Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct
and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
3 See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv.
1389 (1992) (analyzing tension between organized bar and government agencies regarding the
professional obligations of lawyers).
4 See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 48-63 (1986) (describ-
ing the various versions of the model rules adopted by the ABA beginning in 1908); Stanley A.
Samad, Evolution of a Code of Lawyering The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 56 OIo
ST. B. ASS'N REP. 1692 (1983) (discussing the evolution of the rules of professional conduct over
the past 150 years); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989) (providing a political account
of the six-year process in which the ABA developed the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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rules, 5 the work product of bar associations does not have the independent
force of law.6 Only a government body pursuant to its lawmaking authority
can adopt legally enforceable rules to regulate lawyer conduct.
Traditionally, courts have been the principal lawmakers for lawyers.
Over the past quarter century, pursuant to their supervisory authority over
the legal profession, 7 courts have filled this role by promulgating and enforc-
5 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Gross, The Long Process of Change: The 1990 Amendments to the
New York Code of Professional Responsibility, 18 FoRDHAM UR. L.J. 283 (1990) (describing
the revisions to the New York Code of Professional Responsibility adopted in 1990); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1252 (1991) (noting state revisions
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct); John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable Is the
Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 497,501 n.11 (1979) (noting that the modi-
fied forms of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by states vary
greatly).
6 See, eg., Culebras Enters. Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F.2d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Absent
promulgation by means of a statute or a court rule, ethical provisions of the ABA or other
groups are not legally binding upon practitioners."); Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1032
(N.Y. 1990) ("we are not constrained to read the rules literally or effectuate the intent of the
drafters, but look to the rules as guidelines"); Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee: On
the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 485, 532-33 (1989) ("Neither the adoption
of the Code by the ABA nor its endorsement by the Connecticut Bar Association made it en-
forceable against an attorney .... ).
7 In the colonial era, responsibility for regulating lawyers was largely shared by colonial
courts and legislatures. See Bruce A. Green, "Lethal Fiction". The Meaning of "Counsel" in the
Sixth Amendment, 78 IowA L. Rav. 433, 465-68 (1993) (describing colonial and post-revolution-
ary licensing statutes). Since this nation's founding, however, the oversight of lawyers has been
predominantly a judicial function. Today, it is understood that federal courts and most state
courts supervise and discipline lawyers pursuant to inherent judicial authority "to admit, suspend
and disbar lawyers who practice within the jurisdiction of the court." Green, supra note 6, at
530-31 nn.161-62 (citing authority); see Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regula-
tion-The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LrirrL ROCK L.J. 1, 3-6 (1989-90);
see also Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEx.
L. REv. 1805 (1995) (discussing the "broad, inherent authority in state and federal trial courts to
exert a high degree of affirmative case management"); John Papachristos, Comment, Inherent
Power Found, Rule 11 Lost: Taking a Shortcut to Impose Sanctions in Chambers v. NASCO, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 1225 (1993) (analyzing "the Supreme Court's arguments in favor of a broad
inherent power"). Judicial regulation of lawyers' practice may also be premised on express
grants of authority by legislative or state constitutional provisions. For example, federal district
courts have authority to adopt local rules regulating lawyers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988),
FED. R. Cim. P. 57, and FED. R. Civ. P. 83. See Green, supra note 6, at 533 n.176.
Pursuant to this authority, courts may establish standards of conduct for lawyers either
through rulemaking or on an ad hoc basis in the course of adjudication. See e.g., Theard v.
United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (holding that disbarment by state court does not auto-
matically result in disbarment by federal court); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d
226, 240 (2d Cir.) ("It is well established that a district court, pursuant to its rulemaking author-
ity or on an ad hoc basis, may review a contingency fee agreement."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926
(1987); Jenkins v. McCoy, 882 F. Supp. 549, 553 (S.D.W. Va. 1995) (citing authority for the
proposition that "courts have an inherent authority to supervise the collection of attorney fees
and monitor contingent fee agreements").
For most of the past quarter century, the scope of the courts' inherent authority to regulate
lawyers was considered to be extremely expansive. To be sure, rules of conduct are subject to
the limits of constitutional provisions such as the First Amendment, see, eg., Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350 (1977), as well as express statutory limits, see, e.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975
F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992). Subject to that caveat, however, courts have assumed that they have
authority to impose upon lawyers virtually any standard of conduct that might plausibly be justi-
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ing sets of rules drafted by bar associations.8 Thus, in judicial proceedings
within a particular state, lawyers' conduct is typically governed by a set of
rules adopted by that state's judiciary based on a version of either the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("ABA Model Rules") 9 or the prede-
cessor ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("ABA Model
Code").' 0
In federal judicial proceedings, however, the regulation of lawyers has
been characterized by uncertainty and disharmony." The conduct of lawyers
in federal proceedings is governed by the rules of the federal, not state,
courts.12 The federal district courts, however, do not currently apply a uni-
form set of professional rules.' 3 Moreover, even rules that are substantially
identical have been interpreted in vastly different ways by courts of different
fled based on any of a variety of interests, including the need to protect clients and prospective
clients, the attorney-client relationship, the integrity of judicial proceedings, or the need to pro-
mote public respect for the courts or the legal profession. See, eg., Succession of Wallace, 574
So. 2d 348, 350 (La. 1991) ("This court has exclusive and plenary power to define and regulate all
facets of the practice of law, including the admission of attorneys to the bar, the professional
responsibility and conduct of lawyers, the discipline, suspension and disbarment of lawyers, and
the client-attorney relationship .... The sources of this power are this court's inherent judicial
power emanating from the constitutional separation of powers .... the traditional inherent and
essential function of attorneys as officers of the courts.... and this court's exclusive original
jurisdiction of attorney disciplinary proceedings.").
The most serious recent challenge to the scope of courts' supervisory authority over lawyers
has come from the United States Department of Justice, which promulgated a federal regulation
in August 1994 that is intended to govern prosecutors' communications with represented individ-
uals and, in so doing, to preempt inconsistent state and federal rules of professional conduct. See
Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. pt. 77 (1995); infra part I.
8 See e.g., 1 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3 (Feb. 23, 1994) (listing states
adopting rules based on ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
9 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (1983).
10 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrY (1970). The one exception is Califor-
nia, where the California Rules of Professional Conduct depart from both ABA models. See
WoLu'AM, supra note 4, at 64-65.
11 See e.g., Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1991) (criticizing inconsis-
tent standards in federal district courts resulting from application of state court rules of profes-
sional conduct).
12 See, eg., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985) ("The state code of professional
responsibility does not by its own terms apply to sanctions in the federal courts."); In re Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Federal courts may adopt state or ABA
rules as their ethical standards, but whether and how these rules are to be applied are questions
of federal law."), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993).
'3 See Daniel R. Coquillette, Report on Local Rules Regulating Attorney Conduct 3-4
(July 5, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coquillette Report]. Some district courts apply
the ABA Model Rules; some apply the earlier ABA Model Code; some apply the standards
applicable in the state in which the district court sits; some apply some combination of these; and
others have not explicitly adopted any set of rules. Id.; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum
Federal Practice: Ethics and Erie, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 89, 99-101 (1995) (discussing the
various model codes and rules of professional responsibility adopted by different federal district
courts); Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REv. 137,
152 (1994) (discussing the failure of some federal courts to distinguish the applicable ethics
code); Malcolm R. Wilkey, Proposal for a "United States Bar" 58 A.B.A. J. 355, 356 (1972)
(advocating the development of a "uniform nationwide criteria for the admission of attorneys to
practice before all United States district and appellate courts"); Harvey G. Sherzer, Note, Certi-
fication of Out-of-State Attorneys Before the Federal District Courts: A Plea for National Stan-
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federal districts.14 In response to a report prepared in July 1995 by Professor
Daniel Coquillette, 15 a Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States ("Judicial Conference") convened a meeting in January 1996 with offi-
cials of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and congressional staff members,
as well as representatives of the organized bar, to consider this problem.
That meeting took up questions of both institutional and procedural choice:
First, who should decide which rules of professional conduct to apply to law-
yers in federal court proceedings? And, second, by what process should the
rules be developed?
One possibility is for federal courts to continue to promulgate profes-
sional standards that are heavily dependent on the work product of the or-
ganized bar.16 Professor Coquillette proposes that greater uniformity in the
regulation of federal practitioners may nonetheless be achieved by either of
two routes. First, the federal judiciary might adopt the ABA Model Rules,
with or without modification, as the single set of rules applicable in federal
proceedings. 17 Second, each federal district court might instead apply the
rules applicable to practitioners in its state' 8-rules which are themselves
variants of one of the ABA models in all states but California. 19 Most com-
mentators favor one of these options.20
dards, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 204, 209 (1967) (recommending the unification of the many
district court rules).
14 See infra notes 327-328 and accompanying text.
15 Coquillette Report, supra note 13.
16 See id. at 38-41. Eli J. Richardson recently made a similar recommendation. See Rich-
ardson, supra note 13, at 184 ("Each federal court should identify in its local rules a single code
that governs attorneys' conduct in the court to the exclusion of all other codes.").
17 See Coquillette Report, supra note 13, at 38-39.
18 Id. at 39-41.
19 See supra note 10.
20 A committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York recently divided
almost equally between these two options. See Committee on Professional Responsibility, Uni-
form Ethics Rules in Federal Court: Jurisdictional Issues in Professional Regulation, 50 REc.
Ass'N B. Crry N.Y. 842, 842 (1995) [hereinafter Uniform Ethics Rules]. Nine members favored
a federal rule adopting the ABA Model Rules, while the other eight favored a choice-of-law rule
directing federal courts to apply specified state rules of ethics. Id.
In her recently published article, Linda S. Mullenix takes a similar approach to the question
of what ethical rules should apply in federal court. She begins by describing the federal courts'
application of inconsistent sets of ethical rules as well as, in some cases, their reliance on com-
mon law or procedural rules. See Mullinex, supra note 13, at 100-02. She perceives this
hodgepodge of authority to create difficulties for litigators in ascertaining what standard of pro-
fessional conduct to uphold in any given case. As an interim solution, she suggests a uniform
federal choice-of-law provision to guide the determination of which federal district's ethical rules
should apply when the potentially applicable rules are inconsistent. See id. at 127. For the long
term, she urges the federal judiciary to promulgate a uniform code of professional responsibility
for federal practitioners. See id. at 126. She does not, however, address the nature of such a
code.
By contrast, this Article does not agree that the existence of differently worded rules is the
root of the problem for litigators. Rather, this Article argues that federal litigators are poten-
tially subject to inconsistent standards of conduct largely because courts render inconsistent in-
terpretations of rules that are substantially similar, if not identical, in wording. See infra part II.
The adoption of a single set of federal rules will not go far toward establishing uniformity unless
those rules are more detailed and less ambiguous than the ABA-drafted rules on which courts
presently rely. A uniform set of ambiguous and open-textured rules would invite courts of dif-
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Federal Rules of Professional Conduct
An alternative to judicial regulation of federal practitioners is for an-
other branch of government,2 1 such as an executive agency through the ad-
ministrative rulemaking process,22 to establish detailed rules to govern some
ferent districts, and even different courts of the same district, to render inconsistent interpreta-
tions, as they presently do. See infra part II.B.2. Litigators would remain uncertain about what
conduct is expected of them. Thus, while taking as its starting point the need for federal rules of
ethics, this Article focuses on the nature of the rules that federal courts should adopt and the
process by which uniform rules should be developed. See infra part III.
21 Fred C. Zacharias has explored the possibilities of various federal legislative approaches
to regulating lawyers' professional conduct. See Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73
TEX. L. REv. 335, 379-86, 396-406 (1994). Although his proposals are principally directed at the
adoption of uniform standards to govern aspects of the professional conduct of both state and
federal practitioners, see id, at 379-87, 396-99, he briefly explores the possibility of a uniform
code applicable only in federal courts, see id. at 399-400. He is unenthusiastic about this option
because it does not address the principal concern of his article, namely, the disparity of profes-
sional standards among the states. Id. at 399-400.
Zacharias is one among several commentators who have addressed the inconsistency of
state court standards of practice and the question of whether federal rules of conduct should be
adopted to remedy this problem. See, ag., Samuel J. Brakel & Wallace D. Loh, Regulating the
Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REv. 699, 716-19 (1975); Stephen B. Burbank, State
Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FoRD-
HAM URB. L.J. 969, 969 (1992); Committee on Counsel Responsibility, Risks of Violation of
Rules of Professional Responsibility by Reason of the Increased Disparity Among the States, 45
Bus. LAW. 1229, 1235-36 (1990); Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics,
1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 959, 976-81; Duncan T. O'Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical
Obligations, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 678, 678-81 (1986); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline
in 2050: A Look Back, 60 FoRDHAm L REv. 125,127 (1991). This Article, in contrast, deals with
the more realistically solvable problem of inconsistent federal court standards.
22 Although federal agencies have not ordinarily attempted to regulate the practice of
non-agency lawyers before federal courts, they have exercised their authority to regulate the
practice of private lawyers in agency proceedings. See Coquillette Report, supra note 13, at 26
n.14 (citing inter alia, Securities and Exchange Commission, Canons of Ethics, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 200.50-.72 (1994); Patent and Trademark Office Code of Professional Responsibility, 37
C.F.R. §§ 10.20-.112 (1994); Immigration and Naturalization Service Regulations, 8 C.F.R.
§ 292.3 (1994); Internal Revenue Service Rules Applicable to Disciplinary Proceedings, 31
C.F.R. §§ (A) 10.50-.59 (1994)); see generally Arthur Best, Shortcomings of Administrative
Agency Lawyer Discipline, 31 EMORY L.J. 535 (1982) (describing the regulation of attorneys in
agency proceedings by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and Federal Commu-
nications Commission); Robert G. Heiserman & Linda K. Pacun, Professional Responsibility in
Immigration Practice and Government Service, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 971 (1985) (examining the
professional responsibility standards employed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to
regulate the conduct of practitioners); Note, SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys
Under Rule 2(e), 79 MtcH. L. REv. 1270 (1981) (discussing the authority of the SEC to discipline
attorneys under general rulemaking provisions).
In the past decade, the most controversial example of federal agency regulation of law prac-
tice was the proceeding brought against Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays, and Handler ("Kaye
Scholer") by the Office of Thrift Supervision. The case has occasioned a flurry of professional
and academic commentary. See, eg., Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye,
Scholer, The Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 985
(1993); Joyce A. Hughes, Law Firm Kaye Scholer, Lincoln S&L and the OTS, 7 NoTRE DAME
J.L. E'r1mcs & PUB. POL'Y 177 (1993); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count" Regulating
Lawyers After Kay4 Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145 (1993); Nancy A. Combs, Comment, Un-
derstanding Kaye Scholer: The Autonomous Citizen, the Managed Subject and the Role of the
Lawyer, 82 CAL. L. REv. 663 (1994); Charles R. Zubrzycki, Note, Current Developments, The
Kaye, Scholer Case: Attorneys' Ethical Duties to Third Parties in Regulatory Situations, 6 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETIcs 977 (1993).
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or all aspects of lawyers' conduct in federal proceedings. Prompted in part
by the inconsistent application of professional rules in federal court, the DOJ
did precisely that in August 1994, thereby becoming the first federal agency
to promulgate a detailed regulation explicitly preempting judicial standards
of conduct that would otherwise apply to a group of federal lawyers.23 Its
regulation applies to lawyers in the DOJ in the course of criminal or civil law
enforcement proceedings and addresses in particular their communications
with persons represented by counsel. By promulgating the regulation, the
lawyers in the DOJ asserted the authority to be "self-regulating" in the truest
sense. Pending federal legislation, intended to resolve questions about
whether the DOJ possessed the authority it asserted,24 may encourage the
DOJ to adopt preemptive rules governing other aspects of federal prosecu-
tors' professional conduct.25
In many ways, the Kaye Scholer case seemed to reprise the controversy two decades earlier
surrounding the SEC's attempts to police lawyers appearing before that agency. See, e.g., SEC v.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1973) (sanctioning lawyer who had negligently
prepared an erroneous opinion letter used to sell securities); SEC v. National Student Mktg.
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that a lawyer knowing of substantial misrepre-
sentations in proxy statement is liable for aiding and abetting securities fraud by closing merger).
See generally ABA Section of Corp., Banking and Business Law Ad Hoe Comm., SEC Standard
of Conduct for Lawyers: Comments on the SEC Rule Proposal, 37 Bus. LAW. 915 (1982) (an-
nouncing the response by the ABA to the SEC's proposed standards of professional conduct for
lawyers); David H. Barber, Lawyer Duties in Securities Transactions Under Rule 2(e): The Carter
Opinions, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 513, 514 (assessing "the current status of administrative actions
brought by the SEC against lawyers pursuant to Rule 2(e) ... in an attempt to identify the duties
of securities lawyers under that section"); Robert A. Downing & Richard L. Miller, Jr. The
Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NoTrE DAME LAW. 774 (1979) (discussing the existence
and scope of the SEC's statutory authority to regulate the professionals practicing before it);
Junius Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-the Lawyer's Dilemma,
33 Bus. LAW. 1389 (1978); Steven C. Krane, The Attorney Unshackled- SEC Rule 2(e) Violates
Client's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 57 NoTRE DAME LAW. 50 (1981) (discussing the
SEC's regulation of the securities bar).
23 See Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910 (1994) (to be codi-
fied at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77) (proposed Aug. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Communications with Represented
Persons (Final Rule)]; infra part II.
24 See S. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1995) ("Notwithstanding the ethical rules or the
rules of the court of any State, Federal rules of conduct adopted by the Attorney General shall
govern the conduct of prosecutions in the courts of the United States."); Coquillette Report,
supra note 13, at 36-38.
25 The DOJ has taken issue with two other provisions of the ABA Model Rules. The first,
Model Rule 3.8(f) of the ABA Model Rules, limits the circumstances under which a prosecutor
may issue a grand jury subpoena to a lawyer in order to obtain testimony about the lawyer's
client. In 1986, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts adopted a
similar restriction, which the government challenged unsuccessfully. See United States v.
Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117, 117 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 832 F.2d 664
(1st Cir. 1987) (en bane). Following the ABA's amendment of the Model Rules to include
Model Rule 3.8(f), the government opposed the adoption of this provision by other federal dis-
trict courts with relative success. Compare Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1087 (R.I. 1992)
(rejecting United States Attorney's request to exempt federal prosecutors licensed in the state
from the provision requiring prior judicial approval for attorney subpoenas) with Baylson v.
Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the rule may not be enforced
against federal prosecutors in Pennsylvania). See generally Roger C. Cranton & Lisa K. Udell,
State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Sub-
poena Rules, 53 U. Prr. L. Rav. 291, 359-86 (1992) (discussing "the controversy arising out of
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This Article argues that both alternatives have benefits but are ulti-
mately unsatisfactory.26 The administrative rulemaking process has the ad-
vantage of allowing the most complete elicitation and consideration of
factors that ought to go into the choice of a particular standard of conduct.27
Further, it allows the development of rules that are both more certain and
better tailored to particular aspects of professional conduct than the bar asso-
ciation rules of general applicability32 Despite these advantages, lawmaking
by a branch of government other than the federal judiciary is the wrong insti-
tutional choice. Executive agencies lack objectivity because rules of profes-
sional conduct invariably implicate the government's interest as a party to
federal litigation.29 Administrative regulations will therefore overvalue the
interests of the government as a litigant. There is, thus, substantial wisdom to
the tradition of disinterested judicial regulation of the bar.
Although judicial responsibility for the regulation of lawyers avoids the
problem of subjective lawmaking, and is thus a more appropriate institutional
choice, the federal judiciary's wholesale adoption of one or more sets of pro-
fessional rules drafted by a bar association is deficient from a procedural per-
spective. Unlike the detailed rules promulgated by the DOJ to govern a
discrete area of conduct for a particular set of federal lawyers, the bar associ-
ation rules are extremely imprecise.30 Adopting a bar association model sim-
ply defers judicial lawmaking to adjudication, where concrete questions of
lawyer conduct will finally be resolved in individual cases with guidance from
vague or ambiguous rules. Such cases arise sporadically with the result that
the appropriate standard of conduct may never be determined authorita-
the increased use of subpoenas to lawyers"); David A. Hoffman et al., Attorney Subpoenas and
Massachusetts Rule PF 15, 74 MAss. L. REv. 95, 96-97 (1989) (identifying "the problem the
attorney subpoena poses for the attorney-client relationship"); Max D. Stem & David Hoffman,
Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1783, 1795-815 (1988) (discussing the judicial response to the increased use of attorney
subpoenas); Robert N. Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal for Re-
form, 23 AM. CRrM. L. REv. 95, 125-33 (1985) (proposing administrative action to protect the
attorney-client relationship modeled after the regulations promulgated by the DOJ for subpoe-
nas to journalists); Patricia A. Mellon, Comment, Attorneys' Subpoenas: The Constitutional, Eth-
ical and Practical Issues, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 121 (1987) (concluding that "the threat attorneys'
subpoenas pose to the attorney-client relationship mandates some restraint on the use of such
subpoenas").
To a lesser extent, the DOJ has resisted application of ABA Model Rule 3.3(d), which
requires lawyers in ex parte proceedings to inform the tribunal of "all material facts known to
the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts
are adverse." According to the accompanying commentary, this rule would apply in grand jury
proceedings. It would therefore seem to require prosecutors, as an ethical matter, to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury when seeking an indictment. In December 1993, the
DOJ filed a civil lawsuit in Colorado, in part seeking to enjoin the application of that state's
version of this rule. See United States v. Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Comm., 871 F.
Supp. 1328, 1328 (D. Colo. 1994). The DOJ's legal challenge was subsequently dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 1330.
26 See infra parts I.C, I.B.
27 See infra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
28 See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
29 See infra part I.C.2.
30 See infra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
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tively. Moreover, because judicial decisionmaking in adjudication lacks the
openness and deliberateness that is characteristic of rulemaking, rulings con-
cerning lawyer conduct are unlikely to be fully considered and, consequently,
unlikely to command respect within the legal profession.31
This Article explores the relative merits of these institutional and proce-
dural choices in the context of the problem that has occasioned much of the
recent debate about the regulation of federal practitioners: the question of
whether lawyers or their investigators may directly contact represented per-
sons in federal criminal cases. To illustrate the shortcomings of agency
rulemaking, Part I examines the recent DOJ regulation governing federal
prosecutors' communications with represented persons. To show what is
wrong with the federal courts' adoption and interpretation of bar association
rules, Part II examines a recent decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit") dealing with criminal defense
lawyers' communications with represented persons.
Finally, Part III of this Article proposes a third alternative that was
presented to the Judicial Conference just prior to its January 1996 meeting:32
The federal judiciary should independently develop and promulgate specific
and detailed rules of professional conduct for lawyers in federal court pro-
31 See infra part II.B.1.
32 On December 1, 1995, Professor Coquillette presented a second report to the Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Study of Recent Federal
Cases (1990-1995) Involving Rules of Attorney Conduct 1 (Dec. 1, 1995) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Coquillette Study]. It reported the results of a study of published federal court
decisions addressing the rules governing attorney conduct over a five-year period. See i. at 2-5.
Professor Coquillette found that 46% of the disputes involving attorney conduct concerned con-
flict-of-interest rules, and that the remaining cases generally addressed only a handful of ethical
rules, including principally the rules against communicating with represented parties, the advo-
cate-witness disqualification rules, and rules dealing with attorneys' fees. See id. at 3-4. Sixteen
categories of ethical rules were never once addressed in decisions published during the five-year
period, and many other categories were rarely addressed. Id. at 4-5. Based on his study, Profes-
sor Coquillette presented an option that had not been included in his initial report: "adopting
uniform national federal rules for attorney conduct only in certain key areas, and then stipulat-
ing that all other cases be governed by state standards." Id. at 5.
Additionally, Professor Coquillette's report appended an earlier draft of this Article, see id.
app. IV, and briefly described and discussed its proposal. See id. at 5-6. The study notes that,
consistent with the proposal made in this Article, the Judicial Conference might adopt an in-
dependent set of detailed rules "in limited, narrow areas-rather than 'across the board.'" Id.
at 6. In response to this Article's advocacy of a more comprehensive set of rules, however, the
Coquillette Study notes that "[w]hether this would be seen as a benefit to the hundreds of
thousands of American lawyers and law students who have had to learn at least two other model
systems, is open to debate." Id. at 6 n*. This implicit criticism is taken up later in this Article.
See infra part III.F.
At the same time, Professor Coquillette notes, perhaps half-seriously, that "if this Commit-
tee recommends the entirely new federal 'rules of conduct for lawyers' proposed by Professor
Green, this Reporter would eagerly seize his place in history by creating an entirely new draft
code." Coquillette Study, supra, at 6 n*. The observation may overlook the process this Article
proposes for developing federal rules of ethics-a process that certainly would make it difficult
for any individual to claim credit for the final product. See infra part III.A. Coquillette's eager-
ness to carry the laboring oar also suggests, however, both that developing a new set of ethics
rules would be far less laborious than some might fear and that at least one of the leading au-
thorities on legal ethics would enthusiastically participate in the project.
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ceedings.3 3 Although judicial rulemaking has proven successful in establish-
ing federal rules of procedure and evidence,34 federal courts and others can
be expected to resist taking this route2 5 This Article demonstrates, however,
that only by independently developing detailed rules can the federal judiciary
establish standards of conduct for federal practitioners that are appropriate,
clear, and uniform. Although the process would be burdensome in the short
run, in the long run it would preserve resources that would otherwise be de-
voted to interpreting unclear rules in adjudication. In sum, federal court
rulemaking would retain the virtues but avoid the shortcomings of both exec-
utive branch rulemaking and the judicial adoption of bar association
standards.
I. Executive Agency Rulemaking: The Problem of Subjectivity
Lawyers in the DOJ are in a sense an exception to the general rule that
lawyers cannot regulate themselves. DOJ has authority to promulgate regu-
lations governing the conduct of its employees, including those who are law-
yers. 36 For the most part, however, DOJ exercises this authority interstitially.
Thus, it has directed its lawyers to "be guided in their conduct" by the ABA
Model Code,37 while adopting independent standards of conduct for govern-
ment lawyers, some promulgated as federal regulations38 and others included
as guidelines in the Department of Justice Manual,39 to supplement both the
profession's standards and, insofar as they differ, the standards adopted by
federal courts.
DOJ's extraordinary decision in August 1994 to preempt judicial stan-
dards of conduct by promulgating a regulation governing its lawyers' commu-
nications with represented persons4° was the product of more than a decade
of frustration with the applicable rules of professional conduct and the man-
ner in which courts enforced them. This Part argues that the regulation ap-
33 As Professor Coquillette notes, uniform rules could be adopted pursuant to either a
special act of Congress or the existing Rules Enabling Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994). Co-
quillette Report, supra note 13, at 38.
34 See, eg., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2237 (1989) (concluding that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are "a major triumph of law reform"); Peter G. McCabe, Re-
newal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1655, 1656 (1995) (citing authority
describing the success of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
35 See infra notes 285-288 and accompanying text.
36 See 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
37 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1 (1989) ("[A]ttoreys employed by the Department [of Justice]
should be guided in their conduct by the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association."). This provision was not updated following the ABA's adoption of the Model
Rules in 1983.
38 See eg., 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1989) (restricting communications with news media in pend-
ing cases); 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1989) (restricting issuance of subpoenas to members of the news
media).
39 See, e.g., DEPAR-MENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-2.161(a) (Supp. 1993) (regulating issu-
ance of grand jury subpoenas to lawyers); id. § 9-7.302 (regulating monitoring of oral and wire
communications); id. § 9-2.142 (regulating dual and successive prosecutions in state and federal
court); id. § 9-11.153 (requiring warnings to grand jury witnesses).
40 See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. pt. 77 (1995).
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propriately addresses DOJ's concerns except in one significant respect. The
process that led to the final regulation provided an opportunity for relevant
interests and considerations to be aired fully. Because the regulation is both
detailed and applicable in all federal districts, the uncertainties previously
faced by DOJ lawyers have been greatly reduced. But, because of the subjec-
tivity of the ultimate decisionmaker-DOJ itself-one cannot have any de-
gree of confidence that, in the end, the regulation sets forth an appropriate
standard of conduct for government lawyers.
Part I.A briefly describes the events leading up to the decision to pro-
mulgate this regulation. Part I.B describes the rulemaking process and its
final product. Part I.C examines the virtues, and the one profound shortcom-
ing, of this process.
A. Background: Federal Prosecutors and the No-Contact Rule
1. The No-Contact Rule in Criminal Prosecutions
In 1970, the ABA adopted the Model Code, which served as the model
for sets of professional rules adopted within virtually every state over the
ensuing few years. Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-104(A)(1) of the Model
Code provided that:
[d]uring the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall
not: [c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the sub-
ject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented
by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such party or is authorized by law to do so.41
This "no-contact rule," which has been said to protect clients from overreach-
ing on the part of opposing counsel 42 as well as to ensure clients the effective
assistance of counsel,43 later became the basis of Model Rule 4.2 of the ABA
41 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1970). This rule was based
on Canon 9 of the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics which provided in pertinent part:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should deal only with his counsel." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHmcs Canon 9
(1908). This provision in turn derived from a century-old principle. See generally John Leub-
sdorf, Communicating with Another Lawyer's Client: The Lawyer's Veto and the Client's Interests,
127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 684-85 (1979) (discussing the origins of DR 7-104).
42 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,211 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) ("Lawyers
are forbidden to interview the opposing party because of the supposed imbalance of legal skill
and acumen between the lawyer and the party litigant .... "); In re Atwell, 115 S.W.2d 527, 528
(Mo. Ct. App. 1938) ("The rule is to prohibit lawyers from taking advantage of litigants who are
represented by counsel.").
43 See Bruce A. Green, A Prosecutor's Communications with Represented Suspects and
Defendants: What Are the Limits?, 24 CRrM. L. BULL 283, 285 & n.7 (1988); see also United
States v. Batchelor, 484 F. Supp. 812, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that the rule "insur[es] that
laypersons not make decisions of major legal implication without the advice of counsel");
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmiLrrY EC 7-18 ("The legal system in its broadest
sense functions best when persons in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their
own counsel. For this reason a lawyer should not communicate on the subject matter of the
representation of his client with a person he knows to be represented in the matter by a lawyer
.... "); Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 71:302 (June 22, 1988) ("The purpose of the
restriction on communications with parties represented by counsel is to preserve the integrity of
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Model Rules,44 which superseded the Model Code in 1983. Every state cur-
rently has a rule based on or equivalent to DR 7-104(A)(1) and Model Rule
4.2.45 Consequently, federal district courts apply the no-contact rule to law-
yers in federal court proceedings pursuant to their local rules of court that
incorporate by reference state rules of professional conduct, bar association
rules, or both.46
The no-contact rule potentially forecloses prosecutors from gathering
evidence through otherwise lawful means. Constitutional decisions dealing
with criminal investigations allow prosecutors and their agents substantial
leeway to question individuals to obtain confessions or leads for use against
others. Generally speaking, these decisions impose no greater restrictions on
the prosecution when dealing with represented suspects and defendants than
when dealing with unrepresented ones.47 For example, under Supreme Court
decisions, the prosecution may employ undercover investigators or infor-
mants to obtain statements from an individual who has not yet been formally
charged, regardless of whether that individual has retained a lawyer in con-•
nection with the investigation.48 Moreover, prosecutors or their investigators
may question both represented and unrepresented defendants concerning
crimes other than those for which they have formally been charged.49 In-
deed, they may question represented defendants concerning pending charges,
as long as these defendants first waive their right to counsel.50
By the mid-1970s, criminal defense lawyers began to perceive the no-
contact rule to be a possible source of restrictions on prosecutors and their
agents beyond those already imposed by constitutional decisions dealing with
police interrogation.51 This raised two problems for prosecutors. The first
was that courts might suppress incriminating statements made by defendants,
although otherwise admissible, on the ground that they had been obtained in
violation of the ethical rule. The second was that disciplinary authorities
might sanction prosecutors personally for violating the rule.
Although the no-contact rule undoubtedly originated with civil cases in
mind,52 most prosecutors initially accepted that the rule applied in criminal
the lawyer-client relationship by protecting the represented party from the superior knowledge
and skill of the opposing lawyer.").
44 As amended in August 1995, Model Rule 4.2 provides: "In representing a client, a law-
yer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of
the other lawyer or is authorized bylaw to do so." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT
Rule 4.2 (1995).
45 See STEPHEN GILLERs & Roy D. SIMoN, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS 270-72 (1996) (identifying selected state variations of Model Rule 4.2).
46 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
47 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
48 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964).
49 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
50 See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 300 (1988).
51 See, eg., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941,954-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 989 (1974); State v. Yatman, 320 So. 2d 401, 402-03 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); State v.
Cotton, 341 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1976); State v. Gilcrist, 531 P.2d 814, 816-17 (Wash. Ct. App.
1975); State v. Britton, 203 S.E.2d 462, 466-67 (W. Va. 1974).
52 See Green, supra note 43, at 285 & n.8.
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cases. In the very least, the rule foreclosed various measures that were, in
any event, forbidden by constitutional decisions. For example, prosecutors
could not communicate directly with indicted defendants for purposes of ob-
taining admissions about pending charges or negotiating a plea. By virtue of
the no-contact rule, a prosecutor who did so would be subject to professional
discipline.
It was uncertain, however, whether and to what extent the rule imposed
independent restrictions. Did the no-contact rule apply at all to criminal
prosecutors who acted within constitutional and statutory limits, or were
their communications "authorized by law" because they were consistent with
the prosecutors' legal mandate to investigate and prosecute crimes? Assum-
ing the rule applied to prosecutors, did it apply to criminal investigators, who,
even when acting under prosecutors' supervision, had an independent man-
date to investigate criminal conduct? If the rule applied to investigators as
well as government lawyers, did it apply before the filing of criminal charges
when, at least as a formal matter, an individual was not a "party" to criminal
proceedings? The no-contact rule was sufficiently ambiguous that prosecu-
tors could not predict with certainty how courts would answer these
questions. 53
By 1980, although the no-contact rule had rarely been invoked in federal
cases, the DOJ began to see it as a cause of concern.54 One problem
presented by the rule was that federal courts might employ it to restrict
otherwise lawful investigative measures. Another was that different federal
courts might interpret the rule differently, so that a federal prosecutor li-
censed in one state but practicing in another would face uncertainty about
which interpretation was controlling.
2. Litigating the Lines
When the no-contact rule was initially invoked, the DOJ responded by
arguing that its prosecutors' conduct fell within the lines. Unlike some of
their state court counterparts, federal prosecutors were enormously success-
ful in making this argument. Federal courts almost invariably rejected de-
fendants' claims that a federal prosecutor, acting either directly or through
investigative agents, violated the no-contact rule by communicating with rep-
resented persons.55
53 For commentary addressing these interpretive issues and related issues concerning the
no-contact rule's application to prosecutors, see Committee on Criminal Law, Establishing Ethi-
cal Standards for Federal Prosecutors and Defense Lawyers, 49 R-c. Ass'N B. Crry N.Y. 21, 32-
35 (1994) [hereinafter Establishing Ethical Standards]; Cramton & Udell, supra note 25; Green,
supra note 43; F. Dennis Saylor & J. Douglas Wilson, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: The
Application of Model Rule 4.2 to Federal Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 459 (1992); William J.
Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REv. 1903 (1993); H. Richard
Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules
of Access and Restraint, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 1137 (1987); Neals-Erik Delker, Comment, Ethics
and the Federal Prosecutor: The Continuing Conflict over the Application of Model Rule 4.2 to
Federal Attorneys, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 855 (1995).
54 See Ethical Restraints of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility on Fed. Criminal
Investigations, 4 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 576 (1980).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739-40 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
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A testament to the vigor of the federal government's advocacy is United
States v. Hammad.5 6 In that case, the Second Circuit initially invoked the
ethical rule to restrict prosecutors and their agents from communicating with
represented suspects during the course of an investigation 5 7 The court re-
vised its opinion, however, in response to the government's petition for re-
hearing, and provided that as long as legitimate investigative techniques were
used, direct communications with represented suspects would generally be
permissible.5 8 While finding that the investigative technique employed in
that case-the use of a sham grand jury subpoena-was in fact illegitimate,
the court nevertheless declined to suppress statements thereby obtained from
the defendant.59
Thus, federal courts rarely invoked DR 7-104, and only when other im-
proper conduct was coupled with the prosecution's ex parte contact.6 More-
over, while state prosecutors were occasionally disciplined for violating the
ethical rule,61 federal prosecutors apparently were not.62 Nonetheless, the
mere prospect that evidence might be suppressed or, even worse, that federal
prosecutors might be sanctioned personally for violating the no-contact rule
remained chilling.
3. Challenging the Rule
In 1989, the DOJ shifted from arguing with the judges about where the
ethical lines were drawn to asserting that prosecutors had no obligation to
play within the lines drawn by the courts. In June of that year, then-Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh issued what came to be known as the "Thorn-
burgh Memorandum." The memorandum stated baldly "that contact with a
represented individual in the course of authorized law enforcement activity
does not violate" the no-contact rule.63 Further, it announced that the DOJ
would rely on the Constitution's Supremacy Clause to resist attempts to ap-
ply the no-contact rule to federal prosecutors." It reasoned:
855 (1990); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Partin, 601
F.2d 1000, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980).
56 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
57 United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), modified, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
58 See Hammad, 858 F.2d at 839. No decision since Hammad has found that the no-con-
tact rule was violated because the government employed an improper investigative technique.
As one district judge recently observed, "[i]n practice.... the broad exceptions to the rule noted
in Hammad may operate to swallow the Rule itself except in perhaps the most egregious in-
stances of misconduct." United States v. Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
59 See Hammad, 858 F.2d at 842.
60 See id. at 839; United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (prose-
cutor misled federal magistrate in seeking authorization to speak with represented defendant),
vacated, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
61 See, e.g., In re Brey, 490 N.W.2d 15 (Wis. 1992).
62 Disciplinary proceedings were brought against federal prosecutors on rare occasion,
however. See United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kolibash v. Committee on
Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1989); In re John Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992).
63 Memorandum from Dick Thornburgh, United States Attorney General, to United
States Attorneys 9 (June 8, 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum].
64 Id.
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[A]lthough the states have the authority to regulate the ethical con-
duct of attorneys admitted to practice before their courts.... that
authority permits regulation of federal attorneys only if the regula-
tion does not conflict with the federal law or with the attorneys'
federal responsibilities.
Notwithstanding the state of the law, the defense bar has con-
tinued to press its position that DR 7-104 does in fact limit the uni-
verse of appropriate federal investigative techniques.65
Thus, as conceptualized by the Thornburgh Memorandum, DR 7-104(A)(1)
constituted state law that could not be applied to federal prosecutors insofar
as doing so would conflict with the DOJ's law enforcement objectives. The
memorandum was immediately and forcefully criticized by members of the
private bar and by academics, 66 some of whom saw it as an expression of the
position that prosecutors may generally adhere to lower standards of ethics
than other practitioners. 67
The Thornburgh Memorandum potentially affected federal prosecutors
in various ways. To those cautious prosecutors who sought to stay within the
sometimes ill-defined lines drawn by the courts interpreting the no-contact
rule,68 the memorandum provided some comfort that if they inadvertently
65 Id. at 3.
66 See, e.g., Jerry E. Norton, Ethics and the Attorney General, 74 JUDICATRE 203, 207
(1991); ABA Adds Two Model Rules on Subpoenas, Practice Sales, 6 Laws. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) 25, 27 (Feb. 28, 1990) (opposing "any attempt by the Department of Justice
unilaterally to exempt its lawyers from the professional conduct rules that apply to all lawyers
under applicable rules of the jurisdictions in which they practice.").
67 See, e.g., Norton, supra note 66, at 207 (asserting that the Thornburgh Memorandum
portends "that state codes of professional conduct will simply not apply to attorneys who have as
their client the federal government"); William Glaberson, Thornburgh Policy Leads to a Sharp
Ethics Battle, N.Y. TIMEs, March 1, 1991, at B4 (reporting that defense lawyers perceived "that
the department was using the memorandum to give prosecutors a wink of ecouragement [sic] to
ignore the rules of ethics when the rules got in the way of obtaining a conviction"); Tom Watson,
AG Decrees Prosecutors May Bypass Counsel, LEGAL TiMEs, Sept. 25, 1989, at 1, 29 (reporting
that Neil Sonnett, President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, described
the memorandum as "a green light to ignore the Code of Professional Responsibility"); see also
Cramton & Udell, supra note 25, at 321-22 (describing private bar's objections to Thornburgh
Memorandum).
68 In the Second Circuit, for example, decisions stated that the rule applied both "to gov-
erument attorneys... [and] to non-attorney government law enforcement officers when they act
as the alter ego of government prosecutors," United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 645 (2d Cir.
1983) (citations omitted); that the rule generally applied to criminal investigations, United States
v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990); that the rule
excepts communications that are "authorized by law," which includes "legitimate investigative
techniques in conducting or supervising criminal investigations," id. at 839; and that "the use of
informants to gather evidence against a suspect" prior to indictment "will frequently fall within
the ambit of such authorization." Id.
These pronouncements left open a variety of questions. For example, when is a federal
investigator an "alter ego" of the prosecutor? Are post-arrest and post-indictment investigative
techniques also within the "authorized by law" exception? Which investigative techniques are
illegitimate? When is the use of informants outside the "authorized by law" exception? See
Establishing Ethical Standards, supra note 53, at 34 ("Lacking a 'bright-line' rule, defense law-
yers and courts have focused on various aspects of the Hammad opinion in challenging and
evaluating the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct." (discussing United States v. Santopiero,
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strayed, they would be fully supported by the DO] at its highest level. It may
also have emboldened more adventurous prosecutors to test the lines where
they were uncertain or even to ignore the lines drawn by the courts with
regard to ex parte- contacts with represented individuals.69
The Thornburgh Memorandum also added another legal weapon to fed-
eral prosecutors' arsenal in cases in which courts or disciplinary bodies were
called on to consider whether prosecutors had overstepped the bounds of the
no-contact rule.70 It allowed prosecutors to argue that, by virtue of the au-
thority of the Attorney General, federal prosecutors no longer were legally
obligated to play within the lines, and that state disciplinary bodies and fed-
eral courts had no constitutional authority to make federal prosecutors do so.
In this respect, however, the Thornburgh Memorandum may have backfired,
hoisting the DOJ on its own petard.71 This is true for several reasons.
To begin with, the Thornburgh Memorandum was deliberately con-
frontational. It posed a challenge to the constitutional authority of courts to
regulate federal prosecutors. Courts did not take this challenge lightly. For
example, a federal district court in New Mexico, in rejecting a prosecutor's
challenge to a state disciplinary proceeding predicated on an alleged viola-
tion of DR 7-104, stated:
[T]he Government threatens the integrity of our tripartite structure
by arguing [that] its lawyers, in the course of enforcing the laws reg-
ulating public conduct, may disregard the laws regulating their own
conduct.... [T]he insolence with which the Government promotes
this as official policy irresponsibly compromises the very trust which
empowers it to act.72
This district court judge's displeasure with the Thornburgh Memorandum
was surely shared, if not necessarily expressed, by many other federal judges.
At the same time that the Thornburgh Memorandum waved a red flag in
front of the courts, it did little to advance a constitutional challenge to judi-
cial authority. The Thornburgh Memorandum was just that-a memoran-
dum. It did not have the force of law. So, while the DOJ had constitutional
arguments to make, it could not effectively make the best argument: that the
no-contact rule was "trumped" by federal law that explicitly authorized pros-
ecutors' communications with represented individuals.73
809 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Conn. 1992) and United States v. Buda, 718 F. Supp. 1094 (W.D.N.Y.
1989))).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609,615 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) (Parker, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Scozzafava, 833 F. Supp. 203,208 (W.D.N.Y.
1993), aff'd, 60 F.3d 810 (2d Cir. 1995).
70 Se e.g., United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 968-69 (D.D.C. 1993), aff'd, 54 F.3d
825 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1445-50 (N.D. Cal. 1991), va-
cated, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Abreu, 747
F. Supp. 493, 500 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
71 The petard was a medieval weapon which, by the use of explosives, was designed to
blast open the heavy doors of an enemy's fortress, but which had an unfortunate tendency to
misfire, causing its engineer, in Shakespeare's phrase, to be "hoist with his own petar." WILL Am
SrAKuSPEAR, HAMLET act 3, sc. 4, line 208 (TJ.B. Spencer ed., 1980).
72 In re John Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D.N.M. 1992).
73 Cf. United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117, 125-26 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding that
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Indeed, the legal position reflected in the memorandum seemed to be-
tray a misunderstanding of the constitutional question raised by the DOJ's
challenge to the no-contact rule. Because federal courts had adopted the no-
contact rule, this was not primarily a Supremacy Clause question,74 but a sep-
aration-of-powers question.75 The question was not, in other words, whether
states could regulate federal prosecutors through the application of ethical
rules, but whether federal courts could do so.76 Until the Thornburgh Memo-
randum, the authority of federal courts to regulate federal prosecutors as
lawyers had never seriously been questioned. If the challenge were to be
raised, it would ultimately be resolved by the federal judges whose traditional
authority to regulate the bar was called into question. As far as one could
tell from its public pronouncements, the DOJ under Attorney General
Thornburgh clearly had not considered the difficulty it would face if it sought
to rely on the Thornburgh Memorandum as a source of authority for ignoring
the no-contact rule as it was applied by federal courts.
While providing no support for the new constitutional argument, the
Thornburgh Memorandum undercut the DOJ's ability to make the old argu-
ment in favor of a narrow interpretation of the no-contact rule. Before the
memorandum was issued, when prosecutors or their agents communicated
with represented individuals, courts interpreting this rule were inclined to
credit the federal prosecutors' arguments that they had acted in accordance
with important law enforcement needs and that the disciplinary rule should
be interpreted to accommodate such needs.77 Moreover, courts would have
state authority to regulate the legal profession by enforcing its rules of professional conduct
extends to the regulation of federal prosecutors, except insofar as state rules actually conflict
with federal law), aff'd, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir.), aff'd on reh'g, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987).
74 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 25, at 354 ("[B]ecause many federal courts adopt state
ethics rules as local court rules, giving them the force of federal law, the Supremacy Clause is not
greatly implicated in these conflicts.").
75 See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1365 (1st Cir. 1995); Cram-
ton & Udell, supra note 25, at 297, 384-86 (addressing separation-of-powers issue in context of
federal court rule restricting prosecutors from issuing subpoenas to lawyers).
The DOJ continues to mischaracterize the issue of regulation of federal prosecutors princi-
pally as a question of the applicability of state rules of professional conduct. Thus, in defending
proposed federal legislation that would explicitly authorize the DOJ to adopt preemptive rules
governing its lawyers' conduct, the Deputy Attorney General recently argued: "The attorney
general cannot permit an individual state court rule to override the ethical and law enforcement
responsibilities of a prosecutor acting under the authority of the federal government to enforce
federal law." Jamie S. Gorelick, Within the Law, WASH. PosT, May 21, 1995, at C7.
76 An ancillary question was whether state disciplinary authorities had authority to sanc-
tion federal prosecutors licensed by the state for violating DR 7-104 as applied and interpreted
by the federal district court in which the prosecutor practiced. Until now, courts have found that
state authorities may discipline federal government lawyers for misconduct in federal court pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 1989)
(ruling that state bar disciplinary proceeding may be removed to federal court); Waters v. Barr,
747 P.2d 900, 902 (Nev. 1987) (holding that state supreme court had authority to discipline Assis-
tant United States Attorneys).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that use
of informant to talk with defendant after he retained counsel but before he was formally charged
did not violate his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel or the ABA Model Rules);
United States v. Guerrerio, 675 F. Supp. 1430,1436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that prosecuting
attorney's alleged violation of rule prohibiting direct communication by an attorney with party
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been inclined to find that, even where federal prosecutors had overstepped,
they had done so in a good-faith effort to comply with an ambiguous discipli-
nary rule. After the Thornburgh Memorandum, and particularly in cases in
which the federal prosecutor cited the memorandum to justify his or her con-
duct, courts were unlikely to assume the best.78
B. Redrawing the Lines: The New DOJ Regulation
1. The Rulemaking Process
In the face of the disaster that was the Thornburgh Memorandum-a
disaster both from a public relations and a legal perspective-the DOJ em-
barked on a new, more sophisticated, and more promising approach. Where
previously it had argued that it was entitled to play outside the ethical lines
drawn by the courts, the DOJ now sought to redraw the lines.
The DOJ began in November 1992 with the proposal of a federal regula-
tion79 to be issued pursuant to the Attorney General's statutory authority to
prescribe regulations governing the conduct of the DOJ's employees, the
conduct of litigation, and the like.80 The proposed regulation was intended to
supplant Model Rule 4.2, DR 7-104, and equivalent no-contact rules adopted
and applied by state and federal courts.8' The regulation was not justified,
however, as a device for circumventing these ethical restraints, but rather, as
a means of resolving "uncertainty and confusion arising from the variety of
interpretations of state and local Federal court rules" by "impos[ing] a com-
he knows to be represented by counsel did not mandate suppression of suspect's recorded
statement).
78 For example, in United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 989
F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), the defendant initiated communica-
tions with the prosecution, whereupon the Assistant United States Attorney obtained a federal
magistrate's permission to speak with the defendant in defense counsel's absence. Rather than
simply defending his conduct on the ground that it comported with DR 7-104, the prosecutor
invoked the Thornburgh Memorandum as a principal justification. The district court excoriated
him for doing so, characterizing the memorandum as "nothing less than a frontal assault on the
legitimate powers of the court." ld. at 1461. Moreover, the court construed the prosecutor's
conduct in seeking the magistrate's permission far more harshly than it need have done, finding,
on the basis of a fairly ambiguous record, that the prosecutor had misled the magistrate about
why the defendant was disinclined to include the defense attorney in discussions with the prose-
cutor. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially determined
that this finding of fact was not clearly erroneous, United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1040
(9th Cir.), amended, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), although it reversed the district court's order
dismissing the indictment, concluding that the remedy was inappropriate. Id. at 1042. At the
government's urging, the court of appeals subsequently revised its opinion to observe that,
although the magistrate judge apparently did not have a full understanding of the facts surround-
ing Lopez's request, the district court's "finding that [the prosecutor] materially misled the mag-
istrate judge ... is not sustainable without resolving certain conflicts in the testimony ... as to
what [the prosecutor] knew and when he knew it." 4 F.3d at 1462.
79 Communications with Represented Persons, 57 Fed. Reg. 54,737 (1992) (to be codified
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77) (proposed Nov. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Communications with Represented
Persons (1992)].
80 See id. at 54,741.
81 See id. at 54,740-41.
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prehensive, clear, and uniform set of regulations on the conduct of govern-
ment attorneys ..... 82
In drafting the regulation, the DOJ purported to be "follow[ing], in sub-
stance, traditional interpretations of DR 7-104,"83 at least with respect to
conduct that authorities had previously addressed. With respect to the gray
areas, the DOJ purported "to strike an appropriate balance between the
need to protect the attorney-client relationship from unnecessary intrusion
and the need to preserve the ability of government attorneys to conduct legit-
imate law enforcement activities." 84 The substance of the proposal seemed
to belie this approach, however. The proposed regulation, which would have
imposed virtually no restrictions on prosecutors other than those reflected in
constitutional case law,85 essentially codified the Thornburgh Memorandum.
Prior to the initiation of formal criminal proceedings, when a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, prosecutors and their investiga-
tors would have been permitted to undertake any "communication... per-
mitted by law."'86 During the "prosecutive stage" of a criminal proceeding,
after the defendant had formally been charged with a crime, prosecutors and
their investigators would have been permitted to contact the defendant di-
rectly to gather evidence of crimes unrelated to the ones charged.87 They
would also have been permitted to speak with a represented defendant about
the pending charges if the defendant had "initiated" the communication and
had "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the presence of
counsel."88
82 Id. at 54,737; see Jamie S. Gorelick & Geoffrey M. Klineberg, Justice Department Con-
tacts with Represented Persons: A Sensible Solution, 78 JUDICATURE 136, 142-43 (1994).
83 Communications with Represented Persons (1992), supra note 79, at 54,740.
84 Id.
85 The regulation would have codified restrictions contained in the case law. For example,
it would have provided that, once the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached,
prosecutors "may not deliberately elicit incriminating information from the represented person
concerning the pending criminal charges." Id. at 54,743. This restriction is already imposed by
decisions applying the right to counsel to police interrogation. Seek e.g., Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964) (holding that "petitioner was denied the basic protections of [the
Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminat-
ing words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted
and in the absence of his counsel").
Similarly, at that stage of proceedings, the regulation would have imposed restrictions on
undercover agents' and informants' presence at meetings between the defendant and the defense
lawyer. See Communications with Represented Persons (1992), supra note 79, at 54,743. Similar
limits have been recognized in Supreme Court and lower court decisions dealing with the so-
called "spy in the enemy camp." See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557-58 (1977)
(holding that undercover agent's presence at a meeting between defendant and defendant's
counsel was not a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights as long as agent did not
communicate the substance of the conversation); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 644 (5th
Cir. 1981) (finding dismissal of indictment inappropriate when defendant had failed to show any
prejudice resulting from undercover agents' presence at a meeting between himself and his coun-
sel); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 208 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversing conviction because in-
formant's revelation of defense strategy to prosecuting attorneys was violative of defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights).
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Although the DOJ engaged in some informal consultations with mem-
bers of the organized bar and consulted academic, judicial, and professional
writings in the course of drafting the proposed regulation, it saw the thirty-
day public notice-and-comment period as the principal occasion for receiving
ideas from individuals outside the DOJ regarding the wisdom of the regula-
tion.89 During that period, the DOJ received twenty sets of comments, half
of which urged the DOJ to extend the period for public comment.90 The
DOJ, now under the direction of Attorney General Janet Reno, did so in July
1993, while at the same time responding (in almost every case unsympatheti-
cally) to the comments already received.91
In March 1994, the DOJ proposed another rule.92 The original version
had been revised in response to the comments received in the interim, the
overwhelming majority of which had come from federal prosecutors (only
one of whom opposed the rule) and from others within the federal govern-
ment.93 Among other things, the new version would preclude prosecutors
from engaging in plea discussions and similar negotiations with represented
individuals at any stage of a criminal case, unless the individual had initiated
the discussion.94 Further, it would require prosecutors to seek judicial ap-
proval before talking about the substance of pending charges with a defend-
ant who had initiated communications in the absence of the defense lawyer.95
For the first time, the DOJ also issued planned additions to the Depart-
ment of Justice Manual to govern prosecutors' communications with repre-
sented individuals. 96 The planned additions to the Department of Justice
Manual would impose restrictions that were not included in the regulation
itself. These additional restrictions, like others contained in the Department
of Justice Manual, would not have the force of law, however. 97
Finally, in August 1994, more than a year and a half after such a rule was
first proposed, the DOJ promulgated its final rule governing contacts with
89 See Communications with Represented Persons, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,976, 39,982 (1993) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77) (proposed July 26, 1993) [hereinafter Communications with Rep-
resented Persons (1993)].
90 See id. at 39,976-77.
91 See id. at 39,976-91 (addressing comments).
92 See Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,086 (1994) (to be codi-
fied at 28 C.F.R. pt. 77) (proposed Mar. 3,1994) [hereinafter Communications with Represented
Persons (1994)].
93 See id. at 10,088-89.
94 See id. at 10,101.
95 See id. at 10,100.
96 See id at 10,097-99. The planned provisions, as well as the proposed regulation, gov-
erned all DOJ attorneys engaged in criminal and civil law enforcement, not just prosecutors. See
id. at 10,097. That is equally true of the regulation as ultimately promulgated. See Communica-
tions with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23. This Article focuses, however, on
these provisions insofar as they affect federal prosecutors and, therefore, for convenience, refers
to federal prosecutors in contexts where other DOJ lawyers might also have been included.
97 See, eg., Chesnoff v. United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 13 F.3d 1293, 1296
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that grand jury witness lacked standing to assert a violation of an inter-
nal government guideline regulating subpoenas issued to attorneys because DOJ Guidelines do
not establish rights in civil or criminal matters but merely assist the United States Attorney's
Office in its internal operations).
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represented persons without their lawyers' consent.98 This final version made
only minor amendments to the penultimate one.99 Shortly thereafter, the
DOJ incorporated provisions in the Department of Justice Manual imposing
additional, albeit unenforceable, restrictions on federal prosecutors in com-
municating with represented persons.1°°
2. The New Regulation
Entitled "Communications with Represented Persons,"''1 the new regu-
lation applies both to federal prosecutors and to other DOJ lawyers engaged
in civil law enforcement investigations or proceedings.1°2 It is intended to
supersede rules of professional ethics that restrict lawyers in making direct
contact with individuals who are represented by counsel.103 The regulation
establishes a standard for federal government lawyers that is more permissive
than the ethical rules, particularly as they have been interpreted by state
courts and ethics committees. 104 Furthermore, the regulation expressly for-
bids state disciplinary authorities and federal courts from enforcing the rules
of ethics insofar as they are more restrictive. 05 Indeed, it forbids state disci-
plinary authorities from sanctioning a federal government lawyer for violat-
ing one of the more permissive rules established by the regulation itself,
unless and until the Attorney General finds that the lawyer willfully violated
the rule.106 Thus, with respect to ethical limits on communications with rep-
resented parties, the DOJ has arrogated to itself the authority both to redraw
the line more expansively and to decide for itself when federal government
lawyers may be called for crossing the line.
In criminal cases, the regulation authorizes prosecutors and their agents
to communicate with represented individuals before they are arrested or in-
dicted for purposes of conducting an investigation.10 7 The principal limita-
tion on such communications at the investigative stage is that the prosecutor
may not engage in plea negotiations, negotiations over immunity, or similar
negotiations in counsel's absence unless the individual initiates the communi-
cation and the court consents. 08 Once the individual is arrested or charged,
98 See Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23.
99 See id. at 39,910.
100 See DEPARTMENT OF JusIcE MANUAL §§ 9-13.200 to -13.260B (Supp. 1993).
101 Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. pt. 77 (1995).
102 See id. §77.2
103 See id. § 77.12.
104 See infra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
105 See 28 C.F.R. § 77.11(a) (1995).
106 See id.
107 See id. §§ 77.3, 77.7. The regulation is intended in part to supersede the Second Cir-
cuit's ruling in Hammad that covert communications with represented individuals are improper
when illegitimate investigative techniques are employed. See supra note 59 and accompanying
text. Whether the regulation must be read to do so, however, is unclear. The court would be
free to hold that, whether or not an individual is represented, the use of a sham subpoena to
obtain statements from that individual is improper. Cf. People v. Auld, 815 P.2d 956, 959 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that dismissal of the case is an appropriate remedy when the district
attorney perpetrates a fraud upon the court), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992). But see United
States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1987) (upholding use of sham subpoena).
108 28 C.F.R. §§ 77.6(c), 77.8 (1995).
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the individual goes from being a "represented person" to a "represented
party," in the language of the regulation,10 9 and further restrictions on ex
parte communications are imposed. In general, the prosecutor may not com-
municate or cause agents to communicate directly with the defendant "con-
cerning the subject matter of the representation."" 0 This general rule is,
however, subject to various exceptions that are potentially controversial, in
that they authorize communications with represented defendants that many
would view as inappropriate and that, indeed, might be improper under judi-
cial interpretations of the prevailing ethical rules.
For example, the regulation authorizes prosecutors to interview repre-
sented defendants "in the course of an investigation.., of additional, differ-
ent or ongoing" crimes (i.e., crimes other than those for which the defendant
has been arrested or indicted)."' This has been considered improper by
some authorities even when the prosecutor makes an effort to avoid discuss-
ing the crime charged"Z2-an effort that the regulation seems to require of
federal prosecutors. 113 It might reasonably be argued that the interrogation
of indicted defendants about past conduct jeopardizes all the interests that
the no-contact rule is designed to protect. In the defense attorney's absence,
a prosecutor or her agents may obtain incriminatory admissions by unfairly
reinforcing and exploiting the defendant's misunderstanding that it is in his
best interest to cooperate. 114 The ex parte contact may also undermine the
defendant's trust and confidence in the defense lawyer who represents him
109 See iL § 77.3.
11o Id. § 77.5.
111 Id. § 77.6(e).
112 See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 197 Cal. Rptr. 436,438-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); In re Burrows,
629 P.2d 820, 825 (Or. 1981) (en banc); California State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. 1979-49 (1979), reprinted in 55 CAL- ST. BJ. 263,263 (1980); Oregon State Bar Legal
Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 484 (1983).
113 The regulation prohibits "any communication that is prohibited by the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel." 28 C.F.R. § 77.4 (1995). The impact of this restriction, however, is far
from clear. For example, the Supreme Court has not construed the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to prohibit the prosecutor from deliberately eliciting statements from an indicted de-
fendant in defense counsel's absence. It has simply barred the admission of the statements in
evidence on the then-pending charges. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). The
final rule does not contain the explicit restriction included in the original proposal that would
have required the prosecutor to avoid "deliberately elicit[ing] incriminating information from
the represented person concerning the pending criminal charges." Communications with Repre-
sented Persons (1992), supra note 79, at 54,743. The supplementary information accompanying
the final rule suggests that the omission was deliberate, and that prosecutors are now authorized
to elicit from represented defendants incriminating statements about pending criminal charges as
long as the prosecutor's subjective motivation is to investigate other, uncharged offenses. See
Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23, at 39,922.
114 See Green, supra note 43, at 320. Often an individual contacted by a prosecutor or her
agents is led to believe that it is in his interest to cooperate with law enforcement authorities.
Prosecutors and agents typically make comments to reinforce this belief. When prosecutors or
their agents contact an indicted defendant in defense counsel's absence, they are likely to create
the erroneous impression that it is in the defendant's interest to cooperate in order to receive a
benefit with respect to the pending charges and, furthermore, that it would be against the de-
fendant's interest to include defense counsel in the conversation. As a consequence, the defend-
ant may make incriminating statements in the erroneous belief that the prosecutor will dismiss
the pending charges or provide some other form of leniency in reward for his cooperation.
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on the pending charges, thereby diminishing the defense lawyer's later effec-
tiveness in conducting plea negotiations, in giving advice, or in advocating for
the defendant in court. One might therefore question whether, in authoriz-
ing prosecutors to seek incriminating statements from defendants whenever
there are uncharged offenses to investigate, the regulation gives adequate
weight to the interests protected by the no-contact rule.115
Indeed, as interpreted in a recent advisory opinion of the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Responsibility, the prosecutor should be forbidden
by the no-contact rule from interviewing an individual represented by coun-
sel in connection with a criminal investigation whether or not the individual
is under indictment on unrelated charges.116 According to the ABA commit-
tee, once a suspect is known to have a lawyer representing him with respect
to specific allegations, the rule should be read to forbid direct contacts by
either the prosecutor or investigators acting under the prosecutor's
direction. 1 7
C. The Benefits and Shortcomings of Federal Executive Rulemaking
In promulgating the new federal regulation, the DOJ asserted an author-
ity it never previously has exercised and that no other body of lawyers (other
than judges) ever has been thought to possess: the exclusive authority to
make and interpret the ethical rules governing certain areas of their own pro-
fessional conduct. Commentators have questioned whether the DOJ cur-
rently has the authority to exclude the judiciary from its traditional province
of establishing ethical rules for lawyers, 118 and, as noted previously, federal
legislation has been proposed to provide the DOJ more explicit authority to
do so.119 The DOJ will encourage federal courts to avoid having to resolve
this question by interpreting the no-contact rule to accommodate the provi-
sions of the regulation. 20 If, however, a federal court concludes that a fed-
115 See id. at 318-20 & 320 n.120.
116 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995)
[hereinafter ABA Op. 95-396].
117 The opinion expresses the view that: (1) the no-contact rule applies in criminal as well
as civil matters, see id. at 5-6; (2) the rule applies to communications with anyone known to be
represented by counsel in connection with the matter to be discussed, not only with formal "par-
ties," see id. at 6-9; (3) although some courts have held the rule inapplicable to criminal investi-
gations prior to arrest or indictment, these readings of the rule are unsound, see id. at 9-12; and
(4) a lawyer is responsible for the activities of an investigator acting under his or her direction.
See id. at 19-21.
118 See, e.g., Samuel Dash, An Alarming Assertion of Power, 78 JuDicATURE 137 (1994).
119 See S. 3, supra note 24 and accompanying text. Questions have been raised about the
appropriateness of the proposed legislation. See, e.g., Gerald H. Goldstein, Government Law-
yers: Above the Law?, WASH. PosT, May 2, 1995, at A19. But see Gorelick, supra note 75;
William G. Otis, Prosecutors on Trial, WASH. PosT, May 30, 1995, at A13.
120 DR 7-104 and equivalent ethical rules, as adopted in most jurisdictions, permit other-
wise improper communications that are "authorized by law." The government argues that con-
duct comporting with the regulation falls within the "authorized by law" exception. See
Communications with Represented Persons (1993), supra note 89, at 39,978. One problem the
government faces is that this exception is not included in the no-contact rule applied in some
districts. See id.
Another problem is that a federal regulation is not necessarily the type of "law" to which
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eral prosecutor acted in violation of the no-contact rule even though the
communications were authorized by the regulation, several difficult questions
will arise, including: whether federal courts have rulemaking authority or
general supervisory authority to adopt the no-contact rule and to apply it to
federal prosecutors,12' and, if so, whether the federal court has constitutional
authority to apply the no-contact rule in the face of a contrary federal
regulation. 22
the ethical rule is intended to defer. See Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op.
95-05 (1996) (noting that it is unclear whether the DOJ regulation constitutes "law" authorizing
otherwise impermissible communications under Model Rule 4.2). A recent ABA opinion takes
the view that the regulation would fall within this exception only if the regulation had "been
properly promulgated pursuant to statutory authority that contemplates regulation of the char-
acter in question." ABA Op. 95-396, supra note 116, at 22. Although the opinion retreats from
deciding whether the regulation meets this test, id. at 23 n.65, Lawrence J. Fox's separate concur-
rence flatly states the view that the DOJ's "regulations are clearly not authorized by law" be-
cause "[t]here is no Congressional grant of authority to the Justice Department to issue
regulations undermining the fundamental rights of clients to be represented by counsel." Id. at
24 (concurring opinion).
In United States v. Florida Cities Water Co., 41 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1541 (M.D. Fla.
1995), an environmental enforcement proceeding initiated by the DOJ, the defendant raised
some of these questions, but the district court avoided resolving them. See id. at 1543. The court
endorsed the magistrate judge's order requiring that before the government attempted to inter-
view potential witnesses, it must give the defendant reasonable advanced notice. See id. This
would allow the defendant's counsel, in the case of a represented witness, to alert the witness's
counsel and, in the case of an unrepresented witness, to discuss the matter with the witness and
to advise the witness that he or she may be subject to criminal prosecution. Because the court's
order did not flatly prohibit the government from interviewing the defendant's present or former
employees, but merely required advanced notice before government lawyers attempted such
interviews, the applicability of the DOJ regulation was not directly called into question.
121 Decisions such as Hammad and Lopez suggest that, until now, federal courts have taken
it as a given that their authority to regulate the professional conduct of lawyers justifies applying
the no-contact rule to federal prosecutors, at least in the absence of conflicting federal law. In
response to suggestions that it lacks authority to supersede ethical rules adopted by the federal
court, however, the DOJ has argued, among other things, that federal courts' "supervisory
power may not be used as a means of prescribing standards of prosecutorial conduct for out-of-
court activities" such as criminal investigations that otherwise "do not violate clear constitutional
or statutory norms." Communications with Represented Persons (1993), supra note 89, at
39,981.
The DOJ's distinction between in-court and out-of-court conduct is apparently premised on
the assumption that courts' inherent authority may be justified only by the interest in protecting
the integrity of judicial proceedings. This cramped construction of judicial authority defies the
contemporary practice and understanding. Courts routinely assume responsibility to set stan-
dards governing the setting of attorneys' fees and other out-of-court relations between lawyers
and their clients or third parties. See Jenkins v. McCoy, 882 F. Supp. 549, 553 (S.D.W. Va. 1995)
(citing authorities).
122 There is little helpful precedent addressing the separation-of-powers question that
would be raised by a conflict between an ethical rule properly adopted by the courts and a
regulation properly promulgated by the executive.
A third constitutional question would be raised in a case in which a federal prosecutor
violated the regulation itself. As noted earlier, the regulation not only redraws the lines, but also
leaves it to the Attorney General to call the lines. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Unless the Attorney General finds a violation of the regulation, and further finds that the viola-
tion was willful, the prosecutor may not be personally sanctioned by a state or federal discipli-
nary body. 28 C.F.R. § 77.12 (1995). This provision challenges the authority of courts to
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These questions are important, but for purposes of this Article the more
important question is different. DOJ's exercise of executive agency rulemak-
ing authority illustrates one available process for developing standards of
professional conduct for some or all lawyers in federal court proceedings.
The question is whether, assuming it is available, this process is an appropri-
ate one. This Part begins by addressing the virtues of the process, then ad-
dresses the single, but fatal, shortcoming: the ultimate decisionmaker's lack
of objectivity.
1. Virtues of Agency Rulemaking
In commentary accompanying its regulation and the three earlier pro-
posals, the DOJ reflected its understanding of its role and concomitant re-
sponsibilities in fashioning rules to govern its lawyers' professional conduct.
In the DOJ's portrayal, it approached the task of rulemaking essentially as
the judiciary would be expected to if it were to amend and expand DR 7-104
to clarify how the rule applies to prosecutors. Thus, the DOJ justified the
regulation as a reasonable exercise of lawmaking, implicitly contrasting it
with the predecessor Thornburgh Memorandum, which, at least in the eyes of
judges and commentators, was a pure exercise of power designed to liberate
federal prosecutors from what they viewed as an onerous ethical restriction
imposed by the judiciary. Indeed, the regulation was depicted as an exercise
in self-restraint more than self-liberation. The drafters' goal was simply to
establish a single, uniform standard governing communications with repre-
sented individuals. 123 In the areas where there was a consensus among fed-
eral courts about the scope of how the ethical rule applied to prosecutors, the
prevailing approach would be codified by the regulation, while in the gray
areas, the DOJ would "strike an appropriate balance."' 124 This approach to
developing standards of professional conduct seems entirely appropriate. 125
discipline attorneys who are federal prosecutors for violating law that unquestionably applies to
them, namely, the DOJ's own regulation.
123 See, eg., Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23, at
39,913 ("[T]his rule is not designed to diminish the ethical responsibilities of government attor-
neys; it is intended to clarify those responsibilities.").
124 Id. at 39,924-25; see also id. at 39,911 ("this regulation attempts to reconcile the pur-
poses underlying DR 7-104 and Model Rule 4.2 with effective law enforcement").
125 An earlier article suggested that the propriety of a prosecutor's communications with
represented parties should be determined in the light of a balancing of the "legitimate interests
that weigh in favor of or against the application of the rule." Green, supra note 43, at 315; see
also Green, supra note 6, at 534-42 (arguing that ambiguous ethical rules should be interpreted
to promote sound policy, not to promote their drafters' apparent intent). When prosecutors or
their agents communicate directly with a represented suspect or defendant, rather than commu-
nicating through defense counsel, several important interests protected by DR 7-104(A)(1) may
be jeopardized, including, primarily, the interest in protecting the client from overreaching and
the interest in assuring the client effective representation of counsel. On the other hand, direct
communications with the client may promote legitimate law enforcement interests, including,
among others, the interest in developing reliable evidence for use at trial and the interest in
preventing future crimes. See Green, supra note 43, at 318-19. The point of the article was that
courts should balance these countervailing interests when deciding how to apply DR 7-
104(A)(1) to criminal investigations and prosecutions-a question not specifically contemplated
by those who drafted the rule.
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The process undertaken by the DOJ to craft rules of conduct that would
strike the appropriate balance, although not beyond criticism, seemed rea-
sonably designed to produce a full public discussion and consideration of fac-
tors relevant to the calculus. From November 1992, when it first proposed a
rule, until August 1994, when it finally promulgated one, the DOJ received
and reviewed comments from 260 different sources. 126 Although the major-
ity came from within the DOJ,127 others came from private attorneys, public
defender offices, local bar organizations, state bar disciplinary counsel, state
prosecutors, and state court judges. 128 Many of the comments from outside
the DOJ were directed principally at the question of whether it was necessary
or appropriate for the DOJ to adopt exclusive rules governing its own law-
yers' conduct.' 29 Other comments, however, addressed the content of the
proposed rule in its various incarnations,130 prompting the DOJ to acknowl-
edge criticism, to defend the proposal where it considered the criticism un-
just, and to amend the proposal to the extent it deemed appropriate. 131
Certainly, the process by which the DOJ promulgated the regulation was
more open and more considered than the process by which the ABA adopted
DR 7-104(A)(1) and Model Rule 4.2. Likewise, the DOJ gave far more at-
tention to the question of when prosecutors should properly communicate
with represented individuals than did any of the federal district courts at the
126 See Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23, at 39,912-13
(receiving 20 comments in response to the initial proposal, 219 comments in response to the
second publication of that proposal, and 31 comments in response to the third and substantially
revised proposal).
127 Communications with Represented Persons (1994), supra note 92, at 10,088-89 (receiv-
ing 219 written comments in response to second publication of proposal of which 159 were from
DOJ employees).
128 Se4 eg., Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23; Com-
munications with Represented Persons (1994), supra note 92; Communications with Repre-
sented Persons (1993), supra note 89.
129 See eg., Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23, at
39,913-17 (addressing criticisms of third proposal relating to the need for the rule and the DOJ's
authority to adopt it); Communications with Represented Persons (1993), supra note 89, at
39,976-82 (reviewing general comments received in response to first version).
130 See, eg., Communications with Represented Persons (1994), supra note 92, at 10,089-96
(addressing comments relating to provisions of second proposal and describing revisions); Com-
munications with Represented Persons (1993), supra note 89, at 39,982-91.
131 Se eg., Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23, at
39,918 (expanding definition of "attorney for the government" in final rule in response to criti-
cism from DOJ components); id. at 39,919 (rejecting criticism of rule's distinction between a
represented "party" and a represented "person"); id at 39,920 (clarifying, "[i]n response to one
comment,.., that representation is presumed to cease to be current for purposes of these rules
when the matter in question has reached a final judgment... unless there is reason to believe
that representation is continuing"); id. at 39,922 (responding to a comment from a United States
Attorneys' Office, final rule was changed to clarify that, for purpose of exception permitting
communications with arrested defendants who waive their right to counsel, "the usual Miranda
warnings and waiver suffice"); id. at 39,922-23 (agreeing with individuals' comments that the
range of contacts allowed during investigations was broader than necessary to meet the DOJ's
legitimate needs, but indicating that the DOJ would address this concern through changes to the
Department of Justice Manual, rather than the rule itself).
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time they decided to adopt professional rules on a wholesale basis by incor-
poration in a local rule of court.132
Moreover, the detailed rules produced by the DOJ, some contained in
the regulation itself and some added to the Department of Justice Manual,
provided far more guidance than the no-contact rule, which is intended to
apply to lawyers universally. The standards of conduct adopted by the DOJ
focus on a single group of lawyers-federal government lawyers-engaged in
a limited area of representation-criminal or civil law enforcement. 33 Be-
cause they are specific and contextual, they leave notably less room for inter-
pretation than the no-contact rule. Moreover, because they apply to federal
government lawyers in all districts, they avoid the problem of "balkaniza-
tion"-the danger that a federal prosecutor functioning in different districts
will be subject to inconsistent rules.
2. The Lack of Objectivity
The one serious and, indeed, fatal flaw in the process by which the DOJ
promulgated its regulation was that the drafting and ultimate decisionmaking
were entirely controlled by lawyers within the DOJ. Oddly, in the many
pages of commentary accompanying the regulation and the proposed rules
that preceded it, the DOJ never squarely confronted this problem. Critics of
the proposed rule had seemingly raised this question, asking, for example,
whether "the Department of Justice is the proper arbiter of the ethical stan-
dards to be imposed upon its employees."'1 34 But the DOJ took this and simi-
lar comments as a challenge to its legal authority, not to the wisdom of
exercising its authority.
The prosecutor's customary role is in large part as advocate, and this was
the role that dictated the DOJ's approach to DR 7-104 before it drafted the
regulation. By contrast, in drafting and promulgating the regulation, the
DOJ's lawyers did not serve as advocates. Nor did they serve as administra-
tors of criminal justice, as they do when they exercise discretion about whom
to investigate, whom to charge, what charges to bring before the grand jury,
whether to plea bargain, and the like. In this context, they acted as
lawmakers. This role brought with it a different, and ill-defined, set of re-
sponsibilities, which was in tension with the responsibilities flowing from
their other roles.
Was the DOJ well equipped to assume the relatively unfamiliar role of
lawmaker-a role which, as conceived by the DOJ itself, is close kin to that
of judge?135 Or, to ask another way, was the DOJ qualified to develop ethi-
132 For the most part, federal district courts have adopted local rules that incorporate either
the standard of the state in which the court sits, an ABA model, or both. See supra note 13.
There is no indication that, in the course of doing so, district courts gave attention to the wording
or substance of particular rules. See Green, supra note 6, at 533-34, 547 (noting when district
court judges of Connecticut adopted the ABA Model Code they "did not discuss the particular
provisions or even think about them").
133 See text accompanying note 102.
134 Communications with Represented Persons (1993), supra note 89, at 39,979.
135 A related question concerns the enforcement of the regulation. As noted earlier, the
regulation precludes courts from sanctioning government lawyers for communicating with repre-
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cal rules designed to balance the interest of the attorney-client relationship
against the countervailing law enforcement interests?
Surely, the DOJ possesses the requisite insight and expertise, particu-
larly when it comes to evaluating the relevant law enforcement needs. The
DOJ may lack comparable expertise when it comes to evaluating the impact
of prosecutors' communications on represented defendants and, in particular,
on their relationship with counsel. But the DOJ is comprised of extremely
bright lawyers with a variety of experiences. Moreover, written comments, as
well as informal input in the drafting stage, allowed the DOJ to collect rele-
vant information.
What was lacking, however, was objectivity. The DOJ is not only, or
even primarily, a lawmaker, but a representative of a party before the federal
courts. Any rules of conduct it developed would profoundly affect the inter-
ests of its client, the government. Prosecutors engaged in the competitive
enterprise of gathering incriminating evidence cannot objectively determine
how much weight to give the respective interests of the government and the
individual and how the balance should be struck. Outside the context of
rulemaking, many would argue, the DOJ and its prosecutors have routinely
undervalued the attorney-client relationship in their quest for evidence. The
practice of issuing subpoenas to criminal defense attorneys for information
relating to their clients136 is just one example to which defense lawyers might
point. When prosecutors act as rulemakers, they cannot avoid being biased
by their investigative interests or being influenced by the kinds of judgments
they routinely make as advocates-including formerly as advocates for a nar-
row interpretation of the no-contact rule.137
sented persons in violation of the regulation unless the DOJ first determines that a willful viola-
tion occurred. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. One might question whether the
DOJ is the appropriate agency for deciding whether a lawyer within the DOJ has violated the
regulation and, if so, whether sanctions should be imposed. See Bruce A. Green, Policing Fed-
eral Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L.
Rnv. 69 (1995).
136 See supra note 25 (citing authorities addressing ABA Model Rule 3.8(0, which restricts
this conduct).
137 See e.g., ABA Op. 95-396, supra note 116, at 24 ("To ever permit a litigant (particularly
one as powerful and capable of threatening represented parties as the Justice Department) to
decide what rules will govern its own lawyers unbalances the judicial process in a fundamental,
unfortunate and inequitable way.")
The DOJ might answer that its lawyers routinely exercise objective judgment outside the
trial context. For example, individual prosecutors exercise objectivity in deciding whom to inves-
tigate and what charges to bring. While taking into consideration issues of fairness to the ac-
cused and proportionality, prosecutors also take into account the government's own interests in
preserving resources, in gathering evidence to be used against others, in deterring future crimes
by the particular defendant and other defendants, and the like. There is no reason to believe,
however, that prosecutors weigh the respective considerations objectively, that is to say, in es-
sentially the same way that a neutral and detached officer would. Nor is there any requirement
that they do so.
The DOJ might also argue that as an entity it is practiced in exercising objectivity in the
adoption of standards that restrain the conduct of its lawyers. But this answer confuses self-
restraint with objectivity. Provisions of the Department of Justice Manual that guide or limit the
discretion of federal prosecutors are often a product of self-interest. For example, the provision
on the issuance of subpoenas to attorneys, DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE MANUAL § 9-2.161(a)
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Even if the DOJ were reasonably qualified, in theory, to engage in ob-
jective rulemaking, its assumption of this role invariably raises problems of
appearance. When the DOJ's prosecutors draft regulations that preempt the
judiciary's ethical rules-and particularly when they do so behind closed
doors, as in this case-one might assume that the prosecutors in the DOJ
were playing their accustomed role, advocating primarily for their own inves-
tigative interests. Similarly, when they subsequently seek to justify their
handiwork, one might assume that they are continuing to serve as advocates,
advancing the most palatable explanations for their drafting decisions, but
not necessarily the true ones.138
Certainly, courts are better equipped, after receiving input from prose-
cutors, defense lawyers, and others, to fashion rules that strike an objective
balance.139 Courts have both the requisite expertise, derived in part from
their traditional experience in supervising the legal profession, as well as the
requisite neutrality and detachment. Moreover, from the perspective of both
the bar and the general public, ethical rules adopted by courts are far more
likely to appear to strike an objective balance between competing
prosecutorial and individual interests. Given the obvious superiority of the
judiciary as an arbiter of ethics, one must invariably be skeptical of the DOJ's
motives when it opts to abrogate existing judicial rules of ethics by unilater-
ally promulgating regulations governing the conduct of its lawyers.
Even if one had faith that, in other contexts, the DOJ could engage in
the quasi-judicial function of drafting ethical rules for federal prosecutors,
and could do so objectively, one might be skeptical in this context.14° Be-
(Supp. 1993), was largely designed to deflect criticism of this practice and to discourage courts
from adopting more onerous restraints such as those urged by the ABA. See Green, supra note
135, at 76.
138 Cf. Floyd Abrams, Why Lawyers Lie, N.Y. TirMs MAO., Oct. 9, 1994, at 54 ("Public
statements of prosecutors and defense counsel alike must be viewed with the greatest of
scepticism.").
139 See Establishing Ethical Standards, supra note 53, at 44-45. In the absence of judicial
involvement, another preferable alternative would be to seek consensus among those with vari-
ous perspectives. A Conference recently hosted at Fordham Law School proceeded on this
understanding:
The co-sponsors of this Conference shared the view that the best way to
achieve satisfactory resolutions of ethical issues is through open discourse among
individuals with varied perspectives, and that shared view explains the Confer-
ence's structure. The co-sponsors took as a given that no single group could claim
to have all the right answers to the difficult questions of professional responsibility
confronting lawyers for older clients. The fact that individual groups tend to be
defined by a similarity of interest or experience among their members would make
any one group particularly hesitant to make such a claim. In looking for answers to
the hard questions facing lawyers [who represent older clients], it is critical to con-
sider the widest variety of perspectives-to seek the views of lawyers who repre-
sent older clients, lawyers who practice in other areas, non-lawyer representatives
of older persons, academics, health-care professionals, and others with valuable in-
sights. That is why this Conference was co-sponsored by six groups representing
varying perspectives, and why the co-sponsors sought to bring together thoughtful
individuals with a variety of backgrounds and experiences.
Bruce A. Green & Nancy Coleman, Foreword, Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 961, 970-71 (1994).
140 Pronouncements by the DOJ in defense of the regulation would tend to reinforce this
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cause the regulation imposes few restrictions on prosecutors beyond those
already imposed by the Constitution and other laws,' 4 1 it is hard to avoid the
conclusion that the regulation overvalues law enforcement interests at the
expense of the interests ordinarily protected by the no-contact rule. More-
over, given that the regulation was drafted and promulgated hard on the
heels of the Thornburgh Memorandum, and given the DOJ's concurrent
challenges to other aspects of judicial regulation,'4 2 it must almost invariably
be perceived as an attempt to liberate prosecutors from judicial oversight,
rather than simply an attempt to attain uniformity while deferring to past
judicial judgments.143
perception. See, e.g., Communications with Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23, at
39,911 ("[T]he Department has long maintained, and continues to maintain, that it has the au-
thority to exempt its attorneys from the application of DR 7-104 and Model Rule 4.2 and their
state counterparts.").
141 See, e.g., id. at 39,915 (noting that two organizations criticizing the proposed regulation
read it as "holding government attorneys to ethical standards no higher than what the Constitu-
tion provides").
142 The DOJ has challenged both the authority of courts to apply ethical rules to federal
prosecutors, see supra, note 25, and the authority of courts to provide various sanctions for con-
cededly improper prosecutorial conduct. See e.g., United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 767 (1st
Cir. 1994) (assessment of monetary penalties against the government for prosecutorial miscon-
duct violates sovereign immunity); United States v. Woodley, 9 F.3d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that absent an express waiver of sovereign immunity a court may not impose monetary
sanctions against the government); United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing
to dismiss indictment despite prosecutorial misconduct), cerL denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993); United
States v. Prince, No. CR 93-1073(RR), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2962 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1994)
(rejecting government's argument that sovereign immunity bars imposition of sanctions against
it).
143 The DOJ's decision to preempt judicial rules of conduct raises two prudential concerns
apart from whether, in doing so, it developed substandard rules because of its exclusion of others
from the drafting and decisionmaking processes. The first is the regulation's possibly negative
impact on the DOJ's relations with bench and bar. The danger is that it will ratchet antagonism
up a notch. Certainly, state judges have viewed the regulation as an act of advocacy from the
perspective of both the DOJ's role in fashioning the rule and in enforcing it. The Conference of
Chief Judges has responded by taking the position that the DOJ lacks constitutional authority to
preempt state regulation of attorneys who are federal prosecutors. See Communications with
Represented Persons (Final Rule), supra note 23, at 39,915-16. State Chief Judges have agreed
to instruct state disciplinary authorities essentially to ignore the regulation. See Mark Curriden,
State Court Chiefs Rex New Muscle, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 1994, at Al, A26; Coquillette Report,
supra note 13, at 33-34.
The other concern is the regulation's potential impact on federal prosecutors themselves.
At the same time that the DOJ has sought to promote compliance with ethical rules by training
ethics experts in each of the United States Attorneys' Offices, it has promulgated a regulation
that sends very different signals: a signal to individual prosecutors and their offices that they
may appropriately test the limits of proper ethical conduct in order to promote investigative and
prosecutorial interests, and a signal that prosecutors, and not the courts, are the arbiters of their
own conduct. This may encourage federal prosecutors to take an aggressive approach even to-
ward those ethical rules that are legally enforceable. And, if federal prosecutors are adamant
about challenging judicially imposed ethical rules such as Model Rule 4.2, how can they be ex-
pected to exercise reasonable judgment and restraint in those areas where they are not, and
never have been, subject to judicially enforceable limits of any meaningful sort-areas such as
the choice of whom to investigate or the preparation of witnesses?
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11. Federal Court Lawmaking: The Inadequacy of Adjudication
At present, most federal courts apply ABA rules of professional conduct
or state variants that are incorporated by reference in local district court
rules.144 For the most part, these rules of conduct are not context-specific.
Rather, they cut across the varied contexts in which lawyers serve. Conse-
quently, many are deliberately open-textured 145 and others that initially ap-
pear to be worded more precisely prove, in important respects, unclear in
meaning or application. 46 Their meaning for federal practitioners cannot be
144 See supra note 13. On occasion, federal courts establish legally enforceable standards of
lawyer conduct in the course of adjudication by issuing pronouncements about how lawyers
should behave on an ad hoc basis. One illustration is a series of judicial opinions in the Second
Circuit requiring prosecutors to take steps to avert a conflict of interest on the part of the de-
fendant's lawyers. See, eg., United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1986) (prosecutors
should move for defense counsel's disqualification before trial when they are aware of a conflict
of interest). See generally Bruce A. Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Prosecutor's Responsibil-
ity when Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323 (1989)
(arguing that prosecutors should help to eliminate defense lawyers' conflicts of interest).
145 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) (1993) (mandating
that it is misconduct to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion"); id. Rule 8.4(d) (mandating that it is misconduct to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice"). See generally Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity
and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267,276 (1970) (noting that vague and
broad language describing proscribed conduct is ineffective in providing standards for profes-
sional discipline); Martha E. Johnston, Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility:
Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. Rav. 671 (1979) (arguing that the broad language in the ABA
Model Code does not provide sufficient guidance to practicing attorneys and may lead to selec-
tive enforcement by state bar committees).
146 The ABA drafters conceive of the professional rules as stating general obligations, and
not containing "implementing regulations"-a conception which is at odds with their use as
disciplinary standards. For example, several years ago, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility objected on this ground to a proposed amendment to the ABA
Model Rules specifying that attorneys must perform at least 50 hours of pro bono work annually:
This Committee strongly believes that the Model Rules are not the appropri-
ate place for what are in effect implementing regulations, even for a subject as
important as pro bono publico service. We have objected on precisely this ground
to a proposal to implement the requirements of Model Rule 1.15, for safekeeping
property, by an amendment to that Rule that would prescribe recordkeeping and
accounting procedures. We would similarly oppose a proposal, were one advanced,
to implement Rule 1.1's command of competence by spelling out continuing legal
education requirements; or Rule 1.5's requirement that fees be reasonable, by the
insertion of numerical guidelines. It is this Committee's firmly held view that the
proper role of the Model Rules is best served by preserving their character as rela-
tively general statements of principle rather than detailed prescriptions for imple-
mentation of those principles.
Letter from David B. Isbell, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, to various federal and state bar associations 1-2 (April 2, 1992) (on file with The
George Washington Law Review).
Many commentators have noted that this approach has produced rules that are extraordina-
rily uncertain in scope and application. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promul-
gate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639, 642 (1981) ("[T]he Model Rules are drafted with an
amorphousness and ambiguity that render them virtually meaningless."); Green, supra note 6, at
502-08 (noting that the disciplinary decision in Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57
(2d Cir. 1988), resolved only one of five interpretive questions under DR 7-102(B)(2) that were
raised by the lawyer's conduct); Wilkins, supra note 1, at 810 (noting that "both the Model Code
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determined conclusively until federal courts authoritatively interpret them, as
they may do either in adjudicating whether a lawyer should be sanctioned
personally for misconduct,147 or in rendering a decision in litigation that turns
directly or indirectly on the propriety of a lawyer's conduct.148 In his report
to the Judicial Conference, Professor Coquillette proposed that federal
courts continue to rely on bar association rules.149
This Part argues that the proposal reflects an appropriate institutional
choice but an inappropriate procedural one. If federal courts continue to
apply bar association rules, they will be compelled to resolve most disputed
questions about the appropriate standard of lawyer conduct in the course of
adjudication, rather than by rulemaking. In adjudication, courts tend to
overlook relevant considerations and to provide unsatisfactory explanations
for the choices they make, thereby undermining confidence that they have
adopted the most appropriate standards of professional conduct. Moreover,
courts tend to determine only the propriety of the conduct immediately
before them, thus perpetuating uncertainties about the propriety of related
lawyer conduct.
and the Model Rules are filled with ... commands" that "are ambiguous, incomplete, or in
tension with other, plausibly applicable rules"). But see Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and
Regeneration of Ethics, 1980 AM. B. FouND. RE-s. J. 953, 953-54 (noting "the shift from articulat-
ing professional standards, suffused with ideas of morality and ethics, and enforced if at all by
informal sanctions and peer pressure, to enacting comprehensive and explicit legislation at-
tended by formally imposed sanctions for breach").
147 In some cases, courts review disciplinary decisions rendered by agencies or committees
acting under judicial authority and subject to judicial oversight. See, e.g., In re Cooperman, 633
N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994). In others, courts assume responsibility from the outset for deciding
whether to sanction a lawyer. See, e.g., United States v. Gionvanelli, 897 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.)
(upholding summary contempt sanction), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822 (1990); People v. Simac, 641
N.E.2d 416 (I. 1994) (upholding contempt conviction).
148 The most frequent source of such decisions are motions to disqualify an opposing law-
yer based on a conflict of interest. See generally Mark F. Anderson, Motions to Disqualify Op-
posing Counsel, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 238 (1991) (noting the increasing use of motions to
disqualify, often for purely strategic purposes); Stephen H. Goldberg, The Former Client's Dis-
qualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 Mnm. L. REv. 227,227-
28 (1987) (describing how motions to disqualify counsel for conflict of interest have prolifer-
ated); Bruce A. Green, "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1989) (describing judicial treatment of
motions to disqualify); James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification,
1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 419 (arguing that disqualification has become too common); Linda
A. Winslow, Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney Disqualification Motions: A Realistic Ap-
proach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L. REv. 863 (1987) (noting that disqualification motions
have become a common tactic in litigation). Lawyers may be disqualified to prevent or sanction
other misconduct as well. See, eg., Shelton v. Hess, 599 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (disquali-
fying plaintiff's lawyer for improper ex parte communication with represented party).
Decisions interpreting rules of professional conduct may also respond to motions to sup-
press evidence allegedly obtained by a lawyer through improper means or motions or for a pro-
tective order to prevent an opposing lawyer from engaging in allegedly wrongful conduct. See,
ag., Trans-Cold Express, Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc., 440 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1971) (sup-
pressing evidence obtained through improper ex parte communication with represented party).
See generally Erica M. Landsberg, Comment, Policing Attorneys: Exclusion of Unethically Ob-
tained Evidence, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1399 (1986) (arguing for the adoption of an exclusionary
rule for evidence obtained in violation of the rules of professional responsibility).
149 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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These shortcomings are illustrated in the context of a recent decision of
the Second Circuit, Grievance Committee v. Simels,150 which overturned an
order sanctioning a criminal defense lawyer for violating the no-contact
rule.'5 ' The court's opinion, which is described in Part II.A, appropriately
illustrates the shortcomings of judicial reliance on bar association rules, not
because it is an unusually bad opinion, but because it is an unusually good
one, in that it is far better and more extensively reasoned than the average
opinion interpreting standards of professional conduct. 52 Part II.B demon-
strates that, while representing the best that can be achieved by promulgating
and interpreting bar association standards, the decision ultimately stands as
evidence of a flawed lawmaking process.
A. The Simels Decision
The Simels decision addressed the conduct of a criminal defense lawyer,
Robert M. Simels, in connection with his representation of a defendant,
Brooks Davis, in a narcotics conspiracy case in 1988.153 Shortly before the
trial, a government witness in the narcotics case was shot. 5 4 Agents arrested
a suspect, Aaron Harper, who, under interrogation, admitted his role in the
shooting and implicated Simels's client.15 Harper thus became a possible
witness against Davis at the pending narcotics trial.156 He also became a po-
tential codefendant on additional charges the government planned to bring
based on the shooting and, at the same time, a potential witness against Davis
on those same charges. 5 7
At his client's request, in an effort to develop evidence with which to
impeach Harper or, better yet, to exonerate Davis, Simels visited Harper in
prison. 58 Although he indicated that he was represented by counsel, Harper
submitted to an interview and ultimately signed an affidavit, which Simels
later sought to use at Davis's trial.'l 9 On learning of the affidavit, however,
150 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995).
151 See id. at 651.
152 Cf., e.g., In re Alcantara, No. D-13 September Term 1995, 1995 N.J. LEXIS 1364 (N.J.
Dec. 1, 1995). For a discussion of In re Alcanta, see infra note 198. The Simels case is unusual in
other respects. First, the procedural setting is uncommon: Rarely do federal courts invoke their
disciplinary processes to regulate the conduct of lawyers in criminal proceedings, and rarer still
are disciplinary decisions addressing criminal law practices that are not manifestly improper.
Moreover, the subject matter of the decision is noteworthy: Judicial decisions only infrequently
address the propriety of criminal defense lawyers' conduct outside the courtroom. Finally, the
issue addressed by the court-how DR 7-104(A)(1) applies to criminal defense lawyers-is itself
significant. This question lurked, largely unnoticed, behind the past decade's-debate about how
this same rule applies to prosecutors. See supra part I.A. Not surprisingly, therefore, the court's
opinion in Simels establishes new ground in the area of professional responsibility in criminal
law practice and has important implications, not only with respect to defense lawyers' conduct,
but also with respect to prosecutorial conduct.
153 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 642-43.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 643.
156 See id,
157 See id. at 650.
158 See id. at 643.
159 See id. at 643 & n.3.
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the district judge ordered a mistrial and disqualified Simels from representing
Davis.160 Thereafter, the prosecution referred Simels's conduct to the Com-
mittee on Grievances of the Southern District of New York.161
From the point when the grievance committee received the referral until
the Second Circuit issued its decision more than five years later, the proceed-
ings involving Simels were closed to the public. After determining that
Simels's conduct merited prosecution for, among other things, violating DR
7-104(A)(1),162 the grievance committee referred the case to a three-member
panel headed by a retired state court judge and appointed a special counsel
to prosecute the charges. 63 The panel received evidence and issued findings
of fact and conclusions of law.164
The panel interpreted the disciplinary rule narrowly and thus concluded
that it did not apply to Simels's conduct, but the grievance committee re-
versed the panel's conclusion of law and issued a sanction of censure.165 It
reasoned that Simels had interviewed Harper about the "matter" in which
Harper was represented, namely, the shooting of a government witness, and
that, as a potential codefendant, Harper was a "party" represented in that
matter.166 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, endorsing the panel's nar-
rower interpretation.167 It concluded that neither witnesses nor potential co-
defendants are "parties" under DR 7-104(A)(1). 168
The Second Circuit's analysis in Simels began with three observations
about the interpretation of disciplinary rules. First, the court would engage
in de novo review of district court decisions interpreting a disciplinary rule.
No deference would be accorded district court interpretations. 169 Second,
where "neither the plain meaning nor the intent of the drafters can be dis-
cerned from the face of the [disciplinary] rule, matters of policy are appropri-
ately considered in determining its scope.' 170 Considerations of policy are
160 See id. at 643 n.3. The court of appeals later rejected a claim that the disqualification
order was unwarranted and that a retrial should therefore be barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817
(1989).
161 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 643. The disciplinary process in the Southern District of New
York is governed by General Rule 4 of the United States District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York. For a recent examination of the process, see In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d
84 (2d Cir. 1994), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 73 (1995).
162 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 643. Other allegations of misconduct were either dismissed by the
panel or not considered. See id. at 643-44. The court of appeals in Simels determined that there
was no basis for remanding for further consideration of these other allegations. See id. at 644
n.5.
163 See iL at 643.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 644.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 645.
168 See idU
169 See id.
170 Id. Simels implicitly rejected a principle of interpretation adopted by the Second Circuit
in an earlier disciplinary decision, Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988).
In Doe, the court equated the meaning of a disciplinary rule with "the drafters' intent." Id. at 62.
Accordingly, faced with another ambiguous disciplinary rule, the Doe decision undertook a
search for the intent of the ABA members who had drafted the ABA Model Code. See id. It
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particularly important when applying disciplinary rules in the criminal con-
text because rules regulating criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors will
have an impact on "a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel
and the public's interest in effective law enforcement.' 171 Finally, "well-es-
tablished principles of federalism require that federal courts not be bound by
either the interpretations of state courts or opinions of various bar associa-
tion committees."'1 72 Such interpretations might "contravene important fed-
eral policy concerns."' 73 Furthermore, "requiring a federal court to follow
the various and often conflicting state court and bar association interpreta-
tions... threatens to balkanize federal law."' 74
The court then reviewed the history of DR 7-104(A)(1) and prior Sec-
ond Circuit precedent interpreting the rule in criminal cases. It began by
identifying interests that have been said to be protected by the rule restrict-
ing communications with represented parties, including the protection of cli-
ents from overreaching by opposing counsel, 175 but derogated the
disciplinary rule as "primarily a rule of professional courtesy."'1 76 It noted
that "it was not until more than a half century after its promulgation that
defense attorneys began to urge that the Rule should apply in criminal pro-
ceedings,"'1 77 thus implying that DR 7-104(A)(1) was not intended to have a
met with some academic criticism as a consequence. See, e.g., Green, supra note 6, at 558 (con-
cluding that "[c]onsistent with their traditional authority to regulate the bar, courts can and
should act as policy-makers when they interpret ambiguous provisions of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility").
171 Simels, 48 F.3d at 645.
172 Id. In this case, bar association opinions pointed in opposite directions. Compare New
York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 245 (1972) ("A lawyer may properly
interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action
without the consent of the opposing counsel or party, as a witness does not 'belong' to any
party.") with New York County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Question No. 676
(1990) (holding criminal defense attorney may not directly contact a potential witness who has
not been implicated in the charges against his client but is represented on unrelated criminal
charges; the term "party" includes any represented "person" whose interests may be implicated
by the communications) [hereinafter New York County 676].
173 Simels, 48 F.3d at 645.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 646-47.
176 Id. at 647.
177 Id. The court's reference is somewhat misleading. Apparently, the court was referring
to the general principle that lawyers should not communicate with represented adversaries, as
codified in the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics ("ABA Canons"). Canon 9 provided, in
pertinent part: "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL E-Ics
Canon 9 (1908). The ABA Canons, unlike the ABA Model Code, was not designed to serve as
the basis of disciplinary standards (although state courts sometimes invoked them for that pur-
pose). See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 54-55 ("The Canons... seem to have been a statement
of professional solidarity-an assertion by elite lawyers in the ABA of the legitimacy of their
claim to professional stature." (footnote omitted)). Even so, the relevance of the underlying
principle to criminal proceedings was noted prior to the adoption of the ABA Model Code,
which included DR 7-104(A)(1), in 1969. See, eg., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 210-
11 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (rejecting analogy to ABA rule on ground that communication
with represented defendant was undertaken by codefendant, not by government lawyer); United
States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir.) (declining to exercise supervisory authority to sup-
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particularly important role in the criminal context. 178 Then, the court re-
viewed prior Second Circuit decisions. None, it noted, had interpreted the
specific language of DR 7-104(A)(1) that was placed in issue by Simels's con-
duct, and none had directly passed on how the rule applied to criminal de-
fense lawyers. 179
Finally, the court analyzed how DR 7-104(A)(1) applied to Simels's con-
duct in communicating with Harper, a potential witness against his client,
Davis, as well as a potential codefendant. 80 It concluded, on balance, that
"the purposes served by DR 7-104(A)(1)" were overridden by the "concern
of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
and a lawyer's ethical duty of zealous advocacy."''1
Although the opinion had earlier rejected the "plain meaning" and "in-
tent of the drafters" interpretive standards,182 the court's starting point in
analyzing how the rule applied to Simels's conduct was the language of the
rule. 183 The court seemed to assume that DR 7-104(A)(1) applies only when
a lawyer representing a client in a particular matter communicates about the
subject of the representation with an individual who is represented as a"party" in the same "matter."'184 Proceeding on this assumption, the court
first addressed the possibility that Harper had been interviewed in connec-
tion with the pending narcotics charges. 85 In that event, even assuming Da-
vis was represented by counsel in that "matter," the rule would not apply
because Harper was simply a potential witness, not a "party" in that case.186
press confession based on violation of Canon 9 of the ABA Canons), cert denied, 389 U.S. 993
(1967). Within a short time after state cotrts began adopting the ABA Model Code to establish
the standard of conduct for lawyers within the jurisdiction, defense lawyers began to invoke DR
7-104(A)(1) in criminal cases to support motions to suppress confessions allegedly obtained in
contravention of the rule. See supra note 51 (citing cases).
178 The ABA itself would no doubt reject this position. See supra notes 116-117 and accom-
panying text; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1373
(1976) (the rule bars a prosecutor from sending a represented client a copy of a letter containing
a plea offer, even though no charges had yet been filed); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Report No. 301 to the House of Delegates (Feb. 12, 1990) (on file with the
ABA) (criticizing Thornburgh Memorandum, which asserted that prosecutors were not bound
by DR 7-104(A)(1)).
179 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 647.
180 See id. at 650.
181 Id.
182 See id. at 645.
183 See id. at 650.
184 See id. Other authorities have read the rule more broadly. See, eg., WOLFRAM, supra
note 4, at § 11.6.2 & n.33 (noting that DR 7-104(A)(1) probably prohibits contact with any per-
son represented by a lawyer in a matter); Green, supra note 43, at 305-09 (discussing authorities
addressing whether "the subject of the representation" for a defendant includes uncharged
offenses).
185 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 650.
186 See id. The court's conclusion seems somewhat inconsistent with decisions recognizing
that government witnesses in criminal cases may have important interests implicated by the trial
in which they are testifying that are adverse to the interests of the criminal defendant. See, e.g.,
United States ex reL Stewart v. Kelly, 870 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that trial court's
refusal to allow defendant to be represented by attorney he chose, where interests of defendant
were potentially in conflict with interests of prosecution witness who was former client of that
attorney, was not a violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v.
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Then the court addressed the possibility that the relevant "matter" was
the attempted murder of a government witness.187 In that event, it found that
Harper and Davis were not "parties" to the same matter. 188 There was no
realistic possibility that Harper and Davis would be tried together, even if
they were named as codefendants in the same indictment, because no witness
other than Harper had implicated Davis.189 Moreover, the court of appeals
rejected the grievance committee's conclusion that, if actual codefendants are"parties" for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1), then potential codefendants must
be as well.19° It pointedly left open the question of whether the lawyer for
one defendant in a multidefendant case may communicate directly with a
codefendant, but noted that even if such contacts were improper once a crim-
inal case commenced, the proscription would not necessarily apply to poten-
tial codefendants. 191
The court supported its interpretation by reference to several considera-
tions of policy. First, a broad interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1) would dis-
courage investigative steps that defense lawyers must take to prepare for
trial: "We are not prepared to hold that a defense attorney engaging in criti-
cal pre-trial investigation, which might produce valuable sources of impeach-
ment material or, better, direct evidence of his or her client's innocence, is
committing professional misconduct."'192 Additionally, "those potentially af-
fected by the Rule are entitled to clear notice of its scope," which the court's
narrow interpretation was said to provide.193 Finally, insofar as this interpre-
tation might undermine the interests of represented witnesses such as Davis,
this raised a policy issue implicating federal law enforcement concerns that
was best left to Congress or the Supreme Court to resolve, rather than to
district courts interpreting disciplinary rules.194 This last consideration
echoed one raised at the very outset of the court's legal discussion: that the
grievance committee's interpretation would "broad[ly] change[ ] . . . tradi-
tional . . . defense practices," and that "such substantial modifications
[should] be made," if at all, "only after careful consideration by the represen-
tative branches of the federal government."'195
B. The Lessons of Simels: The Benefits and Shortcomings of Interpreting
Bar Association Rules in Adjudication
Simels exemplifies the two-stage process by which federal courts regu-
late lawyers. First, district courts adopt local rules incorporating bar associa-
tion rules of professional conduct or state variants that are, in either case,
Cheshire, 707 F. Supp. 235, 239 (M.D. La. 1989) (holding that defense attorney was disqualified
from representing defendant because of attorney's prior representation of government witness).
See generally Green, supra note 148, at 1217-18 & nn.83-84 (discussing Stewart and Cheshire).





192 Id. at 651.
193 Id.
194 See id.
195 Id. at 644.
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imprecise. 196 Second, on a case-by-case basis, federal courts resolve issues
concerning the reach of the incorporated rules as those issues arise in the
course of adjudication.197 In this case, the no-contact rule, made applicable
to federal practitioners by local rule of the Southern District of New York,
set an unclear standard of conduct for criminal defense lawyers. Among the
questions was whether a criminal defense lawyer may communicate directly
with a represented person who is either a potential witness against, or a po-
tential codefendant of, the lawyer's client. Almost a quarter century after the
ABA incorporated the no-contact rule in its Model Code, this issue was fi-
nally resolved authoritatively for lawyers in the Second Circuit in the context
of disciplinary proceedings that were closed to the public. The issue remains
unresolved, however, in virtually all other federal circuits and state courts,
since few judicial decisions other than Simels have confronted it. Moreover,
when other courts outside the Second Circuit do address this issue, they will
be free to interpret the no-contact rule differently, as the New Jersey
Supreme Court did in a recent opinion that did not even acknowledge
Simels.198
The advantage of this mode of judicial regulation over executive agency
rulemaking is obvious: In both the rule-promulgation and adjudication
stages, the lawmakers are neutral and detached judges, rather than lawyers
who regularly represent parties before the federal courts. The disadvantages
lie both in the process and in the limited nature of the rules it produces.
1. Procedural Limitations of Adjudication
Unconstrained by the intent of those who drafted DR 7-104(A)(1), the
Simels court appropriately sought to apply the rule to defense lawyers in a
way that made sense as a matter of policy. Resolution of this policy question
required balancing countervailing considerations. On one side were those
interests underlying the disciplinary rule that would be promoted by ex-
tending it to Simels's conduct. On the other were the interests of zealous
advocacy, fair notice, and judicial deference to the policymaking branches of
196 One reflection of this is the proliferation of bar association committees that have been
established to give advice to lawyers about the propriety of their proposed conduct. See infra
note 306 and accompanying text. Opinions published by committees of the ABA and state and
local bar associations are synopsized in the Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA/
BNA).
197 See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting DR 7-
104(A)(1)); Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988) (interpreting DR 7-
102(B)(2)); International Business Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978) (interpret-
ing DR 5-105); Mustang Enters., Inc. v. Plug-In Storage Sys., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (interpreting Model Rule 1.10); United States v. Josten, No. 88 CR 644, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10983 (N.D. I11. Sept. 14, 1989) (interpreting DR 9-101(B)).
198 In In re Alcantara, No. D-13 September Term 1995, 1995 NJ. LEXIS 1364 (NJ. Dec. 1,
1995), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a criminal defense lawyer had violated the no-
contact rule by communicating directly with represented codefendants who had entered guilty
pleas with lenient sentence recommendations conditioned on their testifying against the lawyer's
client. The court's reasoning, in its entirety, was that "[t]he word 'party' in [Model Rule 4.2]
denotes 'adversaries,' "which would include the codefendants, because by agreeing to testify on
the government's behalf, "their status [had become] much more significant than that of mere
witnesses; they were adverse-party witnesses." Id. at *20.
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government, that supported a narrower reading. Thus, the Simels court's
conception of lawmaking in the area of lawyers' professional conduct was
essentially the same as that of the DOJ when it adopted rules governing pros-
ecutors' communications with represented persons.199
Unlike the DOJ, however, the court received limited input before an-
nouncing an authoritative rule. The Second Circuit had the benefit of the
views of the special counsel, the panel, and the district court grievance com-
mittee, as well as the arguments of Simels.200 However, it never heard from
the government, whose complaint had initiated the grievance proceedings,
from the ABA or state or local bar associations, from representatives of the
criminal defense bar (other than Simels himself),201 from academics, or from
other interested parties. Because the proceedings were closed, other views
could not be expressed through amicus briefs, as they have sometimes been
in cases involving lawyers' professional conduct.20 2 Moreover, once the Sec-
ond Circuit issued its decision, the rule it laid down as a practical matter was
final.20 3 Because this was adjudication, not rulemaking, the court did not re-
ceive comments and would have been unlikely to reconsider its decision in
response to comments that were put forth.
The theoretical limitations of this process can be illustrated concretely in
the context of the Simels decision. The court in that case failed, at least ex-
plicitly, to consider perspectives that a variety of groups might have been
expected to offer had the same issue been addressed through rulemaking
rather than adjudication. From the organized bar's perspective, the opinion
overlooked an important interest promoted by the no-contact rule. From the
government's perspective, it overvalued the defendant's interest and under-
valued the cooperating witness's interest in effective representation. The
opinion did not consider, from the defense bar's perspective, how the possi-
bility of defense lawyers' ex parte contacts with other defense lawyers' clients
will affect cooperation among potential codefendants and their lawyers. Fi-
nally, the court lost the opportunity to benefit from an academic perspective
on constitutional concerns that lay beneath the surface of the court's opinion.
With the benefit of these varied perspectives, the court might have
reached a different conclusion about the appropriate standard of conduct for
a criminal defense lawyer in Simels's situation. Or, the court might have
been confirmed in its wisdom. Either way, having to acknowledge and ad-
dress these perspectives and to explain its decision in the light of them would
199 See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
200 Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 642-44 (2d Cir. 1995).
201 Simels, of course, appeared in a personal, rather than representational capacity, and
could not have been expected to represent the views of the defense bar insofar as they conflicted
with his own interest in avoiding disciplinary sanctions.
202 See, e.g., United States v. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 65 F.3d 963 (1st
Cir. 1995); In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994).
203 On occasion, a party seeks rehearing or rehearing en banc. On rarer occasion still, a
federal court of appeals revises its opinion in response to such a request. See, e.g., United States
v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir.), modifying 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 498
U.S. 871 (1990). In this case, however, special counsel did not petition for rehearing and, thus,
there would have been no occasion for the court to reconsider its decision.
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have resulted in a ruling worthy of greater respect and confidence for having
been more fully considered.
a. The ABA Perspective: The Value of the No-Contact Rule
The Simels court characterized DR 7-104(A)(1) as "primarily a rule of
professional courtesy, '204 thereby implying that the purposes underlying DR
7-104(A)(1) are not particularly weighty. From the perspective of the ABA,
the court was almost certainly too cavalier in its treatment of this rule for
three reasons.
First, in alluding to the interests served by DR 7-104(A)(1), the court
failed to acknowledge what, in the ABA's view, is "the central proposition"
on which the no-contact rule rests, namely that "'[t]he legal system in its
broadest sense functions best when persons in need of legal advice or assist-
ance are represented by their own counsel.' ",205 How the disciplinary rule
serves the interest in assuring clients the advice and assistance of independ-
ent counsel is most clear when a lawyer contacts a represented person di-
rectly in order to resolve a legal dispute, rather than simply to obtain
information. For example, in a criminal case, a criminal defendant would
ordinarily look to defense counsel for advice about whether to plead guilty or
stand trial. If a prosecutor were to speak to the defendant about these op-
tions in defense counsel's absence, the defendant might feel pressed to make
a decision without the benefit of independent legal advice.2°6 It is for this
reason that the DOJ regulation generally forbids prosecutors to engage di-
rectly in plea negotiations with represented persons.207
In Simels, this interest in effective representation was plainly implicated.
The opinion does not explain how Simels convinced Harper to answer his
questions and sign an affidavit. It is clear, however, that Harper faced a deci-
sion with significant legal consequences. While cooperating with Simels
might have served whatever interest Harper had in assisting Simels's client, it
would have jeopardized his relationship with the government. Harper would
unquestionably have benefitted from his lawyer's advice with regard to this
decision. Had Simels approached Harper through his lawyer, Harper would
have received advice of counsel. Because Simels approached him directly,
Harper did not.
204 Simels, 48 F.3d at 647.
205 ABA Op. 95-396, supra note 116, at 4-5 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
sPoNsmitr.r EC 7-18 (1980)); see also supra note 43 (noting that the no-contact rule protects
clients from opposing counsel and ensures that laypersons make major decisions with the advice
of their own counsel).
206 Cases extending the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to police interrogation serve a
similar function. See, eg., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 & n.7 (1985); see also Uviller,
supra note 53, at 1176 (arguing that once the state's interests become adverse to the defendant's,
police should not be able to use an inquisitorial method of gathering evidence).
Ex parte communications by a codefendant's lawyer might similarly deprive the defendant
of counsel's advice as to an important decision with legal implications. See, eg., United States v.
Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.) (Fletcher, J., concurring) (identifying problems that may
arise when a codefendant's lawyer has contact with another codefendant whose interests poten-
tially conflict with the lawyer's client's interests), vacated, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
207 See Communications with Represented Persons (1994), supra note 92, at 10,092-93.
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Second, the ABA could have been expected to challenge the Simels
court's reasoning that if DR 7-104(A)(1) were more than "a rule of profes-
sional courtesy," it "would have provided protection for unrepresented par-
ties" as well as represented parties. 2 8 Lawyers have no practical choice but
to communicate directly with litigants who choose to represent themselves;
the adversary process could not effectively function otherwise. The ABA
Model Code makes this point in the Ethical Consideration relating to DR 7-
104(A)(1). 20 9 Moreover, to the extent the rule is designed to promote effec-
tive assistance of counsel, as well as to safeguard the lawyer-client relation-
ship and protect against disclosures of attorney-client privileged
information,210 there is no reason to extend its protection to those who are
unrepresented.
Finally, the ABA, which includes far more civil than criminal litigators,
might have been expected to note that the court's derogation of the interests
protected by DR 7-104(A)(1) is inconsistent with the considerable impor-
tance ascribed to the rule by courts, as well as the organized bar, in the civil
context. The rule has been read broadly to impose severe restrictions on civil
litigants' access to potentially relevant evidence. For instance, the rule has
been read to forbid communications with represented individuals who are
not "parties" in a formal sense because civil proceedings have not yet been
initiated,21' with witnesses and others who have interests with respect to liti-
gation but who are not nominal parties in the proceeding, 212 and with em-
ployees and, in some cases, former employees of a corporation that is itself a
party or potential party to litigation. 2 3 Broad effect has also been given both
to the restriction on "communications 2 14 and to the requirement that the
208 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 647.
209 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmILrY EC 7-18 (1980) ("If one is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer representing another may have to deal directly with the unrep-
resented person .... ").
210 See ABA Op. 95-396, supra note 116, at 5.
211 See, e.g., Kearns v. Fred Lavey/Porsche Audi Co., 573 F. Supp. 91, 95-96 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (holding that attorney breached professional standards by negotiating with potential plain-
tiff after he knew that potential plaintiff was represented by other lawyers), aff'd, 745 F.2d 600
(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985); Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc. v. State, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 493, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding rule "attached once an attorney knew that an op-
posing party was represented by counsel even where no formal action had been filed"); Florida
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 78-4 (1978) (holding rule applies "whenever
an attorney-client relationship has been established with regard to the matter in question, re-
gardless of whether or not litigation has commenced"); Mississippi State Bar, Op. 141 (1988)
("[T]he actual filing of a lawsuit or intent to file a lawsuit is irrelevant to the question of whether
the lawyer may communicate with the adverse party."); Oregon State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Gover-
nors, Op. 1991-42 (1991) (holding before instituting lawsuit, lawyer for prospective agent may
not contact prospective defendant or have agent do so if the prospective defendant is known to
be represented); Texas State Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 492 (1994) (holding rule ap-
plies "despite the fact that litigation is neither in progress nor contemplated").
212 For example, the rule has been read to forbid plaintiff's counsel from directly contacting
the defendant's insurer. See, e.g., Waller v. Kotzen, 567 F. Supp. 424, 426-27 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Estate of Vafiades v. Sheppard Bus Serv., 469 A.2d 971, 978 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
213 See infra note 328.
214 See, e.g., In re Schwabe, 408 P.2d 922 (Or. 1965) (disciplining lawyer, in part, for
telephoning adverse party to ask whether he had in fact retained counsel after the lawyer had
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lawyer refrain from communications with represented persons through
others,2 5 while the exception for communications that are "authorized by
law" has been narrowly construed in civil cases. 216 Further, in some civil
cases, courts have considered the no-contact rule sufficiently important to
justify, as a sanction for noncompliance, suppressing evidence 217 or disquali-
fying counsel.218 It is hard to reconcile these broad readings with the notion
that DR 7-104(A)(1) serves no important function.219
b. The Government's Perspective: The Irrelevance of Ex Parte
Communications to Effective Defense Representation
Among the countervailing considerations cited by the Simels court was
the interest of criminal defendants in effective representation, of which one
element is effective pretrial investigation by defense counsel. 2°0 As the court
understood, applying the no-contact rule to pretrial investigations would im-
pede effective representation by foreclosing criminal defense lawyers from
undertaking investigative steps that might produce impeachment evidence or
exculpatory evidence.221 At first blush, it may appear hard to dispute the
importance of this consideration, which alone might outweigh the interests of
represented witnesses and potential defendants that the disciplinary rule pro-
tects. Although DR 7-104(A)(1) has been read more broadly in civil con-
texts, it seems fair, for defense lawyers as well as prosecutors, to allow
greater latitude for ex parte communications in criminal cases, both because
criminal defendants and the government have a more compelling interest in
received a letter from counsel indicating he was representing the adverse party); Board of Pro-
fessional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Op. 85-F-89 (1985) (ruling that attorney
may not eavesdrop on conversation between client and adverse party and that such conduct
constitutes "communication," which is defined as" 'information given; the sharing of knowledge
by one with another .... " (quoting BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 253 (5th ed. 1979)).
215 Lawyers may not circumvent the rule by hiring private investigators to conduct the
questioning. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186, 1214 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (stating that lawyers who order nonlawyer assistants to engage in conduct that vio-
lates the ABA Model Rules are subject to discipline under the Model Rules). Indeed, some
authorities have read the rule to forbid a lawyer from counseling the client personally to contact
a represented adversary. See, eg., In re Murray, 601 P.2d 780, 783 (Or. 1979).
216 See e.g., Oregon State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Op. 1991-6 (1991).
217 See, e.g., Trans-Cold Express, Inc. v. Arrow Motor Transit, Inc., 440 F.2d 1216,1219 (7th
Cir. 1971) ("[T]he desirability of deterring improper investigative conduct [is] a factor which [a]
court could properly consider in the exercise of its discretion to exclude.., evidence."); McCal-
lum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (noting that the court has the power
to prohibit the use of ex parte contacts as admissions); University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F.
Supp. 325, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (concluding that attorney's ex parte contacts with employees of
opposing party should be suppressed).
218 See g., American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 765 F.2d
925 (9th Cir. 1985); Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Shelton v. Hess, 599 F. Supp. 905, 907 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Cronin v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 781 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Nev. 1989).
219 This perhaps is why the Simels opinion, while extensively reviewing criminal case law
applying the rule, does not examine civil case law interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1).
220 See Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 650-51 (2d Cir. 1995).
221 See id at 651.
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securing relevant evidence than do civil litigants and because they have fewer
alternative means of obtaining the evidence.222
Nevertheless, had the government been invited to participate in the dis-
ciplinary proceeding against Simels,2 3 it might have questioned the force of
this interest. Its argument would be that, as a general rule, defense lawyers'
ex parte communications with represented witnesses and potential defend-
ants will not entail a legitimate search for probative evidence. Unlike prose-
cutors and their agents, who make such contacts in the interest of "seeking
justice, '224 defense lawyers will do so in the interest of "zealous advocacy." 225
They will therefore seek to influence witnesses to provide inaccurate ac-
counts which can be used by the defense as evidence or to impeach truthful
222 It has been observed that:
DR 7-104(A)(1) reflects a reasonable and fair determination that, in civil cases, the
interest in open access to information is not substantial enough to outweigh the
interests promoted by the rule. This determination is reasonable because the ethi-
cal rule has only a slight impact on a civil litigant's access to information. In most
cases, the rules of discovery provide an alternative way of obtaining information
that is known to the opposing party. For example, a lawyer may question the op-
posing party in a deposition at which the truthfulness of the party's account can be
put to the test of cross-examination. Because of this opportunity for cross-exami-
nation, the law fairly assumes that in most civil cases, information provided in a
deposition, even if presented in a more favorable light, will not substantially differ
from what would have been learned had the party been questioned in his attorney's
absence. Moreover, even in civil proceedings that do not permit broad prehearing
discovery, an opposing party generally may be called as a witness and questioned at
the hearing itself.
Moreover, the balance struck in civil cases is fair. That is because the impact
of the ethical rule falls equally on both sides of a civil dispute. The rule does not
favor plaintiffs over civil defendants, or vice versa. It does not upset a balance
otherwise created by the law. Neither civil litigant has a greater right or need than
the other to communicate directly with the opposing party.
Green, supra note 43, at 317-18.
223 Had it been available, the government's participation might have been particularly help-
ful because it might have had access to additional evidence or to means of obtaining additional
evidence.
224 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIaarr EC 7-13 (1980) ("[The pros-
ecutor's] duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1992) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate."). See generally Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 3, 4 (1940) ("Although the government technically loses its case, it
has really won if justice has been done."); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991) (discussing
the prosecutor's paramount responsibility to seek justice within the adversarial system).
225 See, eg., Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound. The Intersection of the Ethical
Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REv. 687, 709, 711 (1991) (many criminal defense law-
yers believe that the duty of zealous advocacy, as reflected in ABA Model Code DR 7-101,
requires them to engage in ethically questionable conduct to promote the client's interests); see
also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation-
ship, 85 YALE LJ. 1060, 1060 (1976) (defending traditional conception of lawyer's role "as a
professional devoted to his client's interests and as authorized, if not in fact required, to do some
things (though not anything) for that client which he would not do for himself"); John B. Mitch-
ell, The Ethics of the Criminal Defense Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L.
REv. 293 (1980) (arguing for the necessity of zealous defense even of clients known by the
attorney to be guilty).
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testimony.22 6 This is almost certainly how the government perceived Simels's
conduct. It must have assumed that Davis, Simels's client, had used coercion
or improper inducements to persuade Harper falsely to recant and that
Simels approached Harper to record the false recantation.
Additionally, the government could have been expected to argue that
the interest in effective representation cuts in favor of, as well as against,
restricting communications with represented witnesses because Simels's cli-
ent was not the only one whose interest in effective representation was at
stake. As an arrested defendant who had agreed to cooperate with the gov-
ernment in exchange for leniency, Harper also had an interest in effective
representation.227 Allowing defense lawyers to seek uncounselled statements
from defendants such as Harper denies one group of defendants the benefit
of legal advice needed to protect them from making unwise decisions about
whether to assist another group of defendants.2M
c. The Defense Bar's Perspective: The Impact of Ex Parte Contacts on
Cooperation Within the Defense Bar
If the court had received the views of the defense bar, it would have had
a source of knowledge as to current defense practices and how its ruling
226 The court might well have rejected this argument, had it been made. Lawyers are pre-
sumed to act in accordance with their ethical responsibilities, and there is no justification for
denying this presumption to criminal defense lawyers as a class. See generally, Green, supra note
148, at 1223-30 (discussing traditional judicial optimism about defense attorneys' adherence to
ethical standards). To the extent that defense lawyers conduct investigations consistently with
applicable ethical restrictions, it can be generalized that evidence they uncover through ex parte
contacts will contribute to the discovery of the truth, just as this generalization is made with
respect to prosecutors. See Green, supra note 43, at 317-20. This is not to say that the disclo-
sures themselves will invariably be truthful. However, false information-if proven false-may
be probative regarding the witness's credibility or state of mind. Insofar as such communications
lead to the discovery of truthful, rather than false information, they promote not only the de-
fendant's interest in effective representation but also the public interest in discovering the truth
through the adversarial process.
227 Only the government could have been expected to argue for the interest of cooperating
witnesses in being protected from ex parte contact. The same forces that discourage lawyers
from counseling their clients to cooperate with the government would discourage representatives
of the organized bar from publicly taking the side of cooperating witnesses. See generally Daniel
C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 Onlo ST. LJ. 69, 116-26 (1995) (describing ideological and
economic disincentives against counseling clients to cooperate with the government).
228 The court declined to take the interest of cooperating clients into account, however,
explaining that a district court is not the proper body to choose whether one lawyer's "obligation
to provide effective assistance to his client must yield to another defendant's interests." Griev-
ance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 651 (2d Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, this explanation for not
considering Harper's interest in effective representation seems bewildering, even if one accepts
the court's apparent assumption that the represented person's interest in effective representation
is not one of the interests generally protected by DR 7-104(A)(1). A tension between the inter-
ests of different parties underlies not only DR 7-104(A)(1), but also many of the disciplinary
rules that place limits on zealous representation. Once courts determine to adopt such rules to
regulate lawyers' professional conduct, they have no choice but to resolve such conflicts. In any
case, the Simels court determined to give weight to the interest of Simels's client in effective
representation as a relevant consideration of policy. Having weighed this interest for one class
of defendants-those awaiting trial-it should have weighed this interest for the other affected
class of defendants, i.e., those who were cooperating with the prosecution.
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might alter them. This information would have been important in setting a
standard of professional conduct for criminal defense lawyers. Among the
court's explicit concerns was that a broad reading of DR 7-104(A)(1) would
greatly alter traditional defense practices, a result it said was more appropri-
ately left to Congress or the Supreme Court.229 The opinion provided no
empirical basis, however, for the court's assumption that defense lawyers tra-
ditionally seek evidence from other defense lawyers' clients,23 0 and both the
government and the district court grievance committee evidently viewed
Simels's conduct as exceptional.231 Input from the defense bar would have
enabled the court to learn whether Simels had engaged in a traditional de-
fense practice, as the court assumed.
More important, input from the defense bar might have better enabled
the court to determine, as a practical matter, whether allowing ex parte com-
munications such as those undertaken by Simels will ultimately benefit or
undermine criminal representation. Certainly, from the perspective of crimi-
nal defense lawyers' conduct, the Simels decision is a double-edged sword.
On one hand, it expands opportunities for them to develop evidence that
may be useful in defending their clients against potential or pending criminal
charges. 23 2 As the court noted, defense lawyers are duty bound to provide an
effective defense and zealous representation, which often will entail inter-
viewing prospective witnesses in search of impeachment material or exculpa-
tory evidence. 23 3 Until now, out of concern for DR 7-104(A)(1) (if not as a
matter of courtesy or as a matter of a personal conviction about what is ap-
propriate professional practice), defense lawyers may have hesitated to con-
229 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 651.
230 In other contexts, such as lawyer malpractice cases, expert witnesses customarily testify
about community norms relating to the practice of law. Such testimony might have established
whether criminal defense lawyers have traditionally sought evidence from represented witnesses
or defendants or whether Simels's conduct was aberrational, as the prosecution appears to have
assumed when it referred Simels to the grievance committee. There is no indication, however,
that testimony on this issue was provided at any stage of the Simels case.
231 Moreover, the court's suggestion that it is a traditional practice for criminal defense
lawyers to have ex parte communications with represented witnesses and potential defendants
seems somewhat inconsistent with its endorsement of the view that DR 7-104(A)(1)" 'provid[es]
parties with [a] rule that most would choose to follow anyway.'" Simels, 48 F.3d at 647 (quoting
Leubsdorf, supra note 41, at 686-87).
232 Especially in white collar cases, lawyers representing subjects or targets of a criminal
investigation customarily seek information from potential witnesses and, on occasion, attempt to
influence those witnesses' accounts, either to develop evidence that may be used at trial or, more
often, as part of an effort to stave off the filing of criminal charges. See generally KmNmH
MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 37-100 (1985) (surveying and analyzing how white
collar criminal defense lawyers conduct investigations prior to indictment). Prior to Simels,
these lawyers might have hesitated to communicate ex parte with potential witnesses who had
retained counsel in connection with the investigation or who, as employees of a corporation that
was a subject of the investigation, might be considered to be represented by corporate counsel.
The Simels decision, however, gives defense lawyers in the Second Circuit carte blanche to inter-
view potential witnesses, whether or not they are represented, prior to the filing of criminal
charges.
The court's permissive reading of the no-contact rule will also benefit some defendants who
have been charged with a crime and are awaiting a criminal trial, as Simels's client was when
Simels contacted Harper.
233 See Sinels, 48 F.3d at 651.
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tact directly several classes of prospective witnesses. These classes include
(1) defendants in unrelated criminal cases, 23 4 (2) alleged victims who have
retained lawyers to assist them in their role as witnesses or in connection with
the filing of civil charges, (3) prospective defendants who, as was true of
Harper, face the same possible criminal charges but have agreed to cooperate
with the government by testifying as government witnesses, and (4) code-
fendants who have already pleaded guilty23 5 or against whom the charges
have been dismissed.23 6 After Simels, these witnesses are fair game for de-
fense lawyers in the Second Circuit.
At the same time, Simels poses reciprocal problems for clients in crimi-
nal cases. Prior to Simels, a defense lawyer retained in connection with a
criminal investigation might have cautioned his client not to speak about the
case with anyone else, including even the most trusted friends, because the
government might gain access to the statements and use them against the
client.23 7 The lawyer might have been particularly concerned about forays
from government agents and informants but would scarcely have anticipated
that the lawyers representing other subjects or targets of the investigation
might also seek damaging admissions from the client, either by questioning
the client personally or by employing private investigators.23 8 Nor would a
lawyer for a cooperating defendant in a multidefendant case have expected
that lawyers for other codefendants would seek evidence directly from the
client. After Simels, however, unsophisticated clients may be induced to
make inculpatory or otherwise harmful admissions under the artful question-
ing of other defense lawyers.23 9
That the opportunities and dangers of the Simels decision are reciprocal
for defense lawyers and their clients does not mean that they are equal. In
234 Se4 e.g., New York County 676, supra note 172.
235 Se4 e.g., In re Thompson, 492 A.2d 866, 867 (D.C. 1985).
236 See, eg., United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1988).
237 See, e.g., MANN, supra note 232, at 124-56 (discussing ways to control client disclosures
to third parties).
238 In United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989),
the court determined that Simels had properly been disqualified when he sought to use the
affidavit obtained from Harper to defend his client, because Simels had thereby become a poten-
tial witness. The decision demonstrates the wisdom of ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMnIaSTRAMON OF CRIMIAL JUSCE, THE DEFENSE FUNMd-ON, Standard 4.3(d) (1974) [here-
inafter ABA STANDARDS], which provides:
Unless the lawyer for the accused is prepared to forego impeachment of a witness
by the lawyer's own testimony as to what the witness stated in an interview or to
seek leave to withdraw from the case in order to present his impeaching testimony,
the lawyer should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except in the presence
of a third person.
Id. Standard 4.3(f).
239 Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 651 (2d Cir. 1995). The court warned that:
[I]t is incumbent upon defense attorneys to instruct clients in Harper's position not
to risk foregoing the benefits of a cooperation agreement by talking to, or by sign-
ing statements at the insistence of, another defense attorney. Many defendants are
not sophisticated; most, however, are sophisticated enough to understand the risks
of jeopardizing a cooperation agreement and potentially subjecting themselves to
perjury charges.
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some respects, the decision would seem to be a net gain for the clients of
criminal defense lawyers because the disclosures that defense lawyers will
obtain through ex parte communications with prospective witnesses will ben-
efit their defendant clients more than they will hurt the witnesses who made
the disclosures. For the defendants, the stakes are extraordinarily high. Dis-
closures that may be used to exonerate a client or to impeach a witness may
help tip the balance toward acquittal. The stakes will ordinarily be lower for
the witnesses. On rare occasion, as the Simels opinion notes, a witness's "un-
counselled statement... could jeopardize that person's cooperation agree-
ment and be used against him or her at trial."24° The greater likelihood,
however, is that the witness will simply make inconsistent statements that,
while useful to the defendant's lawyer in cross-examining the witness, cause
only embarrassment to the witness.
On the other hand, by inviting one defense lawyer to contact other de-
fense lawyers' clients, Simels poses a collateral risk to both defendants and
the truth-seeking process. For defense lawyers, the opportunity afforded by
Simels presents a difficult choice: Should they interview other represented
suspects, targets, or defendants? Indeed, are they ethically or constitution-
ally obligated or both to do so, in order to afford the zealous representation
and effective assistance of counsel to which, Simels notes in several places,
their clients are entitled?24' Or may they and should they refrain from doing
so either as a matter of courtesy or to preserve harmonious relations among
defense lawyers representing clients with similar interests? The decision will
create a level of uncertainty about the choices that fellow lawyers will
make.242 Whether or not defense lawyers opt to interview other lawyers' cli-
ents, the very possibility that they will do so may foster distrust among law-
yers. This, in turn, may undermine cooperation among lawyers for potential
or actual codefendants,2 43 thereby facilitating government efforts to "divide
240 Id.
241 See infra note 247.
242 The possibility that other lawyers' clients will choose to cooperate with the govern-
ment's investigation creates a similar type of uncertainty. See generally Richman, supra note
227, at 89-90.
243 Defense lawyers recognize the importance of cooperation among lawyers for defend-
ants in multidefendant cases. For example, a lawyer who represented one of 22 defendants who
were acquitted after a 22 month trial recently observed:
You have absolutely no choice, if you want to win these cases, but to work closely
with your fellow defense counsel and their clients. If you don't, you will surely lose.
You can not afford to have any additional enemies in the courtroom acting out of
malice or out of ignorance.
"Uncensored" CJA Seminar: Basic to Advanced Practice, 9 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 99, 103
(Mar. 1, 1995) (quoting Henry Asbill).
Judicial decisions recognize that defense lawyers share information, divide investigative
tasks, plan strategy together, and divide tasks at trial. See, eg., United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d
911,919 (2d Cir. 1993) (sharing of discovery material). Moreover, the law generally favors coop-
eration among counsel for parties aligned in interest on the theory that such cooperation pro-
motes effective representation and, in turn, truth-seeking. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Superior
Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating that attorney-client and work
product privileges are not necessarily waived upon disclosure of documents to codefendants with
whom the client has a commonality of interest). Thus, the attorney-client privilege has been
extended to protect disclosures of client confidences among counsel representing parties with a
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and conquer." Thus, while Simels makes defense lawyers more certain about
one thing-how the federal court grievance committee will regard contacts
with represented witnesses244 -it makes them less certain about another, i.e.,
whether other defense lawyers will now attempt to take advantage of their
clients. In setting a standard governing criminal defense lawyers' dealings
with other lawyers' clients, the court would have benefitted from the defense
bar's perspective on the importance of cooperation among criminal defense
lawyers and the impact of a permissive rule on such cooperation.
d. The Academic Perspective: Constitutional Implications of the No-
Contact Rule
At bottom, the court's decision may have been driven less by considera-
tions of policy than by considerations of power, or lack thereof. Although
the court in Simels professed to be interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1), its doubts
about whether a district court could have adopted a broader rule lie barely
beneath the surface of the opinion. Its doubts reflected two concerns. The
first was that lower federal courts would lack supervisory authority to circum-
scribe pretrial investigations by means of a broader disciplinary rule.245 To be
sure, the court opined that the federal district courts' supervisory authority
over lawyers "should not be used as a means to substantially alter federal
criminal law practice," 246 not that this authority may not be so used. But the
latter possibility is certainly implicit.
Second, the court was concerned about constitutional limits on the dis-
trict court's supervisory authority. The Simels opinion makes several refer-
ences to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel,247 but does not
common interest. In order to receive the benefit of the privilege, criminal defense lawyers in-
creasingly enter into formal agreements, termed "joint defense" agreements, which memorialize
the terms of their cooperation. See generally Daniel J. Capra, The Attorney-Client Privilege in
Common Representations, 20 TRIAL L.Q. 20 (1989) (describing the mechanics of a joint defense
and the possible ethical problems that its use can create); Patricia G. Wells, A Survey of Attor-
ney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U. MtAMi L. REv. 321 (1981) (explaining the role of the
attorney-client privilege in a joint defense); Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-Defense
Doctrine from the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1273 (1990) (focusing on the need
for a joint-defense privilege); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Multiple Party Situations, 8
COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 156 (1972) (reviewing the common law of attorney-client privilege
in multiple party situations). Lawyers who undertake "joint defense" agreements may respond
to Simels by including a provision barring participants from contacting each others' clients with-
out permission.
244 It may still be unclear how state court disciplinary committees will regard such contacts
by defense lawyers in federal criminal proceedings. State authorities in New York may interpret
DR 7-104(A)(1) more broadly, to proscribe the conduct that Simels deemed permissible, and
prosecute criminal defense lawyers licensed by the state for violating the state disciplinary rule.
The Simels opinion might discourage the enforcement of state disciplinary rules in this way but
does not explicitly foreclose it.
245 The DOI has made this argument in justifying its regulation. See supra note 121.
246 Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also
id. ("If such substantial modifications are to be made, they should occur only after careful con-
sideration by the representative branches of the federal government.").
247 See, e.g., id. ("The Committee's interpretation... raises important issues of policy af-
fecting... the ability of defense counsel to provide the effective assistance and zealous represen-
tation that the Sixth Amendment and DR 7-101, respectively, guarantee to criminal
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explicitly state that a disciplinary rule barring defense contacts with repre-
sented witnesses would contravene that right. Although Simels apparently
did not defend his conduct on constitutional grounds, the court's concerns
were understandable. Numerous decisions have recognized that, to satisfy
the right, criminal defense lawyers must undertake reasonable investiga-
tion.248 If read broadly, DR 7-104(A)(1) would bar defense lawyers from
interviewing represented witnesses who are likely to have relevant evidence,
thus impeding their ability adequately to investigate the case. The Supreme
Court has previously held that a trial court, although motivated by legitimate
ethical considerations, violates the right to effective assistance of counsel
when it forbids a criminal defense lawyer from consulting with the defendant
during an overnight recess between the defendant's direct and cross-exami-
nation.249 It might similarly be argued that, as applied to criminal defense
lawyers, DR 7-104(A)(1) violates the right to effective assistance of counsel,
notwithstanding the possible legitimacy of the ethical concerns underlying
the rule.
Interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1) narrowly enabled the Simels court to avoid
questions about the scope of a court's supervisory authority and the constitu-
tional limits on that authority.250 Yet, the court might have been less re-
strained had it received the benefit of the views of legal scholars who had
studied, or were willing to study, these questions. The court might have been
convinced of its authority to apply the no-contact rule to restrict evidence
gathering by criminal defense lawyers. Alternatively, academic commentary
might have confirmed the court's doubts about the scope of its power, lead-
defendants."); id. at 650 (noting the court "balanc[ed] the purposes served by DR 7-104(A)(1)
against the overriding concern of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel and a lawyer's ethical duty of zealous advocacy"); id. at 651 (noting that by
interviewing a represented witness in search of impeachment material or exculpatory evidence,
the defense "attorney is providing the effective defense and zealous representation required by
the Sixth Amendment and DR 7-101, respectively").
248 See, eg., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) ("[C]ounsel has a duty to
make reasonable investigations ...."); Walker v. Mitchell, 587 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Va. 1984)
(discussing circumstances under which a defense lawyer must investigate a particular defense);
see also Bruce A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1053, 1078 n.16 4 (1980) (contending that inadequacy of investigation should be
relevant only insofar as it impairs lawyer's performance).
249 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976); see also Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853, 857 (1975) (stating that the right to effective assistance of counsel "mean[s] that there
[are] no restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord
with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process").
250 In Simes, the court of appeals had no need to concede that it was doing more, or doing
something other, than simply interpreting a disciplinary provision that had been incorporated by
reference in a district court's local rule. It would have to do so, however, if a district court within
the circuit were later to adopt a disciplinary rule that unambiguously reached a result opposite
from the one reached in Simels-for example, a rule that explicitly bars defense lawyers from
contacting witnesses or potential defendants who are represented by counsel. In that event, the
court of appeals would have to determine whether to strike down the rule as a matter of its own
supervisory authority over lawyer practice, on the ground that the district court exceeded its own
authority in adopting the rule, or on the ground that the rule contravenes the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. It is virtually inconceivable, however, that a district court would put the court
of appeals to this test.
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big it to cite constitutional concerns explicitly to justify a permissive reading
of the no-contact rule. In the former case, the court might have set a stan-
dard of conduct that was more appropriate on policy grounds; in the latter
case, it might have provided a more persuasive rationale for the standard it
set.
2. The Limited Reach of Case-by-Case Adjudication
The Simels court gave weight to the need for drawing a "clear line" that
provides defense lawyers "fair" and "clear notice" about the scope of DR 7-
104(A)(1). 25 1 The court could have provided as much clarity, however, while
bringing Simels's conduct within the ambit of the rule. Quite simply, it could
have read "party" in DR 7-104(A)(1) to mean "person. '252 Under this read-
ing, Simels could not properly have contacted Harper about the shooting be-
cause Harper clearly was represented in connection with the shooting.
In the context of Simels, in any event, the justification rooted in the need
for clear line drawing seems unpersuasive because the court's interpretation
does not in fact draw a clear line. While establishing that witnesses, targets of
a criminal investigation, and arrested but unindicted defendants are not "par-
ties," the court never resolved whether some or all indicted codefendants are"parties" for purposes of the rule.253
On its face, DR 7-104(A) is ambiguous with respect to actual codefend-
ants, just as it was with respect to witnesses and potential codefendants. On
the one hand, indicted codefendants are certainly "parties" vis-a-vis the gov-
ernment. On the other hand, codefendants may not be "parties" vis-a-vis
each other. As Simels notes, DR 7-104 is titled "Communicating with One of
Adverse Interest," and the Second Circuit has never previously interpreted
the term, "adverse interest. 254 The meaning of the term may not be rele-
vant, in that it did not find its way into the text of the disciplinary rule itself.
Alternatively, in the light of the title, the term "party" may be read to imply
some element of adversity.
Moreover, if adversity is required, another question is how much.
Would there be sufficient adversity if the codefendants' lawyers were not for-
251 See 48 F.3d at 649-51.
252 Apparently, this is how the drafters of the rule meant it to be read. One commentator
explains: "Although the matter is not entirely clear under the Code, probably DR 7-104(A)(1)
and, clearly, MR 4.2 prohibit contact with any represented person, including those whose inter-
ests are apparently not adverse to the interests of an existing client of the lawyer." WOLFRAM,
supra note 4, § 11.6.2 (footnotes omitted). This commentator further explains: "The lawyerism
party sometimes refers only to parties in litigation but evidently is here intended to refer broadly
to any 'person' represented by a lawyer in a matter. Vide 'party of the first part' in ancient
contracts." Id § 11.6.2 n.33; see also ABA Op. 95-396, supra note 116, at 6-9 (interpreting"party" in MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2 (1983) to mean "person"). In
August 1995, the ABA amended Model Rule 4.2 to replace the term "party" with "person," in
order to clarify that this is the appropriate reading. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 45, at 266-
68 (excerpting ABA report).
253 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
254 See Simels, 48 F.3d at 646-47. Courts have interpreted the requirement of adversity for
the purpose of other rules. See, eg., United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1993)
(interpreting FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(A)).
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mally cooperating in the defense and the lawyer's communication was for the
purpose of discovering the codefendant's position? Or would the codefend-
ants' interests merely be "potentially adverse" or "different" at that point? Is
it even enough that the codefendant is a party with interests adverse to those
of the defendant, as would be true at the point when the defendant's attorney
decided to interview the codefendant to obtain evidence to exculpate the cli-
ent? Or must codefendants be "adversaries" in the sense of having already
raised antagonistic defenses? Further, does the answer turn on whether the
codefendants will be jointly tried? If it appears that the codefendants will not
be litigants in the same courtroom proceeding, so that one is at most a poten-
tial witness vis-a-vis the other, does the codefendant cease to be a "party" (if
otherwise he would have been one)? 25 5
Both the ABA's ethics committee25 6 and a federal district court outside
the Second Circuit257 have recently concluded that an indicted defendant's
lawyer may not contact a represented codefendant. The grievance committee
that sanctioned Simels had assumed that actual codefendants are "parties"
for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) and therefore are off limits to ex parte con-
tacts by the lawyers for other defendants.25 8 This assumption was critical to
its conclusion that potential codefendants are "parties." Yet, perceiving the
status of actual codefendants to be unclear, the Simels court rejected the
grievance committee's presupposition and declined to resolve the issue, ex-
plaining that it was "not presented for [the court's] resolution."25 9 Thus, in
the end, the court did not draw a clear line, but shifted an unclear one.
At the same time, the court provided a framework for analyzing the is-
sue that seems to point in the opposite direction from the conclusion reached
by the ABA, the recent district court opinion, and the grievance committee.
Given the ambiguity of DR 7-104(A)(1) as applied to codefendants, Simels
indicates that the appropriate interpretive approach is to focus on policy con-
siderations. The three principal policy considerations leading to a narrow
interpretation in Simels would seem to be equally, if not more, applicable to
communications with represented codefendants.
The first is the concern for promoting "investigation essential to a de-
fense attorney's preparation for trial."260 If, as the court noted, "contacting
represented co-targets during the investigative phase of a large conspiracy" is
an element of "critical pre-trial investigation," 261 then contacting the same
255 The Simels opinion strongly suggested this distinction in emphasizing that:
Harper was a cooperating witness and in name only would have been a possible
codefendant or "party" in [the] criminal proceeding [that might be brought against
Davis for his involvement in the shooting of a government witness].... [B]y merely
naming a cooperating witness as a codefendant, the government could cut off a
defendant's ability to contact a represented "codefendant" even though that person
would not likely be a "codefendant" at trial.
Simels, 48 F.3d at 650.
256 See ABA Op. 95-396, supra note 116, at 6 & n.11.
257 See United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 162 F.R.D. 11 (D.P.R. 1995).
258 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
259 Simels, 48 F.3d at 650.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 651.
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individuals after the co-targets have become indicted codefendants would
seem even more crucial. That is because, once the defendant is indicted, the
need is more apparent to conduct pretrial investigation. This is especially
true because individuals have no constitutional right to counsel until they
have been arrested or charged.2 62 The overwhelming number of defendants
being indigent, few secure counsel until that point. Consequently, this may
be the first time that such investigative steps can be taken.
The second policy concern in Simels was the need for "clear notice" of
the scope of the disciplinary rule.263 Interpreting the rule to provide that
their clients' codefendants are never parties would provide defense lawyers
the greatest possible notice. Virtually any alternative interpretation would
present questions about what the rule meant or whether it applied in various
contexts. For example, providing that codefendants are "parties" only when
their interests are actually adverse to those of each other will raise both inter-
pretive issues about the extent of the requisite adversity and factual questions
about whether the codefendants' interests met the threshold of adversity in a
given case. Likewise, distinguishing between codefendants who are likely to
be tried together and those who will be tried separately, if at all, presents
both an interpretive issue about how likely a joint trial must be and a factual
question about whether it is sufficiently clear in a given case that codefend-
ants will be tried together. 264
The last policy consideration was the need to avoid using disciplinary
rules to resolve issues of federal law enforcement policy.265 The question of
whether DR 7-104(A)(1) bars ex parte communications with codefendants
certainly implicates such issues. The question pits one defendant's interest in
obtaining possibly relevant evidence against another defendant's interest in
access to a lawyer's advice. As the court noted in Simels: "If one defense
attorney's obligation to provide effective assistance to his client must yield to
another defendant's interests, that choice should be made either by Congress
or the Supreme Court, and not by district courts' expansive interpretations of
disciplinary rules.''266 This observation should have at least as much force in
the context of actual codefendants as it did in Simels, which implicated the
competing interests of potential codefendants.267
262 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 906 F.2d
1485, 1493 (10th Cir. 1990).
263 See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
264 Even after a trial begins, a defendant in a multi-defendant trial may choose to plead
guilty and testify for the government. Thus, from the perspective of a defendant's lawyer, there
is never certainty that an individual will remain a codefendant and not become a witness.
265 See supra notes 245-250 and accompanying text.
266 Simels, 48 F.3d at 651.
267 At the same time, however, exempting codefendants from the reach of DR 7-104(A)(1)
would appear contrary to a different policy consideration that clearly motivated the Simels deci-
sion, although it was not identified explicitly. Implicit in Simels was a concern for preserving
symmetry between defense and prosecutorial practices. Although the issue before the court was
the propriety of a defense lawyer's ex parte communications with a represented person, the
court undertook an extensive review of prior decisions interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1) as applied
to prosecutors. See id. at 647. In doing so, the court referred to prosecutorial conduct in a
manner implying that its decision was driven by a concern for how the rule applies to prosecu-
tors as well as defense lawyers. See id..
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By leaving open whether these codefendants may be approached with-
out their lawyers' permission, the court compounded the uncertainties that
defense lawyers face after Simels. While extolling the virtues of "clear no-
tice," the opinion failed to provide guidance to defense lawyers in mul-
tidefendant cases about whether they may invoke this investigative option to
obtain evidence helpful to their clients. Likewise, it left lawyers uncertain
whether their own clients will be viewed as a fertile source of information by
lawyers for the codefendants. To this extent, it may undermine cooperation
among lawyers seeking to wage a common defense on their clients' behalf.
The opinion thus reflects one of the most glaring shortcomings of adopt-
ing general rules to be interpreted in adjudication, as compared with adopt-
ing detailed, context-specific rules. The process of establishing precise
standards of conduct for lawyers in adjudication is haphazard. Courts do not
address the propriety of questionable conduct until required to do so, either
because, as in Simels, disciplinary proceedings were initiated, or because the
propriety of the lawyer's conduct is relevant in the context of litigation. Such
cases arise infrequently in federal court, however. While waiting for a court
to resolve questions of lawyer conduct, lawyers must either refrain from pos-
sibly permissible conduct that might serve their clients' interests or engage in
such conduct at the risk of facing disciplinary proceedings, as did Simels.
By interpreting "party" in the disciplinary rule to authorize defense lawyers' communica-
tions with witnesses and potential defendants, the court afforded defense lawyers the same inves-
tigative opportunity it had previously afforded federal prosecutors, albeit by interpreting other
terms of DR 7-104(A)(1). See United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 1988) (stat-
ing that prosecutors are "authorized by law" to seek to elicit statements from a represented
defendant prior to indictment), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990); see also United States v.
Thompson, 35 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling that DR 7-104(A)(1) did not apply to law enforce-
ment agent performing investigative function); United States v. De Villio, 983 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.
1993) (finding no violation of DR 7-104(A)(1) where government arranged for codefendant to
record incriminating conversations with defendants); United States v. Schwimmer, 882 F.2d 22
(2d Cir. 1989) (finding no violation of DR 7-104(A)(1) where prosecutor questioned before a
grand jury a convicted defendant during pendency of that defendant's appeal), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1071 (1990). It thereby preserved the legitimacy of its prior decisions narrowly interpreting
the rule as applied to federal prosecutors. The federal prosecutors' interest in seeking evidence
of guilt seems no more compelling than the defendant's interest in seeking evidence of inno-
cence. Having previously found the prosecution's interest compelling enough to permit prosecu-
tors to communicate directly with represented persons before they have been indicted, the court
would have been hard put to justify striking the opposite balance in the context of investigations
by criminal defense lawyers.
In the case of indicted codefendants, by contrast, the interest in preserving a "level playing
field" would argue for applying the rule to indicted codefendants. Clearly, indicted defendants
are "parties" vis-a-vis the government. Insofar as DR 7-104(A)(1) applies to prosecutors after
the recent DOJ regulation, it almost certainly proscribes communications with indicted defend-
ants about the subject of the pending charges. Allowing defense lawyers to contact indicted
codefendants would thus afford them an investigative opportunity denied to prosecutors. If the
court in Simels was implicitly concerned about interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1) to avoid providing
one side a procedural advantage, this concern would cut in favor of defining codefendants as"parties," notwithstanding that the court's explicit concerns cut the other way.
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II Judicial Rulemaking
A. The Process for Developing Federal Rules of Professional Conduct
As the previous discussions reflect, several considerations bear on the
questions about the choice of institution to draft and promulgate rules of
professional conduct, the process by which the rules should be drafted, and
the nature of the rules themselves. First, the law governing lawyers should
set standards of conduct that are both appropriate and perceived to be ap-
propriate. The DOJ regulation fails by this measure because of the partisan-
ship of those who drafted and promulgated it. Second, the applicable
standards of conduct should be clear. The bar association rules fail by this
measure, as the Simels case reflects. Third, insofar as possible, the standards
applicable in the different jurisdictions in which lawyers practice should be
consistent. Finally, the process for developing standards of professional con-
duct should be reasonably efficient.
In the light of these considerations, the most appropriate process for de-
veloping professional standards for federal practice is the obvious one that
has been resisted by federal courts thus far: federal judicial rulemaking. The
federal rulemaking process has a long history.268 Since the adoption of the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934,269 the Supreme Court has promulgated rules of
practice for federal court, beginning with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938270 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946.271 Since 1958,
principal responsibility for drafting federal rules of practice has been vested
in the Judicial Conference,272 which acts through a Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure and various advisory committees.273
While doubts have been raised about the Supreme Court's authority to
adopt procedural rules pursuant to express federal authority,274 there would
be little question of its authority to adopt rules of professional conduct for
lawyers in federal proceedings.275 As noted earlier, lower federal courts have
268 See generally McCabe, supra note 34, at 1658-64 (recounting the history of promulga-
tion of federal rules of practice and procedure).
269 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 331, 2071-77 (1994)).
270 FED. R. Civ. P. 86(a).
271 FED. R. CRum. P. 59.
272 See Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1994)).
273 See McCabe, supra note 34, at 1659.
274 See id. at 1658 & n.10 (citing authority).
275 Federal courts may adopt rules of professional conduct pursuant to their supervisory
authority over the practice of law. See supra note 7; see also Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar
Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 724 (6th Cir.) ("Federal courts have the inherent authority to discipline
attorneys practicing before them .... "), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 940 (1993); Paul E. Iacono Struc-
tural Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435,439 (9th Cir.) ("In the absence of rules promulgated
by higher authorities in the judicial system, the district courts are free to regulate the conduct of
lawyers appearing before them."), cert denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983). Additionally, they have
authority to do so pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1994), which provides: "The Supreme Court
and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the
conduct of their business."
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done so even in the absence of explicit legislative authority. 276 The problem,
however, is that they have principally relied on imprecise bar association
rules, rather than assuming responsibility for drafting detailed rules.
Rather than continuing to abdicate responsibility for the content of pro-
fessional standards, the federal judiciary should develop independent stan-
dards through federal court rulemaking. Federal rules of professional
conduct should apply in all federal judicial proceedings. These rules should
comprehensively address lawyers' coduct as it relates to litigation. The obvi-
ous process for developing such rules would be a variant of the one by which
federal courts promulgate rules of procedure, a process that has been refined
over the course of more than sixty years277 and has proven successful.278
Alternatively, the Judicial Conference could employ a more streamlined
process that preserves three essential features of the current federal rulemak-
ing process. First, responsibility for drafting rules should be placed in the
hands of a broadly constituted group including federal judges, practitioners,
academics, state judges, and representatives of the DOJ.279 Second, the pro-
cess should allow for consideration of a broad range of perspectives, both by
inviting public comment at public hearings during the drafting stage and by
providing an opportunity for public comment on proposed rules.280 Third,
the rules should be reviewed and promulgated by the Supreme Court, which
may, if it chooses, defer entirely to the Judicial Conference. 281
The process should diverge in two respects from the customary practice
with respect to procedural rules. First, it should be directed toward develop-
ing rules that are more specific and detailed than most federal rules of proce-
dure and evidence. Many procedural and evidentiary rules are designed to
vest considerable discretion in courts.28 2 There is no benefit, however, to
rules of professional conduct that invite inconsistent interpretation and appli-
cation. Lawyers should be afforded as much certainty as possible about
whether their proposed conduct is proper. As discussed below, the adoption
of specific rules is the only reliable means of affording such certainty, and is
the means likely to produce the most appropriate standards.
Second, the process should be an ongoing one, characterized by the re-
consideration and amendment of prior rules in the light of courts' exper-
iences and by the adoption of new ones. In general, the federal judiciary has
been unwilling to make frequent changes to the procedural rules2 and its
changes have occasionally been criticized as unnecessary.284 In the case of
276 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
277 See McCabe, supra note 34, at 1658-64.
278 See supra note 34.
279 See McCabe, supra note 34, at 1664-66.
280 See id at 1669-73.
281 See id. at 1674-75 ("[T]he Court's enormous prestige clearly contributes to the legiti-
macy and credibility of the process.").
282 See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 201,403, 608(b), 609(a) & (b), 611(a) & (b), 614(a), 705,706(a),
1003; FED. R. CQv. P. 6(b), 12(f), 13(f), 14(a), 15(a) & (b), 16(a), 19(b), 20(b), 24(b).
283 See McCabe, supra note 34, at 1678-81.
284 See id. at 1678-79 & nn.114-16 (citing Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural
Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 841 (1993); John P. Frank, The Rules
of Civil Procedure-Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1883, 1884-85 (1989); Michael E.
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judicial rules of professional conduct, however, ongoing review will serve two
purposes. First, it will provide a vehicle to craft rules governing conduct that
has not been adequately addressed by existing rules. Among other things,
ongoing review will enable the federal judiciary either to reject or to codify
standards of conduct that are adopted interstitially by federal courts. Second,
this process will serve as a vehicle to review federal court interpretations of
existing rules and, more importantly, to resolve conflicting interpretations
rendered by courts of different jurisdictions, thereby promoting uniform stan-
dards throughout federal courts.
No doubt, the prospect of federal judicial rulemaking would be strongly
resisted by -the ABA, which, seeking to preserve, its influence over the con-
tent of the professional rules, 28 5 would favor applying the ABA Model Rules
in all federal proceedings. State judges, state disciplinary counsel, and state
bar associations may urge federal courts to apply the rules of the states in
which they sit.28 6 Academics who consult in the area of legal ethics can be
expected to favor these options,2 7 and the DOJ may also, inasmuch as the
Tigar, Pretrial Case Management Under the Amended Rules: Too Many Words for a Good Idea,
14 REv. LMIG. 137, 138 (1994)).
285 Cf. Coquillette Report, supra note 13, at 36 ("The American Bar Association ... would
probably prefer to see a national standard for all federal courts, particularly if it followed the
ABA Model Rules. This would.., probably hasten the day when all states adopt the ABA
Model Rules.").
286 See supra note 143 (discussing state judges' opposition to DOJ regulation).
287 Academic authorities on legal ethics have made a cottage industry of serving as "ethics
experts," opining on the meaning of unclear ethical rules in opinion letters and in litigation. See
Monroe Freedman, Crusading for Legal Ethics, LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 1995, at 25 ("Expert
witnesses on lawyers' and judges' ethics charge as much as $500 an hour for their time, and some
law professors double and triple their academic salaries by consulting and testifying about eth-
ics."). Some have argued that obtaining advice from an individual expert, with whom the inquir-
ing lawyer would have an attorney-client privilege, is preferable to obtaining advice from an
ethics committee. Because statements to an ethics committee generally would not be privileged,
an attorney would usually hesitate to provide it with the kind of detailed information necessary
to an informed decision on matters of complexity. See Experts Examine Function of Legal Ethics
Opinions, 7 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 2,36-37 (Feb. 13,1991) (citing comments
of Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., at a meeting of the National Organization of Bar Counsel
in February 1991).
Increasingly, lawyers have also turned to ethics experts to give opinions to judicial or disci-
plinary bodies about the scope of ethical rules. See, eg., Williams v. Warden, State Prison, 586
A.2d 582, 586 (Conn. 1991) (noting the testimony of experts on lawyers' professional responsibil-
ity); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 593 A.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990)
(stating that defendants submitted the affidavits of ethics experts); Committee of Professional
Ethics v. Baudino, 452 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Iowa 1990) (noting testimony of ethics expert); In re
Gaulkin, 351 A.2d 740, 746 (N.J. 1976) (citing the affidavit of a draftsman for the ABA Special
Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct); see also Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About
When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 243, 244 &
n.13 (1985) (noting the proliferation of ethics experts); Joseph J. Portuondo, Abusive Tax Shel-
ters, Legal Malpractice, and Revised Formal Ethics Opinion 346: Does Revised 346 Enable Third
Party Investors to Recover from Tax Attorneys Who Violate Its Standards?, 61 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 220, 238-39 (1986) (noting the increased use of ethics experts in the courtroom). On occa-
sion, courts have reacted unfavorably to the submission of expert affidavits or testimony on
matters of legal ethics. See, e.g., United States v. Eyerman, 660 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) ("Supplying such affidavits.., seems rather presumptuous, considering that the affiants
have not been asked by the Court for their views . . . ."). More often, however, the expert
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federal courts' continued reliance on unclear bar association rules would per-
petuate the conditions that justify the DOJ in employing a preemptive
regulation.
Finally, many federal judges may prefer adopting ABA rules to the
seemingly more burdensome alternative of drafting detailed rules through a
process comparable to the one that has produced federal rules of procedure
and evidence.28 8 Nonetheless, as the following Parts demonstrate, judicial
rulemaking is superior to either federal agency rulemaking or judicial reli-
ance on bar association rules when measured against the four benchmarks
relevant to the processes for developing professional standards: appropriate-
ness, clarity, consistency, and efficiency. Moreover, contrary to a suggestion
in Professor Coquillette's report, comprehensive federal rules of ethics will
simplify, rather than complicate, the professional lives of lawyers and law
students.
opinions have been considered helpful. See, e.g., Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57,
62 (2d Cir. 1988) (relying on an ethics expert's testimony in interpreting DR 7-102(B)); Fisons
Corp. v. Atochem North America, Inc., No. 90 CIV. 1080 (JMC), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15284,
at *20-*22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1990) (relying on the opinions of experts in order to determine
whether lawyers met the requirements of DR 5-105(C)).
Why, as a theoretical matter, courts should rely on expert testimony on legal ethics-a sub-
ject governed by domestic law, and judge-made law at that-has never fully been explained. See
Green, supra note 6, at 521. The value of law professors as ethics experts turns in large measure
on the ambiguity of the prevailing rules of professional conduct. Academic experts can claim
insight into the meaning of ethics rules that others do not share based, for example, on their
familiarity with the drafting process and on other indicia of intent that are not easily accessible.
288 Judicial rulemaking on a more modest level has drawn support in recent years as an
approach to developing rules of professional conduct. See, e.g., In re Opinion 668 of the Advi-
sory Comm. on Professional Ethics, 633 A.2d 959, 960 (N.J. 1993) (reserving final determination
of ethical restraints on ex parte interviews of employees of a corporate litigant until receipt of a
report of a special committee that was appointed to assess the effects of any rule that the court
might adopt); Establishing Ethical Standards, supra note 53, at 44-45 (endorsing "the federal
district courts' adoption of ethical standards" for lawyers in federal criminal cases based on rec-
ommendations "from a committee established for this purpose which would be composed of
members of various constituencies"); see also United States v. Ward, 895 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 &
n.4 (N.D. II1. 1995) ("A host of questions plagues any attempt to apply Rule 4.2 or its predeces-
sor to prosecutors in the pre-indictment, non-custodial setting present in this case.... If there is
to be national uniformity in this area, this Court believes it can only come through the Supreme
Court's exercise of its rule-making power to craft a uniform rule for federal criminal
prosecutions.").
One federal court, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, appointed a
group two years ago to "undertak[e] a detailed, rule-by-rule analysis of the rules of ethics that
should apply in the Court." See Eastern District Studies Ethic Rules, Welcomes Comments,
N.Y.LJ., Jan. 18,1994, at 48. The group was authorized to consider not only recommending the
adoption of existing rules or sets of rules, but also "recommend[ing] some entirely different
rules." Id Although the group's mandate allows the possibility of fashioning rules that are
more detailed, and less ambiguous, than those now in effect, the group is unlikely to take on such
a demanding task exclusively for the benefit of a single judicial district. This course might eco-
nomically be undertaken by the Judicial Conference, however, since its work product would
ultimately apply throughout the federal courts. Further, while individual districts might adopt
rules that are more appropriate than existing rules and that provide greater guidance to lawyers
who know that they are subject to the rules of that court, these sets of rules will not address the
problem of interdistrict balkanization.
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B. Appropriateness of Standards of Conduct
Perhaps the most important measure of a process for developing profes-
sional standards for federal litigators is the extent to which the standards the
process produces are likely to be appropriate and perceived to be so by the
courts that enforce them, the lawyers subject to them, and others whose in-
terests are affected by them. This consideration has been given short shrift in
discussions about the "balkanization" of professional rules 28 9 From the per-
spective of fashioning the most appropriate standards of conduct, the federal
judicial development of detailed rules is superior to the alternatives ad-
dressed in Parts I and II-namely, agency rulemaking or judicial reliance on
bar association models-for three reasons.
First, specific rules are superior to general rules in capturing appropriate
contextual distinctions. For example, although several ABA provisions make
distinctions based on the context in which lawyers serve,290 the overwhelming
majority apply to lawyers serving in wide-ranging and vastly different roles:
some apply to lawyers engaged in all forms of advocacy;291 many more apply
to lawyers serving in all representational capacities; 292 and a handful even
apply to lawyers in their personal as well as professional capacity.293 Yet,
context is important to determining what professional conduct is proper.294
The ABA rules often fail to take account of meaningful contextual distinc-
tions, such as those based on the lawyer's role.295
289 See, e.g., Coquillette Report, supra note 13, at 1-3.
290 See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d) (1994) (contingent fee
may not be charged in domestic relations or criminal case).
291 See, e.g., id. Rule 3.1 (lawyer may not file frivolous claims or make frivolous contentions
in a proceeding); id. Rule 3.2 (a lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation); id.
Rule 3.3 (duty of candor to a tribunal); id. Rule 3.4 (fairness to opposing party and counsel); id.
Rule 3.5 (relations to the tribunal); id. Rule 3.7 (lawyer as witness).
292 See, ag., id Rule 1.1 (competence); id. Rule 1.2 (scope of representation); id. Rule 1.3
(diligence); id. Rule 1.4 (communication with client); id. Rule 1.6 (confidentiality); id. Rule 1.7
(conflicts of interest).
293 See eg., id Rules 8.1-8.4 (prohibiting lawyers from engaging in certain conduct in both
personal and professional contexts); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBiLY DR 1-101
to -103 (1981) (identifying requirements applicable to lawyers in their personal and professional
roles).
294 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 21, at 975; Green & Coleman, supra note 139, at 967-68;
Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Special-
ties, 7 GEo. . LEGAL ETMCS 149, 149 (1993); Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1151.
295 Optimally, professional norms will take account of different lawyering roles both in a
broad sense-distinguishing, for example, between civil litigation and criminal advocacy or be-
tween advocacy and counseling, see, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Account-
ability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L Rav. 669, 669 (1978) (arguing that in a nonadversarial setting
different principles of professional behavior should apply); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN Rrs. 1, 12 (1975) (asserting "the amoral behavior of
the criminal defense lawyers is justifiable" but not that of other lawyers)-and in a highly spe-
cific sense. See, eg., Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1150-51. Commentators such as David Wilkins
and Stanley Sporkin correctly perceive that the "universal" rules comprising the existing codes
of professional conduct are antithetical to the ideal of context-specific professional norms. Their
solution is the development of separate codes for lawyers serving in different roles. See, eg.,
Sporkin, supra note 294; Wilkins, supra note 22, at 1216; Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions Restate the
Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL Ermcs 903, 930 (1993).
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This is illustrated by the no-contact rule. Federal courts have deter-
mined that the appropriate standard of conduct governing contacts with rep-
resented persons should be more permissive for prosecutors than civil
litigators. While courts have applied the restriction to investigations prior to
the commencement of civil litigation,296 they have declined to apply it to
criminal investigations before formal charges are filed. 297 The no-contact
rule did not reflect these distinctions, however. If read to apply equivalently
in criminal and civil cases, as its language suggests, the no-contact rule would
either be unduly restrictive for prosecutors or unduly permissive for civil liti-
gators. This problem would have been avoided through the adoption of sep-
arate rules for criminal and civil cases. Federal judicial rulemaking will thus
afford an opportunity to craft rules that are more precise and better tailored
than bar association rules to particular courses of conduct in discrete
contexts.
Second, because of the objectivity of the federal judiciary, rules drafted
by the Judicial Conference and promulgated by the Supreme Court can be
expected to strike a fairer balance between competing considerations than
rules adopted by executive agencies or bar associations. 298 Certainly, these
rules will appear to be fairer, and therefore command greater respect from
lawyers to whom they apply. Bar association rules are perceived to privilege
the interests of lawyers over non-lawyers,299 of private lawyers and their cli-
Taking a different approach, bar organizations have sought to develop recommendations or
guidelines for how lawyers in specific settings should represent clients within the confines of the
generally applicable rules, as well as, in some instances, how those rules should be amended.
See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 238, Standard 3-1.1 to -6.2 (addressing the prosecution
function); id., Standard 4-1.1 to -8.6 (addressing the defense function); ACTEC Commentaries
on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 865, 866 (1994);
Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, in 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996); Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing
Older Clients, Recommendations of the Conference, in 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 989 (1994); Pro-
posed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29
FAM. L.Q. 375 (1995); see also GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 45.
296 See supra note 211.
297 See, e.g., United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir.) (holding that "DR 7-
104(A)(1)'s proscriptions do not attach during the investigative process before the initiation of
criminal proceedings"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 855 (1990); United States v. Dobbs, 711 F.2d 84, 86
(8th Cir. 1983) (holding that DR 7-104(A)(1) "does not require government investigatory agen-
cies to refrain from contact with a criminal suspect because he or she previously had retained
counsel"); United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.) (concluding that DR 7-
104(A)(1) was not intended to "stymie undercover investigations when the subject retained
counsel"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
298 See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND
WHAT TO Do ABotor IT 216-17 (1978) (recommending that a neutral body, such as the Judicial
Conference, draft professional rules to avoid professional self-interest inherent in bar association
rules).
299 See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 119 (1989) ("During the next sixty
years [after the adoption of the ABA Canons in 1908], much of what passed for professional self-
regulation actually was preoccupied with limitations on what lawyers could do to promote them-
selves."); Abel, supra note 146, at 686-87; Cramton & Udell, supra note 25, at 317 ("There is
strong evidence that lawyers when they regulate themselves are inclined to take positions that
favor the use of lawyers and enhance their authority and prestige."); Thomas D. Morgan, The
Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REv. 702, 704 (1977) (arguing that
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ents over the government, 30 0 and of corporate law firms and their clients over
small firms, solo practitioners, and individual clients.301 Conversely, adminis-
trative agency rules are perceived to privilege the interests of government
lawyers and the government, as the DOJ regulation illustrates.302
Fimally, detailed rulemaking affords the courts the most complete infor-
mation and most varied insights on which to base their determination of the
appropriate standard. The alternative of relying on bar association rules or,
for that matter, an independent set of general rules, would defer decision-
making to adjudication. As the Simels case illustrates, adjudication allows
inadequate opportunity to elicit and consider the insights of individuals and
institutions with diverse perspectives. 3°3
C. Clarity of Applicable Standards
The ABA has traditionally preferred to adopt rules of professional con-
duct that embody general principles, rather than precise rules that lend them-
selves to enforcement through professional discipline and decisions in
litigation.304 At first glance, this approach might seem antithetical to the or-
ganized bar's interest in maximizing its influence over the content of profes-
sional standards, because ambiguous rules shift responsibility to courts to
announce standards of conduct in adjudication. However, adjudication con-
"lawyers' ethics are consistently self-serving"); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEx. L. REv. 689, 692 (1981) (asserting that
professional codes "consistently resolved conflicts between professional and societal objectives
in favor of those doing the resolving").
300 See, e.g., Otis, supra note 119, at A13 (arguing that it is inappropriate to subject federal
prosecutors to state disciplinary sanctions because "state bars are dominated by private law-
yers-i.e., in criminal practice, by defense lawyers").
301 See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6
(1991) (noting that "more than eighty percent of the lawyers disciplined in California, Illinois,
and the District of Columbia were sole practioners, and none practiced in a firm with over seven
lawyers").
302 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing reaction to Thornburgh Mem-
orandum); supra part I.C.2 (discussing subjectivity of DOJ regulation).
303 See supra part II.B.1. Indeed, adjudication affords less opportunity to consider the dif-
ferent perspectives of federal judges themselves. In adjudication, only the views of the few fed-
eral judges involved in deciding the case are considered. Rulemaking, however, would allow for
input from any federal judge with expertise in an issue.
Comment from federal judges is especially important because, as the Simels court noted,
questions of professional conduct may implicate "important federal policy concerns." Grievance
Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1995). For example, as in Simels, questions arising in
criminal cases may implicate federal law enforcement interests. Similarly, questions arising in
class actions-e.g., whether class counsel may solicit potential class members, whether class
counsel may pay the expenses of litigation, or whether a former class counsel may represent class
members in opposition to a proposed settlement-implicate policies underlying Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23. And, questions arising in discrimination cases-e.g., whether "testers" may
pose as prospective tenants and secretly tape-record conversations with the landlord-implicate
interests underlying federal civil-rights law. Standards of professional conduct may also impli-
cate federal constitutional concerns, as in the cases of those standards governing out-of-court
speech, advertising and solicitation, and criticism of judges. Perhaps most importantly, profes-
sional standards-particularly those governing conduct during trial-may bear in the federal
courts' own interest in the fair administration of justice.
304 See supra note 146.
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cerning unclear rules is sporadic at best305 Thus, bar associations preserve
their influence over the continuing development of professional norms by
taking positions on issues of lawyer professional conduct through processes
other than rule drafting. A principal means of doing so is through the ap-
pointment of advisory committees such as the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Such committees issue nonauthorita-
tive opinions interpreting the ethical rules upon the request of lawyers who
seek guidance concerning their proposed conduct.3°6
More certain standards of professional conduct, whether established by
rule or judicial decision, are necessary for several reasons.307 From the per-
spective of effective regulation, precise standards of conduct are preferable
to vague ones, if only because lawyers are more likely to comply with the
appropriate standard if they know what it is. From the perspective of law-
yers' professional obligation to clients, clear standards of professional con-
duct are as important as clear rules of procedure, since violations of
professional standards may have procedural consequences in litigation.308 Fi-
nally, as the Simels court recognized, clarity is also preferable from the per-
spective of lawyers personally.309 When the standards are indeterminate,
lawyers may inadvertently engage in misconduct or, like Simels, engage in
proper conduct but nevertheless be put to the anxiety and expense of discipli-
nary proceedings.3 10
As Simels illustrates, it is folly to expect federal courts to give clear
meaning to imprecise rules by regularly interpreting them through adjudica-
tion.311 In this respect, rules of professional conduct have served very differ-
305 See infra notes 311-323 and accompanying text.
306 See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 2.6.6 (discussing ethics committee opinions).
For criticisms of bar association ethics opinions, see Jorge L. Carro, The Ethics Opinions of the
Bar: A Valuable Contribution or an Exercise in Futility?, 26 IND. L. REv. 1 (1992); Ted Fmman &
Theodore Schneyer, The Role of the Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Con-
duct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29
UCLA L. REv. 67 (1981); Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics and the Restatement Process-The
Sometimes-Uncomfortable Fit, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 13 (1993).
307 Some have argued, however, that the lack of specificity and clarity in the disciplinary
codes serves positive functions. For example, in addition to serving as a basis for disciplinary
enforcement, the codes encourage lawyers to engage in moral reflection. Rules that are too
precise leave no room for reflection. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NomnE
DAME L. REv. 223, 227-29, 240-43 (1993) (discussing the issues raised by substantive specificity
in drafting professional rules).
308 See supra note 148.
309 See Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 651 (2d Cir. 1995).
310 See Green, supra note 225, at 689-90 (arguing for greater clarity, particularly when law-
yer conduct approaches the lines of criminality); Coquillette Report, supra note 13, at 19 ("A
lawyer's ability to practice law is more than a matter of honor, it is a livelihood, and a sanction
that suspends that livelihood needs to be based on sufficient notice .... ).
In the past, the disciplinary authorities have generally refrained from bringing proceedings
based on conduct that is not clearly improper. See infra note 314 and accompanying text; see
also Green, supra note 6, at 553 (asserting that attorneys should not be punished for violating
ambiguous disciplinary provisions). In this respect, Simels is an exceptional case.
311 See Russell W. Damtoft, Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad vs. Narrow Pro-
scriptions, 65 IowA L. REv. 1386, 1413 (1980) (stating that interpretation of vague standards
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ently from federal rules of procedure and evidence, which are routinely
employed and interpreted by federal courts. Although federal courts may
interpret rules of professional conduct in the disciplinary context or as they
bear relevance in litigation, neither process is effective to develop authorita-
tive judicial interpretations of unclear professional rules.
The disciplinary process is ineffective, in part, because federal courts are
reluctant to invoke it.312 But even if federal courts were to fund and operate
a disciplinary mechanism comparable to those now overseen by state
courts,313 it is unlikely that the process would lead to the clarification of stan-
dards of professional conduct. Disciplinary proceedings have traditionally
been brought only in cases of egregious misconduct, not where there is bor-
derline conduct.314 And even then, disciplinary authorities have reserved
"lead[s] to a slowly developed, haphazardly organized, and frequently conflicting disciplinary
code").
312 With respect to federal prosecutors, it has been observed:
The public record suggests, however, that federal prosecutors are rarely, if ever,
referred to federal grievance committees. Indeed, federal district judges who are
concerned about possible wrongdoing by a federal prosecutor seem to be more
inclined to refer the prosecutor to a state disciplinary committee than to a discipli-
nary committee of the district court. There are various possible explanations for
this. First, federal courts have traditionally deferred to state licensing authorities to
oversee the professional conduct of lawyers. Second, the district court disciplinary
mechanisms tend to be ad hoe and unfunded, whereas the state court disciplinary
mechanisms are professionally staffed and funded by the state. Additionally, dis-
trict court discipline adds to the federal court's workload. For all these reasons,
district courts would tend to invoke the federal disciplinary processes only in excep-
tional cases and would view the state processes as the ordinary mechanism for deal-
ing with wrongdoing by federal litigators, including federal prosecutors.
Green, supra note 135, at 83-84 (citations omitted). These observations are true of federal liti-
gators in general.
313 Professor Mullinex urges the "creat[ion of] federal disciplinary committees within the
federal districts or circuits" as a superior alternative to addressing allegations of attorney mis-
conduct in the context of ongoing federal litigation. Mullenix, supra note 13, at 131. Setting
separate disciplinary mechanisms within each federal district or circuit would not remedy the
problem of inconsistent federal court interpretations of identical ethical rules, however. Each
federal court's disciplinary body would remain free to interpret the rules differently.
This problem of inconsistent judicial interpretations could be addressed by establishing a
single federal agency with disciplinary authority over practice in all federal courts or by allowing
the disciplinary decisions of separate agencies to be reviewed by a single federal court. This
Article takes the view, however, that the preferable road to uniformity is through the adoption
of far less ambiguous rules in the first place, because rulemaking is better than adjudication as a
means of determining the appropriate standard of conduct in an area of controversy or uncer-
tainty. See supra part III.B.
314 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 25, at 304 ("Disciplinary bodies have limited re-
sources, which leads them to concentrate on egregious and intentional professional violations
that harm the offender's client.... Disciplinary authorities are accustomed to leaving most issues
of lawyer conduct to other remedial settings.").
Few publicly reported disciplinary decisions involve uncertain applications of ethical stan-
dards. Those few tend to fall into one of three categories. First, there are a number of cases
involving lawyer advertising that raise interpretive or constitutional questions. See, e.g., Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (concluding that a state may not categorically pro-
hibit lawyers from soliciting business by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential
clients known to possess particular legal problems). Disciplinary counsels' willingness to pro-
ceed in such cases, notwithstanding a general reluctance to test unclear standards, may have any
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their resources for particular types of egregious wrongdoing, particularly
those implicating the interests of individual clients315 To some extent, for-
bearance by disciplinary authorities reflects an effort to allocate scarce re-
sources where most needed.316 But, it also reflects legitimate concern about
the unfairness of seeking sanctions when the applicable standard of conduct
is unclear-a concern shared by the DOJ in promulgating its recent regula-
tion317 and by the Simels court in seeking to draw a clear line.3 18
Federal litigation is ineffective as an alternative means of clarifying stan-
dards of professional conduct. Much of lawyers' out-of-court conduct never
becomes known to adversaries or the court, and thus never becomes an issue
in litigation. Broad areas of conduct subject to professional regulation, espe-
cially those that implicate exclusively the interests of the lawyer's client, will
rarely be raised in litigation.3 19 Further, because federal courts seek to re-
of several explanations: the highly visible nature of the lawyer's questionable conduct may pre-
cipitate public concern to which authorities may feel they must respond; the lawyer personally
may encourage disciplinary proceedings as a way of definitively resolving uncertainties about
whether the advertisement is proper; and disciplinary counsel may react to lawyer advertising
with a distaste carried over from the days when advertising and soliciting were the principal
bugaboos of the organized bar.
Second, disciplinary authorities seem more willing to proceed based on uncertain standards
in cases that involve other conduct that, like lawyer advertising, is highly visible, either because it
occurred in a well publicized litigation or because it was undertaken by a political figure or other
high profile personality. See, e.g., In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 829 (Mo.), cert denied, 502 U.S.
1009 (1991); Kunstler v. Galligan, 571 N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 587 N.E.2d 286
(N.Y. 1991). This exception to the general policy of restraint is attributable not only to the
authorities' perceived need to respond to public concern about visible wrongdoing, but also, at
least in some cases, to the political biases of those authorities.
Finally, disciplinary counsel seem more willing to allege that a lawyer has violated uncertain
standards in cases in which the lawyer has allegedly committed other, clear disciplinary infrac-
tions. See, e.g., In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15, 18 (N.J. 1974) (counseling potential witnesses to remain
silent constitutes "'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice' in violation of DR 1-
102(5)"). The "piling on" of allegations that may be challenged on interpretive grounds may
seem like "gilding the lily," but this approach makes sense for several reasons. First, the amount
of resources expended to present additional charges in disciplinary proceedings that will be com-
menced in any event are negligible in comparison to the amount of resources that would be
expended to present a case that proceeded exclusively on a questionable legal theory. Second, it
might be expected that a favorable interpretation is more likely to be obtained in a case in which
the lawyer's other, clearly wrongful conduct labels him a malefactor. Finally, if an unfavorable
interpretation is received in such a case, the prosecution as a whole may nevertheless be re-
garded as a victory, because the lawyer will have received a sanction on other grounds anyway.
315 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 25, at 305 n.41 ("Commentators report that even the
most egregious prosecutorial misconduct, in violation of professional rules, generally does not
result in disciplinary proceedings." (citing authority)); Green, supra note 135.
316 Cf. Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regula-
tion, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 917, 998 ("Disciplinary agencies apparently adopt a pattern of
resource allocation similar to that of prosecutors in the criminal justice system. Prior sanctions,
disciplinary or criminal, and multiple or sequential complaints are interpreted as an index of the
credibility of the complaint and of the seriousness of the alleged deviance.").
317 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
318 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
319 See Wilkins, supra note 146, at 815-16; Coquillette Study, supra note 32, at 5 (stating
that 16 categories of ethical rules were never addressed in published federal court decisions over
a 5 year period).
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solve litigation efficiently,32 they generally refuse to decide issues concerning
lawyer conduct that do not directly affect the rights of the parties to the liti-
gation.321 The no-contact rule is one of the few rules of professional conduct,
other than the conflict-of-interest rules,322 that courts address with any de-
gree of regularity. And, even so, as Simels illustrates, various questions con-
cerning the scope of the no-contact rule remain unresolved2 Consequently,
as a practical matter, the only way to establish clear standards of conduct is
through the adoption of clear, detailed rules of professional conduct.
D. Consistency
The major concern underlying Professor Coquillette's report to the Judi-
cial Conference is the "balkanization" of rules of professional conduct. 24 To
the extent possible, lawyers practicing within different states and federal dis-
tricts have an interest in consistency among rules of different jurisdictions.
One might argue, however, that this concern has been overstated. If lawyers
can adapt to different procedural and evidentiary rules in state and federal
court, they should be equally able to adapt to different professional stan-
dards. Some might respond that when lawyers undertake to represent a po-
tential litigant, they may not know where the case will be tried and therefore
320 See Wilkins, supra note 1, at 839 & n.168 (citing authority).
321 See, e.g., W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The business of
the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a general overseer of the ethics of those who
practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before it." (citation
omitted)); Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037, 1046 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(asserting "alleged ethical violations should be left to federal or state disciplinary machinery
unless the integrity of the judicial process is threatened"). See generally, Committee on Profes-
sional Responsibility, Suppressing Evidence Obtained in Violation of DR 7-104: If Hammad Is
Right, Is the Civil Law Wrong?, 48 REc. Ass'N B. CrrY N.Y. 431, 433 (1992) (citing W.T. Grant
Co. for the proposition that the courts should not "act as a general overseer of the ethics of those
who practice here unless the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before it"); Green,
supra note 6, at 540-41 n.195 (listing cases where courts have remarked on lawyers' conduct and
others where courts have left the matter for disciplinary committees); Leonard E. Gross, Sup-
pression of Evidence as a Remedy for Attorney Misconduct: Shall the Sins of the Attorney Be
Visited on the Client?, 54 ALB. L. REv. 437 (1990) (examining whether the exclusionary rule
might be applied to an attorney who engages in unethical misconduct during litigation); Amy R.
Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regu-
lation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL Emucs 473, 550-51 n.293 (1995) (listing
cases supporting the belief that disciplinary proceedings are best left to the state bar).
322 See Coquillette Study, supra note 32, at 4. Even the frequent litigation over disqualifi-
cation motions has not substantially clarified the conflict-of-interest rules. On the contrary, to a
large extent, litigation has fostered uncertainty because courts often apply a standard different
from the one embodied in the professional codes. See, e.g., In re American Airlines, Inc., 972
F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (disqualification motion is "'governed by the ethical rules
announced by the national profession in light of the public interest and the litigants' rights"')
(quoting In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262
(1993); Baird v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 771 F. Supp. 24, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing the "Chi-
nese Wall" exception to DR5-105(D)). See generally Burbank, supra note 21, at 975 (comment-
ing that standards of conduct vary depending upon an attorney's role); Richardson, supra note
13, at 167-73 (addressing the uncertain relationship between violations of ethics rules and mo-
tions to disqualify opposing counsel).
323 See supra part II.B.2.
324 See Coquillette Report, supra note 13, at 1-3.
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may not know which jurisdiction's rules of conduct apply. Compliance with
the wrong rules is not a significant problem from a disciplinary perspective,
because disciplinary authorities would rarely, if ever, commence proceedings
against a lawyer who complied with one of two arguably applicable sets of
professional standards. The more realistic concern is that a court will dis-
qualify the lawyer or suppress evidence based on a standard the lawyer could
not reasonably anticipate would be applicable at the time of the relevant
conduct.325
Focusing specifically on inconsistencies in federal court practice, Profes-
sor Coquillette initially offered the Judicial Conference two alternatives:
either apply the ABA Model Rules or some variant in all federal court pro-
ceedings or apply the particular rules of the state in which a given federal
district court sits. 326 Like much of the professional literature addressing the
problem of "balkanization"-that lawyers in different jurisdictions may be
subject to inconsistent ethical obligations-these recommendations exagger-
ate the extent to which the substance of ethical rules varies among jurisdic-
tions327 and overlook the greater extent to which "balkanization" results
from inconsistent interpretations of similarly worded rules. 328
325 For example, the no-contact rule has been interpreted in various ways in the context of
a civil litigator's communications with employees of an adversary corporation. See infra note
328. Before a civil suit is filed, a lawyer might communicate ex parte with an employee who is
outside the "control group," believing that the litigation will take place in a state in which such
communications are permitted. If the litigation later occurs in a jurisdiction with a more restric-
tive interpretation of the no-contact rule, the lawyer might face disqualification or other sanc-
tions. So far, however, reported decisions do not reflect that lawyers often face this problem.
326 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
327 Most jurisdictions' rules of ethics are identical in substance, if not in precise wording.
Occasionally, courts assume that an outcome turns on the choice of the applicable ethical rule,
see, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Island Kitchens, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 176, 179-80 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (discussing whether New York or Pennsylvania rules of professional conduct apply to a
motion to withdraw as counsel). It is unlikely, however, that the choice of rule would often be
outcome-determinative but for the fact that the rules of different jurisdictions have been inter-
preted differently and in ways that were not necessarily preordained by the rules themselves.
Nevertheless, commentators typically illustrate the problem of "balkanization" by identify-
ing the few ethical rules of different jurisdictions that are explicitly at odds with each other, such
as rules governing attorney-client confidentiality that in some states require the disclosure of a
client's intent to commit a fraud and in others forbid it. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 21, at 347
n.52. The ABA has likewise regarded "balkanization" principally as a problem of inconsistent
rules, rather than inconsistent interpretations. This is reflected, for example, in the language of
Model Rule 8.5 and accompanying commentary. Model Rule 8.5 is a choice-of-law provision
establishing which jurisdiction's rules will govern a lawyer's conduct. The commentary explains
that the rule addresses the problem that "[a] lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one
set of rules of professional conduct which impose different obligations." MODEL RuLES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 8.5 cmt. (1995).
328 Opinions issued by bar association ethics committees demonstrate the vast potential for
inconsistent interpretations. Ethics committees have taken differing approaches to questions
such as: (1) whether a lawyer may use privileged material inadvertently provided by one's ad-
versary, compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992) (lawyer who learns after reading privileged document that it was sent inadvertently must
return it) with District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995) (once read, inad-
vertently sent material may be used); (2) whether a lawyer must disclose that the client has
deliberately given a false answer in a deposition, compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987) (disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a crim-
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As the DOJ recognized in adopting its recent regulation, complete uni-
formity requires not only that a single set of rules be made applicable in all
inal or fraudulent act by the client) with Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm.,
Op. 95-3 (1995) (lawyer is not required to reveal client's perjury as long as lawyer does not
submit client's deposition to tribunal); and (3) whether a lawyer may secretly tape-record con-
versations with others. Compare Texas State Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 514 (1995)
(lawyer may not secretly record telephone conversation with others) with New York County
Lawyers' Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 696 (1993) (as a general rule, a lawyer may secretly
record his conversation with another).
This is best illustrated, however, by one of the normative problems for civil litigators that
has occasioned the most discussion in recent years-the question of how the no-contact rule
applies in a case in which the adversary is a corporation. Although the applicable rule adopted
in different jurisdictions is often indistinguishable in substance and precise wording, courts of
different jurisdictions have developed a range of inconsistent tests to determine which present
and former officers and employees of a corporation may or may not be contacted under this rule.
Judicial interpretations have included: (1) the rule categorically restricts ex parte communi-
cations with all former and present officers and employees of a corporate party, see Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D.N.J. 1990);
Cagguila v. Wyeth Lab. Inc., 127 F.R.D. 653, 654 (E.D. Pa. 1989); (2) the relevant "facts and
circumstances" must be weighed judicially to determine whether corporate counsel's presence at
an interview is necessary to ensure that the corporation receives effective representation, see
Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 18 (D. Mass. 1989); Mompoint v. Lotus Dev. Corp.,
110 F.R.D. 414,418 (D. Mass. 1986); (3) the rule restricts communications only with members of
the corporation's "control group"-top managers who make final decisions and top employees
on whose advice they rely, see Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., Inc., 471 N.E.2d
554, 560-61 (11. App. Ct. 1984); (4) the rule applies only to communications with "managing
speaking agents"--those with sufficient managerial authority to speak for and bind the corpora-
tion, see Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250,253 (D. Kan. 1988); Frey v. Department of
Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32,35-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Wright v. Group Health Hosp.,
691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984); and (5) the rule applies only to the corporation's "alter egos,"
which include officers and employees who can bind the corporation, whose acts or omissions are
imputed to the corporation, or who implement counsel's advice, see State v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
589 A.2d 180, 185 (N.J. Super. 1991); Nieseg v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035 (N.Y. 1990);
Strawser v. Exxon Co., 843 P.2d 613, 621 (Wyo. 1992). See generally John E. Iole & John D.
Goetz, Ethics of Procedure? A Discovery-Based Approach to Ex Parte Contacts with Former
Employees of a Corporate Adversary, 68 NoTRE DAm L. Rnv. 81 (1992) (arguing that ex parte
contacts with former employees are discovery problems, not ethics problems); Ernest F. Lidge
III, The Ethics of Communicating with an Organization's Employees: An Analysis of the Un-
workable "Hybrid" or "Multifactor" Managing-Speaking Agent, ABA, and Niesig Tests and a
Proposal for a "Supervisor" Standard, 45 ARK. L. REV. 801 (1993) (proposing that "supervisors,"
as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, should be the focus of the ex parte contacts
ban); Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J. Calfo, Ex Parte Contact with Employees and Former Em-
ployees of a Corporate Adversary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus. LAw. 1053 (1987) (recommending a
complete ban on ex parte contacts for current employees and some former high level employ-
ees); Felicia R. Reid, Comment, Ethical Limitations on Investigating Employment Discrimination
Claims: The Prohibition on Ex Parte Contact with a Defendant's Employees, 24 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 1243 (1991) (proposing a reconciliation between Model Rule 4.2s protective purposes and
a plaintiff's discovery needs).
The ambiguity of the no-contact rule has prompted not only inconsistent interpretations
among courts of different states and federal districts, but also inconsistent interpretations by
judges of a single district. Compare Lang v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 888 F. Supp. 1143
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (Fawsett, J.) (holding that ex parte communications with former employees of
adversary corporation were permissible under the no-contact rule subject to various protective
limitations) with Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla.
1992) (Kovachevich, J.) (forbidding ex parte contacts with former corporate employees), aff'd,
43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
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jurisdictions but also that these rules be interpreted authoritatively by a sin-
gle institution. That is why the DOJ retained authority to determine whether
a federal prosecutor had violated its regulation, rather than leaving enforce-
ment to the various federal district courts.329 To achieve a comparable con-
sistency of standards for lawyers in private practice would require Congress
not only to adopt rules of conduct for lawyers in both state and federal prac-
tice330 but also to establish a national enforcement mechanism.331 Neither
can be achieved by an executive agency or the federal judiciary alone, and
neither is a realistic, or particularly desirable, prospect.
To promote consistency, a set of detailed rules of conduct for federal
practitioners, revised on a regular basis to resolve conflicting judicial inter-
pretations, is superior to adopting the ABA Model Rules. In either case, one
set of rules will apply throughout the federal courts. The difference is that a
uniformly applicable set of detailed rules will leave less room for interpreta-
tion and therefore engender less inconsistent interpretation. Although fed-
eral court rules would be inconsistent with the rules applied in state courts,
the ABA Model Rules would be as well, although perhaps to a lesser extent.
The alternative that each federal court incorporate the rules of its state
would promote consistency between federal and state practice at the expense
of interdistrict practice. The benefit would be illusory, however. As previ-
ously demonstrated, the applicable standard of conduct is determined by ju-
dicial interpretation more than by the language of bar association rules.
Federal courts would continue to apply different standards of conduct be-
cause they refuse to be bound by state court interpretations in light of their
independent obligation to develop standards of conduct that reflect what at
times are unique federal interests.332
Moreover, it is far from certain that federal litigators have a greater need
for consistency between state and federal practice than among the federal
329 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
330 See generally Zacharias, supra note 21 (discussing the usefulness of a federal code of
professional responsibility).
331 See supra note 313; cf McMorrow, supra note 21, at 977 (noting the likelihood of con-
flicting federal court decisions applying FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
The Supreme Court cannot be relied on to resolve conflicting interpretations of professional
rules. The Court has discretion over its docket, and would likely be unwilling to accept more
than an occasional case involving the scope of lawyers' professional conduct.
Although the ABA might propose that its interpretation of ambiguous rules be authorita-
tive in order to achieve national uniformity, deference to the ABA as the ultimate arbiter of
professional standards would suffer from the same flaw as executive agency rulemaking, namely,
the subjectivity of the decisionmaker. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
332 See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640,645-46 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If a particular
interpretation of a state ethics rule is inconsistent with or antithetical to federal interests, a fed-
eral court interpreting that rule must do so in a way that balances the varying federal interests at
stake."); Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("The ethical stan-
dards by which federal courts measure an attorney's professional conduct are standards defined
by federal law."); Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 624 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("Federal law governs the conduct of attorneys in the federal courts."); County of Suffolk
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("A federal court is not
bound to enforce New York's view of what constitutes ethical professional conduct.").
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district courts3 33 Even if one favors federal-state consistency, the develop-
ment of detailed federal rules might prove preferable in the long run. The
adoption of a single set of rules for federal court practice would likely influ-
ence state courts in the development and interpretation of their own rules,334
thus fostering consistency on the state as well as federal level. The incorpora-
tion of state court rules would only perpetuate inconsistencies in the intra-
state standards of professional practice.
333 See Burbank, supra note 21, at 978 ("The federal courts can no longer afford to defer to
the states regarding the norms of professional conduct applicable in federal practice.").
This is a question on which there is a need for empirical research. If litigators are likely to
know that a case will be brought in federal court, but not which federal court, there is a stronger
argument for uniform federal rules. If, however, litigators are likely to know that a case will be
brought in a particular state, but not know whether it will be brought in state or federal court,
there is a stronger argument for incorporating the rules of each state.
Regardless of what such research showed, however, uniform federal rules of ethics may
better address the problem of balkanization. Consider two groups of federal litigators. The first
is comprised of those who practice exclusively within the state and federal courts of a single
state. The second is comprised of those-such as federal government lawyers and civil litigators
concentrating in the areas of federal antitrust, bankruptcy, and securities law-who practice in
federal court throughout the country. Uniform federal rules will slightly disadvantage the first
group by subjecting it to two sets of ethical rules, whereas the state-centered approach will se-
verely disadvantage the second, by subjecting it to fifty sets of ethical rules.
In any case, the two arguments that have been advanced most strenuously in favor of incor-
porating state rules of ethics have nothing to do with the need for consistent rules, much less for
appropriate and clear ones. The first argument is that this would be "a low-cost solution," be-
cause federal courts would be spared the effort of having to decide what standards of conduct
are most appropriate. See Uniform Ethics Rules, supra note 20, at 873. This argument over-
looks the cost of interpreting ambiguous rules in litigation, see infra Part III.E, as well as the
various interests that would be served by uniform federal rules of ethics.
The second argument is that uniform federal rules would be "inconsistent with the theory
and tradition of state regulation of lawyers." Uniform Ethics Rules, supra note 20, at 874. One
aspect of this argument is that if federal courts adopt uniform federal ethics rules, they may be
required to create an independent federal disciplinary mechanism. This seems unlikely, how-
ever. As they do now, federal courts may rely largely on state disciplinary authorities to address
improprieties occurring in federal court proceedings. It would be perfectly appropriate for state
disciplinary authorities to enforce federal rules of ethics, as they enforce other states' rules. The
ABA's model choice-of-law provision assumes that they will do so. See MODEL RuLES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CoNnucr Rule 8.5(b)(1) (1994) (stating that in cases involving misconduct in a judi-
cial proceeding, disciplinary authority of state in which lawyer is licensed will apply the rules of
the court before which the lawyer appeared).
The other aspect of this argument is that the states have an overriding interest in setting the
standard of conduct for the lawyers whom they license, even when those lawyers appear before
the courts of another jurisdiction. This might be true if the function of state ethical rules were
solely to codify standards of fitness to practice law-e.g., that lawyers should be law-abiding,
serve their clients competently, etc.-because licensing authorities clearly have an interest in
determining whether lawyers whom they license have engaged in conduct that reflects adversely
on a lawyer's fitness. For the most part, however, the ethical rules have nothing to do with
fitness to practice per se, but reflect policy decisions about how lawyers should relate to clients,
prospective clients, the court, and third parties. Many are indistinguishable from rules of proce-
dure. Conduct which is permissible under the ethical rules of one jurisdiction but not of another
will rarely, if ever, comprise conduct demonstrating one's lack of fitness to practice law.
334 Cf. McMorrow, supra note 21, at 976-77 (noting the potential leadership role of federal
courts in developing a "vision of [lawyer] competence").
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E. Efficiency
Until now, both state and federal courts have relied on bar association
rules in order to avoid the time and expense of developing their own, more
detailed rules. The experience over the past quarter century, since the adop-
tion of the ABA Model Code, shows that courts have simply shifted the bur-
den.335 Rather than adopting clear rules, courts interpret unclear rules in
adjudication.
Consider, for example, the alternative approaches to resolving questions
about whether lawyers may contact represented persons. This requires reso-
lution of questions on which there is considerable room for disagreement, as
illustrated by both the debate about prosecutorial conduct surrounding the
Thornburgh Memorandum and the DOJ regulation, and the disagreement
among district and appellate court judges about defense lawyers' conduct in
Simels. For the Judicial Conference to adopt a rule specifically answering
these questions with finality would require far more effort at the rulemaking
stage than simply adopting the ABA's no-contact rule, which in one variant
or another is presently in effect in every jurisdiction. Yet, the experience of
the DOJ demonstrates that the task is manageable. On the other hand, leav-
ing these questions open, as state and federal rules have done until now, re-
quires the courts of different jurisdictions to resolve these questions in
adjudication, if they are to be resolved at all. There is little reason to believe
that federal courts and practitioners have spared themselves expense by de-
ferring resolution of all the interpretative questions surrounding the no-con-
tact rule until they can be raised in disciplinary proceedings or litigation.
F. The Simplicity of Comprehensive Federal Rules
Based on his study of reported federal court decisions, Coquillette con-
cluded that "problems relating to attorney conduct have consumed a very
substantial amount of attention in federal courts in the last five years. '3 36
The comprehensive federal code of ethics proposed in this Article would ad-
dress this problem by reducing the amount of federal litigation devoted to
determining what standard of conduct is expected of federal litigators in a
given jurisdiction. At the same time, the proposed federal rules would make
the standards of professional conduct in federal litigation more appropriate,
more certain, and more consistent. Nonetheless, Professor Coquillette ques-
tioned the utility of the proposal upon presenting it to the committee of the
Judicial Conference. Perhaps tongue-in-cheek, he observed that it is debata-
ble whether "lawyers and law students who have had to learn at least two
other model systems" would benefit from having to learn a third set of
rules.3 37 In other words, Coquillette implies, life is simpler for lawyers under
the present regime. Coquillette's concern merits a response.
First, Coquillette's observation ignores the nature of the ABA models
and the complexities they generate. Coquillette misleadingly implies that all
a lawyer presently needs to "learn" are the ABA Model Rules and the ABA
335 See supra part III.C.
336 Coquillette Study, supra note 32, at 6.
337 Id. at 6 n.*.
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Model Code, because their provisions answer lawyers' questions about what
standards of conduct are appropriate in given situations. In reality, lawyers
and law students typically must seek answers, not in the ambiguous and
open-textured provisions of the ABA Model Rules and the ABA Model
Code, but in the several treatises, hundreds of articles, and thousands of eth-
ics opinions and judicial decisions that the ABA model provisions have
spawned. Further, with respect to many questions, no amount of research
will disclose an authoritative answer, because, as Coquillette's study demon-
strated, judicial decisions address a comparatively narrow range of conduct.
Second, Coquillette's observation ignores the nature of the comprehen-
sive federal rules that would be adopted as an alternative to the ABA models
and the comparative simplicity of determining how to conduct oneself under
such rules. Almost certainly, the drafters would take as their point of depar-
ture existing professional norms relevant to the conduct of federal litiga-
tion.338 They could be expected to codify standards of conduct as to which
there is no professional disagreement and seek to choose the most appropri-
ate standard where the professional literature reflects disagreement.
Although the final product may reject some of the choices made by the ABA
in areas of controversy, for the most part the federal rules would fill in the
broad outlines drawn by the ABA's work product, rather than relegating that
task to adjudication. Consequently, lawyers and law students would not have
to learn new standards of conduct where the existing standards are clear.
They would be afforded a set of rules whose meaning would, for the most
part, be consistent with the ABA models, although not with all the opinions
interpreting them. Further, the drafters would endeavor to make the re-
quired conduct apparent on the face of the rules, thereby reducing the need
for lawyers to seek guidance elsewhere.
Whether or not this third set of rules would be beneficial might be con-
sidered in light of what appears to be the favored alternative-a uniform
federal code of ethics incorporating the ABA Model Rules. While the uni-
form federal rules would be worded similarly, if not identically, to the rules of
most states, the rules themselves would give no clear guidance about the pro-
priety of a wide range of conduct. Courts would never have occasion to ad-
dress the propriety of much of that conduct, thus leaving the scope of some
rules perpetually uncertain. As to other conduct, the meaning of the rules, as
construed by different federal and state courts, would ultimately vary.
For example, every federal court and most state courts would apply
ABA Model Rule 4.2, the no-contact rule. From the face of this rule, a crimi-
nal defense lawyer could not determine whether it would be proper directly
338 For example, the drafters might begin with rules relating to the following subjects: (1)
advocacy in adjudication, see MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL Co rnucr Rules 3.1-3.8 (1994);
(2) relations with nonclients, see id. Rules 4.1-4.4; (3) conflicts of interest, see id. Rules 1.7-1.12;
(4) termination of the representation, see id. Rules 1.16; (5) accepting appointments by a tribunal
to represent a person, see id. Rule 6.2; (6) duties of confidentiality and disclosure, see id. Rules
1.6 & 8.3; and (7) proper conduct generally. See id. Rule 8.4. On the other hand, there would be
no need to address aspects of law practice that have essentially no relevance to federal litigation.
See, e.g., id. Rule 1.15 (safekeeping property); id. Rule 1.17 (sale of law practice); id. Rule 6.1
(voluntary pro bono service).
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to contact a represented government witness. To know the answer, the law-
yer would have to "learn" not only Model Rule 4.2, but also the relevant case
law of each jurisdiction, or, at the very least, of the jurisdictions in which he
practiced. The lawyer's research might disclose that the witness could be
contacted in a federal proceeding in the Second Circuit but not in a state
court proceeding in New Jersey, and that, in virtually all other jurisdictions,
the answer was in doubt, so that the lawyer would be proceeding at his peril.
By contrast, a comprehensive federal code of ethics would permit practi-
tioners in all federal districts to know from the face of the no-contact rule
whether they could contact represented witnesses in criminal cases. It is true
that a lawyer who practiced in both state and federal court would have to
"learn" not only this rule but also the possibly inconsistent or unresolved
standards of conduct applied in the state courts before which he appeared.
However, instead of being uncertain about what standard of conduct is re-
quired in federal and state courts alike, the lawyer would now be uncertain
only about the standard required in state courts. On balance, it seems obvi-
ous that a single set of rules that, on their face, prescribe the standard of
conduct for practitioners in all federal courts is far better for lawyers than the
alternative: a set of rules that are, in effect, a statement of general principles
whose meaning in any given jurisdiction must be sought in the case law, often
will be indeterminable even after diligent research, and, where determinable,
often will be inconsistent with the meaning ascribed in other jurisdictions.3 39
Conclusion
In the coming years, the Judicial Conference will face increasing pres-
sure to remedy the federal courts' application of different standards of pro-
fessional conduct. The Judicial Conference will be tempted to adopt rules
incorporating bar association rules of professional conduct; however, it would
be a mistake to do so, as becomes clear when rules of professional conduct
are examined in the context of how federal courts will interpret and enforce
them.
The bar association rules are vague and ambiguous. Until federal courts
clarify them in adjudication, federal practitioners remain uncertain about
whether particular conduct is appropriate. Federal courts, however, infre-
quently address issues of professional conduct in litigation, because they are
unwilling to serve as disciplinarians. Nor do federal courts employ a regular
disciplinary mechanism through which questions about borderline conduct
339 For some lawyers, the greater certainty to be afforded by a comprehensive federal code
of ethics may be a vice, not a virtue. As Professor Coquillette's study illustrated, much of the
conduct of federal litigators that implicates ethical rules rarely if ever comes to a court's atten-
tion. The ambiguities of the ABA rules are rarely resolved authoritatively. Consequently, law-
yers may interpret those rules in a manner beneficial to themselves or their clients without
concern that they will later be sanctioned for doing so. For these lawyers, the most recent option
presented by Professor Coquillette-namely, "adopting uniform national federal rules for attor-
ney conduct only in certain key areas" that are frequently addressed by federal courts, id. at 5-
6-may provide the best of both worlds. Ambiguity would be preserved with respect to conduct
that courts rarely address, while greater clarity would be provided with respect to conduct as to
which there is a risk of discipline.
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can be resolved. Even if such a mechanism were established, it would proba-
bly be reserved for cases of clear improprieties. Thus, bar association rules
would rarely be clarified by federal courts. Nor would state court or bar
association interpretations fill the void, since the meaning of any rules of con-
duct applied in federal courts will be a matter of federal law.
Moreover, when federal courts do address questions of professional con-
duct in adjudication, they are denied the opportunity to receive and consider
comments from individuals and institutions representing diverse interests, as
a rulemaker would. Consequently, courts in adjudication cannot be expected
to resolve uncertainties by adopting the most appropriate standard of con-
duct. Nor can federal courts be expected to interpret the rules consistently
with other federal or state courts. Thus, incorporating bar association rules is
a certain formula for perpetuating the "balkanization" of the standards of
conduct applicable to practitioners in different federal districts.
The only effective way to redress this problem is for a lawmaking institu-
tion to adopt a set of detailed rules to be applied in all federal proceedings.
An executive agency is the wrong institution, because it is a frequent party to
federal court proceedings and is therefore partisan. The federal judiciary is
capable of weighing relevant considerations objectively and is therefore the
appropriate institution. Through the judicial rulemaking process, the Judicial
Conference should develop detailed rules that clearly resolve particular ques-
tions lawyers confront in federal court practice. The standards of conduct
captured by such rules will be more appropriate than those developed in ad-
judication and command greater respect, because they will be the product of
broader perspectives and fuller consideration. They will be clearer than the
standards set by the bar association's rules as sporadically interpreted by fed-
eral courts. And, if regularly amended to resolve conflicting federal court
interpretations, federal rules of professional conduct would achieve a reason-
able degree of consistency among different federal courts. Finally, while em-
ploying the judicial rulemaking process would be burdensome in the short
run, it would spare courts the task of interpreting ambiguous rules.
As the Judicial Conference moves ahead to address problems concerning
the application of rules of professional conduct to federal court practitioners,
it should therefore employ the obvious solution: the development of an in-
dependent set of detailed rules of conduct for lawyers practicing in federal
court.
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